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ABSTRACT

THE EVENT OF REVOLUTION

By
Nathan Alan Eckstrand
December 2014

Dissertation supervised by Professor Fred Evans
This dissertation studies the question of how to conceive of revolution without
necessarily drawing any concepts from the state. When concepts, figures, or objects
drawn from the state are assumed to exist following a revolution, the ability of revolution
to radically change the state is constrained. This problem limits earlier theories of
revolution, such as social contract theory and Marxism, both of which present certain
parts of the state as unchangeable. Social contract theorists necessitate that certain
elements like the sovereign and the nature of the contract be preserved, while Marxism
maintains that the state must follow a trajectory that determines its evolution. A new
theory of revolution (called Dynamic Anarchism) is drawn from theorists who theorize
events (called ‘Evental thinkers’). It is claimed that revolutions should be seen as
separate from the world, and thus are incommensurable, unpredictable, and indiscernible
from the state. Outside the state revolutions are anomalies, but they present themselves
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within the state as catalytic change. Dynamic Anarchism adds to the discussion of events
and revolutions by developing notions of complexity, interconnectivity, and
interconnectivity to describe how revolutions function. The final chapter of the
dissertation consists of an application of the theory of Dynamic Anarchism to the
strategies and tactics used in the French and American Revolutions, by Guerrilla Warfare,
and in 20th Century American Black Radicalism. Lessons about the practicality of
Dynamic Anarchism are drawn from analyses and critiques of these revolutionary
movements.
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Who’s Afraid of Revolution?
The state or revolution: separating false friends
Revolution begins trivially yet ends with great consequence. A solitary suicide,1 perhaps
the right word in the right place,2 wake the masses from their slumber. Despair is replaced with
a hope for a better world characterized by freedom, justice, and equality, and the isolated and
depoliticized find a voice among people determined to act rather than be acted upon. A thousand
conversations held in a thousand sites converge into a manifesto which inspires a thousand
actions. The groundswell of discontent creates the potential for a new and better world, but can
degrade into a nightmare. Either way, it produces a shift to which militants,
counterrevolutionaries, and bystanders respond. ‘Join the revolution and fight for your freedom’,
one side says. ‘Oppose it for your own safety’, says the other. ‘But consider carefully’, say
both, ‘for a wrong decision could be deadly.’ Revolution is a tantalizing potential for the
oppressed, a perpetual danger for the elites, and, save for the brief moments when it captures
center stage, it hovers constantly at the margins of society.
Hope for transformation, breaking down the status quo, and building a new society from
the ground up are the sentiments at the barricades of revolution. In 2011, as the desire for
revolution entered the hearts of people worldwide, protestors declared their commitment to
spontaneity,3 “solidarity amongst the protesters,”4 “rebuilding society,”5 and the need for “no
1

I am thinking here of the Arab Spring and its beginning with the death of Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi via selfimmolation.
2
Here I am thinking of how Occupy Wall Street began with a call to action in Adbusters
3
“Headlines,” hosted by Amy Goodman, Democracy Now, Jan 14, 2011,
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/1/14/headlines
4
“Live from Cairo: Democracy Now!’s Sharif Abdel Kouddous and Anjali Kamat on Egypt’s ‘Farewell Friday,’”
hosted by Amy Goodman, Democracy Now, Feb 11, 2011,
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/2/11/live_from_cairo_sharif_abdel_kouddous
5
“’Occupy Wall Street’: Thousands March in NYC Financial District, Set Up Protest Encampment,” hosted by Amy
Goodman. Democracy Now, Sept 19, 2011,
www.democracynow.org/2011/9/19/occupy_wall_street_thousands_march_in
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more constraints.”6 They made militant demands for “democracy,”7 “civilian rule,”8 “transparent
government,”9 and the obstruction of the “one percent.”10 As the Arab Spring and Occupy flared
around the globe, the institutions and individuals they targeted clung tightly to their traditions,
lamenting the injustice of their circumstances and decrying the vitriol of the protestors. Elites
condemned the “bad actors”11 and speculated about what sinister reasons motivated the
demonstrators to “vilify…success”12.
Justified or not, these movements raise a question: how does revolution transform the
status quo? What transpired in Tarhir and Zucotti—before our very eyes yet still unseen—to
bring about the greatest protests of a generation? Why did the “shot heard ‘round the world” 13 at
Lexington and Concord catalyze a revolution when all the previously fired bullets did not? How
is it that the deaths of several hundred protestors in Tehran became more significant to the
Iranian people than the thousands killed in the decades leading up to Black Friday?
This dissertation arises from my realization that no theory conceives of revolution
without relying on the state, broadly defined as a consistent arrangement of concepts, subjects,
objects, and forces. Concepts of revolution have always been centered around concepts of the
6

“‘This is a Dream Come True’: Egyptians Celebrate in Cairo After Mubarak Resigns” hosted by Amy Goodman.
Democracy Now, Feb 14, 2011, http://www.democracynow.org/2011/2/14/this_is_a_dream_come_true
7
“Headlines,” hosted by Amy Goodman, Democracy Now, Jan 14, 2011,
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/1/14/headlines
8
“‘This is a Dream Come True’: Egyptians Celebrate in Cairo After Mubarak Resigns” hosted by Amy Goodman.
Democracy Now, Feb 14, 2011, http://www.democracynow.org/2011/2/14/this_is_a_dream_come_true
9
“‘Libya Has Reignited the Flame of Liberty in the Arab World’: Juan Cole, Khaled Mattawa on Uprising” Hosted
by Amy Goodman, Democracy Now, August 22, 2011,
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/8/22/libya_has_reignited_the_flame_of
10
“Inside Occupy Wall Street: A Tour of Activist Encampment at the Heart of Growing Protest” hosted by Amy
Goodman, Democracy Now, September 30, 2011,
http://www.democracynow.org/2011/9/30/inside_occupy_wall_st_a_tour
11
Mitt Romney, quoted in “Romney Says Occupy Wall Street Protests Are the ‘Wrong Way to Go’” by Amy
Mingham and Emily Friedman, ABC News, Oct 10, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/10/romneysays-occupy-wall-street-protests-are-the-wrong-way-to-go/
12
John Paulson, quoted in “Billionaire Tells Occupy Wall Street to Get Off His Lawn” by Shira Ovide, The Wall
Street Journal, October 11, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/10/11/billionaire-tells-occupy-wall-street-to-getoff-his-lawn/?mod=wsj_share_twitter
13
Emerson, Concord Hymn, retrieved from http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/175140 on February 2013
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state, while in political theory the attempt to understand the state has always preceded the
attempt to comprehend revolution. Using concepts, subjects, objects and forces that describe the
state to define revolution renders the concept of revolution a product of the state. Until
revolution is conceptually freed from that to which it is opposed, our attempts to use it to bring
about transformative change will only reproduce the constraints of power under the guise of
removing them. My goal is to separate revolution from the state—to study, analyze, and dissect
radical change in order to understand its possibilities, its dangers, and its ability to inform our
collective struggles.
A brief survey of the usual theories of revolution provides little in the way of satisfactory
explanations for the events of 2011. The protestors were not traditional proletarians—many
could even be classified as bourgeoises—nor did they aspire to seize the means of production.
They did not desire a social contract that would lead them out of their natural state and establish
a sovereign. Their target was not a repressive regime of signs, concepts, and structures; their
goal not the deconstruction of meaning for the freedom of indeterminacy. To this day, most
analyses of the events focus on the motivations and strategies of the protestors.
A model that explains the what, why, and how of revolution remains a mystery. For
every revolution in which a particular theory has currency there is another revolution which calls
that same theory into question. Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol point out that the conventional
causes for the Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions—the suffering produced by imperialism and
the capitalist exploitation of resources—fail to explain why other countries experiencing similar
or worse conditions did not revolt. They conclude “one need merely raise these questions in
order to see that the ‘misery breeds revolt’ hypothesis does not explain very much.”14 In his

14

Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol. “Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World” in Social
Revolutions in the Modern World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 260.

3

histiography of the French Revolution, Francois Furet vigorously denies that revolutionary
events were primarily motivated by successive attempts to embody the ‘people’s will.’
Analyzing only how the ruling classes upheld or betrayed the legitimate interests of the common
man ignores how revolution itself became its own telos. According to Furet,
That rationalization of the political dynamic of the French Revolution has one major
flaw, for in reifying revolutionary symbolism and in reducing political motivation to
social concerns, it makes ‘normal’ and obliterates what calls for explanation: the fact that
Revolution placed that symbolic system at the centre of political action. And that it was
that system rather than class interest, which, for a time at least, was decisive in the
struggle for power.15
As Hannah Arendt notes, those reading the American Revolution as the product of social
concerns and new technologies ignore the almost exclusive focus of the revolutionaries on the
proper form of government.16 Theories of revolution constantly struggle to find consistency in
the number and variety of revolutionary events. They apply concepts developed by early modern
political philosophers to communist revolutions, or read gender and racial uprisings through the
lens of the dialectic. Their inability to unlock the state and revolution concurrently with a
foundation that explains both has resulted in frustration. But as long as we hold that the state and
revolution are intrinsically connected, we cannot abandon standard revolutionary theories
without forfeiting the corresponding models of the states these theories are drawn from. If we do
not want political thought to collapse like a house of cards, we must question whether a theory of
revolution must rest upon a theory of the state. Perhaps a more fruitful avenue for exploration is
to examine revolution from the perspective of revolution, so as to let revolution speak. The point
of this project is to explore this possibility, and to see what utility it may offer.
Conventional theories of revolution are grounded in a specific understanding of the state.
When the state collapses, revolution arises parasitically, using what it can from the state’s
15
16

Francois Furet. Interpreting the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 51.
Hannah Arendt. On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), 58.
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framework for its own existence. The state itself disappears, but its cadaver remains, animated
by a revolutionary spirit until a new state forms to replace it. The revolutionary model described
in Hobbes’s Leviathan is simply the misuse of the structures with which a proper state is
composed. To desire a Grecian or Roman democracy is as “the biting of a mad Dogge” and
“wanteth nothing more than a strong monarch [yet] when they have him, they abhorre,”17 while
opposing the sovereign in an organized fashion is to “set up a Supremacy against the
Sovereignty” which afflicts the commonwealth with inconsistent commands.18 Hobbes argues
any violation of sovereign power—including revolution—is an intolerable appropriation of the
state. Likewise, Marx’s communist revolution consists of “the violent overthrow of the
bourgeoisie”19 and the “conquest of political power by the proletariat.”20 Reforms of extant
institutions like private property, the power of the nation-state, and labor are only possible
because the proletariat has acquired a new status as a “ruling class” in control of the same
“conditions of production”21 the bourgeoisie once managed. Marx’s communist revolution is, at
its heart, a simple exchange of leadership. The recognition of this danger leads Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri to say the use of nationalism by activists is a “perverse trick” that offers up
the revolution, “hands and feet bound, to the new bourgeoisie.”22 Foucault also recognizes this
danger when, in his debate with Maoists, he states that “the forms of state apparatus which
[revolutionaries] inherit from the bourgeois apparatus cannot in any way serve as a model for the
new forms of organization” as they carry a danger of repeating “the domination of the

17

Hobbes. Leviathan, (Middlesex; Penguin, 1968) 370.
Ibid., 370-71.
19
Marx and Engels. “Manifesto of the Communist Party”, in The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W Norton
and Company, 1978), 483.
20
Ibid., 484.
21
Ibid., 491.
22
Hardt and Negri. Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 133.
18
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bourgeoisie.”23 In sum, revolutions act in political models like surgical operations. The state is
broken apart, modified, and sewn back together. The result is an alteration of what was, but
every vital part of the model remains.
These conceptions of revolution misrepresent what revolution is capable of. If revolution
is drawn from the state, then it has meaning only in reference to the state, and its scope is limited
by the state. A government may be overthrown, or a set of laws or policies changed, but a state
will persist if fidelity to a certain perspective or set of practices remains. Without a change in its
foundation, the state will be reconstituted along similar lines over and over despite uprisings that
put different people in control. Howard Zinn’s work on the Founding Fathers shows how the
American Revolution, successful in defeating the British government, yet maintained the
legitimacy of “a government to protect [the rich’s] property” in which “rebellions could be
controlled.”24 Economic and social arrangements such as agricultural wage labor and slavery
were outside the purview of the American Revolution. The Founding Fathers intended for the
socio-economic order of the colonies to persist throughout the revolution.
The co-option of the American Revolution’s is an example of how concepts, forces, and
systems pulled from the state can reproduce oppression through successive governments.
Believing that something must persist throughout a revolution—for example, a socio-economic
system or a concept of human nature—hides the creative potential of revolution and replicates
the same order. We learn to see the end of a revolution as merely an altered version of the state
that was overthrown. The figure of the sovereign reappears (perhaps with a little less power and
the crown on another’s head), or production resumes with the workers in control. In either case,
23

Michel Foucault. “On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and
Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (Pantheon Books: New York, 1980), 27.
24
Howard Zinn, “The Spirit of Rebellion” in the Zinn Reader (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1997), 688.
Appeared originally in the July 4, 1975 Boston Globe under the title “The Brooklyn Bridge and the Spirit of the
Fourth.”
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the oppressive foundation remains. Subjugating revolution to rules, ends, or concepts drawn
from a state is to misunderstand the power of revolution, which is to rewrite the state from top to
bottom so that nothing necessarily persists. To say otherwise is to see revolution as part of what
is universal and eternal, as a function of the conceptual system which determines our world
rather than as an opening to radically new possibilities. It is to treat revolution as though it were
a tool wielded by an empowered sovereign and not a potential open to the disenfranchised many.
It is, in short, to turn revolution into the state.
If we are to understand revolution, we must learn concepts particular to it, not ideas
which force it into a predetermined or circumscribed shape. Revolution’s radicality, fecundity,
and creativity call for a particular thematization. To take the topic of revolutions seriously
means articulating a changing, productive, destabilizing force which resists incorporation into
any prescriptive framework. The theoretical and social importance of this analysis comes from
its ability to comprehend the agency that revolutions impart to the world. This agency is nonsubjectified as it is the product of the forces and processes that arise within revolution, and rather
than being pure stems from the particular manner in which each state is organized. A new
conception of revolution framed in this way will reveal new potentials for revolutionaries in both
theory and practice.

The dangers of misusing a revolution
Revolution, as a potential remedy to systems of exploitation and domination, lends itself
to utopian visions of future societies. And yet to treat revolution as panacea is dangerous. It
leads to flowery, romantic images of revolutions as festive,25 omnipresent,26 superhuman,27 and

25

Germaine Greer, The Female Eunuch, (Harper Perennial Modern Classics: New York, 1970) 353-372.
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immortal28—as though revolution is a one-stop shop for a picture perfect life. Revolution’s job
is not to produce utopia, for problems and issues will inevitably arise within the new states that
revolution creates. The aftermaths of the French and Cuban revolutions show how revolutionary
zeal can distract one from the vital work building a new society demands.29 The Arab Spring’s
success in overthrowing tyrants and Occupy’s victory in casting a harsh light on systems of
inequality triggered new struggles against these forces. Utopian visions can manifest themselves
through an obsession on previous triumphs and a desire to recreate the spirit of the past rather
than act in the here and now—a trait Wendy Brown calls “left melancholy.”30 As Rosalyn
Deutsche notes, following the 2003 invasion of Iraq leftist protestors idolized the anti-war
campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s to the point of “[foreclosing] possibilities of political change
in the present.”31 For its message to successfully pass from the streets into the homes and
institutions of society, revolution must follow an arduous process of organization, demonstration,
and advocacy.
Treating all revolutions as a priori evil is also flawed. By ignoring legitimate grievances
and portraying protestors as “growing mobs” engaging in “dangerous…class warfare”32 the
empowered can isolate revolutions from people sympathetic with their goals. Those who use it
26

Yevgeny Zamyatin, “On Literature, Revolution, Entropy, and Other Matters” in Soviet Heretic: Essays trans.
Mirra Ginsburg (University of Chicago Press; Chicago, 1974), 103-112.
27
Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (W.W. Norton and Co; New York, 1959), 57-74.
28
Fred Hampton, from the speech “You can kill a revolutionary, but you can never kill the revolution” on the album
Power to the People - The Black Panther Speeches (Fred Hampton, 2012)
29
Both the French and Cuban revolutions fell far short of the goals revolutionaries espoused. Human Rights Watch
claims that following Fidel Castro’s takeover he instituted a highly effective machinery of repression [Cuba’s
Repressive Machinery, Human Rights Watch, 1999], while Amnesty International charges the Cuban government
with carrying out 216 political executions between 1959 and 1987 [When the State Kills: the death penalty v. human
rights, Amnesty International Publications, 1989] (other estimates place the number significantly higher). The
French Revolution’s Reign of Terror led to the guillotining of at least 16,594 while another 40,000 were summarily
executed or died awaiting trial [Hugh Gough. The Terror in the French Revolution (Hampshore: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010), 77.].
30
Wendy Brown, “Resisting Left Melancholy” in boundary 2 26 no. 3 (1999): 20.
31
Rosalyn Deutsche, “Hiroshima After Iraq: A Study in Art and War” in October, no. 131 (2010): 3.
32
Eric Canter and Mitt Romney in http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/10/romney-says-occupy-wall-streetprotests-are-the-wrong-way-to-go/
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equate revolution with pandemonium, violence, and destruction, ignoring its ability to address
serious issues. States embody order and stability, despite the fact that they are responsible for
more pandemonium, violence, and destruction than any revolution has caused. Cuban and
Russian revolutionaries garnered much support from their violent attacks upon the state while
killing no more than several thousand enemy soldiers, while the nationalist fury of World War I
and imperialist hunger of Vietnam together led to the deaths of at least 18 million and the
decimation of the continents hosting them.33 Revolutions are dangerous, but the violence and
destruction associated with them does not necessarily inhibit, and in some cases advances, their
positive goals. Viewing revolution as destructive or as a cure-all does not reduce revolutions to
the state, but also does not provide it a rigorous philosophical articulation. As panacea or poison,
revolution is oversimplified and its powers distorted. Calls for revolution and protestations
against it, when poorly formulated, resemble romantic tales devoid of intellectual understanding.
Serious consequences come from circumscribing or oversimplifying the concept of
revolution. Establishing a new state that reflects the old stifles revolutionary sentiment and
exacerbates hostilities, as happened in the French Revolution when new rulers responded to the
revolution’s demands with another monarchical system. The numerous smaller rebellions that
compose the French Revolution happened because attempts to return to a feudal system failed. 34
Even if revolutionary passion isn’t further inflamed, assuming the return of a specific state can
generate a brutal program of state-formation, as happened in post-revolution Russia. The

33

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_and_anthropogenic_disasters_by_death_toll; http://www.warmemorial.net/Cuban-revolution-3.115; and
http://www.emersonkent.com/wars_and_battles_in_history/russian_revolution_of_1917.htm. It is important to note
that the several thousands who died in the Russian Revolution of 1917 does not include those killed in the Russian
Civil War following the revolution.
34
John Markcoff makes this point in his work, saying, in one example, “[Seigneurial rights] were a continual bone
of contention between rural communities who found the early enactments of the legislators to be thoroughly
inadequate and legislators faced with continuing rural turbulence.” (John Markoff, The Abolition of Feudalism:
Peasants, Lords, and Legislators in the French Revolution, Penn State University Press 1991, 3)
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transition to communism theorized by Lenin begins with armed workers replacing capitalists and
bureaucrats, but posits that many of the former state mechanisms should be available to the
workers for the purpose of controlling society, labor, and consumption.35 Taylorism, the study of
how management can optimize the productive capacity of a workplace, was imported wholesale
from the United States into Lenin’s Soviet Union. Using Taylorist maxims of scientific
management like “The work of every workman [must be] fully planned out by the management
at least one day in advance,” “maximum output, in place of restricted output,” and “the
development of each man to his greatest efficiency and prosperity,” 36 the Soviets (with Lenin’s
blessing) organized their factories and workers using the same techniques, practices, and means
of production, as the capitalists they opposed.37 Lenin’s opposition to Taylorism was
conditional; when it was attached to the capitalist system it stood for “man’s enslavement by the
machine,”38 but when organized by the Soviets it was “a necessary feature of [the] state.”39 The
Soviet appropriation of Taylorism is a prime example of how elements of a prior state remain
after a revolution, as Soviets only altered, but did not abolish, the factory.40 Lenin’s theory
forms the basis of Stalin’s post-revolutionary program, which takes as dogma that the state will
only wither away if violence and state power intensify for the purpose of crushing the ‘dying
classes.’41 By using a theory that prescribes vicious actions as necessary to reach the post-

35

Lenin, State and Revolution, Foreign Language Press (Peking 1970), 116.
The principles of Taylorism are laid out in Frederick Winslow Taylor’s The Principles of Scientific Management..
37
The appropriation of Taylor’s system by the Soviets is detailed in Thomas Hughes, American Genesis: A Century
of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, 1870-1970 (University of Chicago Press; Chicago, 1989), 255-261.
38
Lenin, “The Taylor System—Man’s Enslavement by the Machine” in Collected Works (Progress Publishers,
1972, Moscow, Volume 20), 152-154. Trans. Bernard Isaacs and Joe Fineberg. Retrieved from Marxists Internet
Archive July 11, 2013.
39
Daniel A. Wren and Arthur G. Bedeian, “The Taylorization of Lenin:rhetoric or reality?” International Journal of
Social Economics 31, no. 3 (2004): 287-288.
40
Lenin, State and Revolution, 121.
41
Stalin, Marxists.org, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1933/01/07.htm
36
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revolutionary world, Stalin’s mass executions,42 his brutal Gulag archipelago,43 and his treatment
of traitors and capitalists “with an iron hand” 44 became affirmations of success.
Analyzing revolution as internal to a state has serious implications for philosophy, as it
invests revolution with necessity or a shape that restricts what revolution can achieve. Karl
Marx’s revolution is immanent to a specific material world and because of this follows a path to
actualize a communist society. This interpretation is not speculative, but is a real movement
which “results from the premises now in existence.”45 The new state is drawn from the old;
revolution only acts as the intermediary, with its beginning, middle, and end already decided.
Hannah Arendt, too, sees revolutions as immanent, but her revolutions are intrinsic to the world
formed when people come together in a community. Revolutions result from action that “can be
accomplished only by some joint effort”46 and have as their end “the foundation of freedom.”47
Any revolution that alters the premise of human plurality obliterates the phenomenon that
produces it. Revolution’s purpose is determined by the world from which it comes. For Marx
and Arendt, concepts of the state—conceived of here as a definite and immanent world—drive
revolution, plotting its course and all the stops along the way. Revolution is only along for the
ride.
What is needed in revolutionary theory is a model of exceptionality, inasmuch as
revolution should be contrasted with the rule of law sponsored by the state. If the state always
indicates an order and circumscribes change, then to theorize what is apart from it requires

42

Stalin executed nearly 700,000 people executed between 1937-1938. Barry McLoughlin “Mass Operations of the
NKVD, 1937-1938: A Survey” in McLoughlin, Barry and McDermott, Kevin, ed. Stalin's Terror: High Politics and
Mass Repression in the Soviet Union. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 141.
43
The Gulag had a 14-hour workdays and overcrowded, underheated barracks. Excerpted from the memoirs of
Jacques Rossi, found at gulaghistory.org.
44
Stalin, Marxists.org, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/x01/ch11.htm#4.
45
Marx, “German Ideology”, Marx-Engels Reader (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), 162.
46
Arendt, On Revolution (Penguin Classics, New York, 1963) 165.
47
Ibid., 135.
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understanding the chaotic and disordered. Revolution must uncover what happens when the
rules of the state cease to function. Understanding change as a difference between two stable
forms or as movement governed by laws, forces, or predictable cycles must be replaced by a
concept of unconditioned change whereby any limits to change can themselves be changed.
Change must be an agent or a motive, not a result of interacting forces and beings. Several fields
have formulated models of how change operates when a central buttress of traditional systems is
removed. Set Theory demonstrates how systems fall into paradox without axioms that define
what is part of a set.48 Chaos Theory questions whether systems can predict the future without
comprehending the present and studies the vastly different outcomes that can result from minor
changes.49 In other words, the utility of traditional systems is limited by their assumptions and
the available data, leading contemporary theorists to study how manipulating assumptions or
data alters how a system functions. Yet these new studies do not free change, but only swap one
set of laws, forces, and predictable cycles for another. They provide a view of how change
operates under specific conditions, not of change as a motive. A study of exceptionality must
focus on understanding change without reintroducing limits. In philosophical terms, it is
necessary to find the borders of fields like ontology and metaphysics, where states begin and
end. This is different from seeking where one ontology replaces another or where one
metaphysical system becomes another, as such exchanges happen only within the confines of
another state. We must seek the frontier of all states and systems, for only at this point can we
contemplate a truly independent revolution.
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Modeling Revolution 1: Deviating from the norm
If we can encounter revolution without the state and without depicting revolution as
universally good or evil, what concept of it appears? What are the potential and dangers of
revolution? What relation can it have to the state? The answers require a bipartite model that
sees revolution from several angles, relating it to the state without reducing it the state. I call this
model Dynamic Anarchism; “Dynamic” to emphasize that the model does not refer to a constant
situation—a status quo—but to movement and creation, and “Anarchism” because the model
purposefully avoids dependence upon the state.
To separate revolution from the state implies several things:


revolution has no definitive arrangement, design, or organization



revolution cannot be anticipated (no one can know of its coming)



revolution cannot be determined (it is impossible to chart its path or manufacture its end)

Revolution is an anomaly in that it is entirely apart from the state, exempt from the status quo,
and a deviation from the natural order. The state’s supposed consistency and ubiquity is
inapplicable to revolution, for within a revolution the characteristics of the state we reflexively
assume in our day to day lives move into a state of flux. Even to describe revolutions as pure
potentiality, contingency, or creativity are inadequate as each carries a functional relationship to
its opposite—potentiality to actuality, contingency to necessity, creativity to constancy—and in
doing so brings with it an element of normalcy. Revolution abstracts itself from the oppositional
terms potentiality/actuality, contingency/necessity, and creativity/constancy. To the degree that
these characteristics are applicable to revolution, they must have a meaning different than the
one they have in relation to the state. The exceptionality of revolution necessitates that even the
category of Being cannot be applied to revolution. Since what counts as a Being is determined
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by the state, then inasmuch as revolution escapes the state its ontology is unknowable. If we are
to grasp revolution as more than a function of a political system, we must hold that no codes
(e.g., revolution reverts back to the state of nature), no purposes (e.g., revolution overthrows the
elites of the dominant class), and no methods (e.g., revolution undermines established meanings)
belong to it.
As anomaly, revolution has three primary characteristics. First, because revolution
cannot be arranged it is incommensurable—it does not fit with what is around it, temporally,
spatially, or otherwise. No common measure exists between it and the state, and the state
provides no tools with which to build one. There is no definite where, no exact when, no
specific what to revolution, yet its very absence is its where, when, and what. From the
perspective of the state, its precise spatial, temporal, and descriptive coordinates are somewhere,
some when, and something. Its presence is its inarticulability, its incapability of being
delineated. The state cannot structure, fix, or organize revolution, and any attempt to do so
further inflames revolution or extinguishes it entirely. It is impossible for the state to be the
vanguard of revolution, for it is the lack of the state, the indeterminacy of revolution’s where,
when, and what, that marks it.
Second, because revolution cannot be anticipated it is unpredictable. It follows no
determinate path, no causal or dialectical chain, that tells us to expect its arrival or permits us to
plot a course to the other side. Because it does not behave according to the laws of the nonrevolutionary world, its appearance is erratic and its effects are unknowable in advance.
Conditions that brought about a revolution at one place and time will not necessarily do so again,
nor does producing another revolution guarantee the same outcome. Strategies and tactics used
to understand or anticipate events in the state are destined to fail in comprehending revolution,
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for the unpredictability of revolution applies not just to its presentation but to its
comprehensibility.
Finally, because revolution cannot be determined it is indiscernible. Our very attempt to
chart a path for it is an attempt to control it. Whatever understanding of revolution comes out of
this project cannot reduce it to a handful of determinate steps or conceptualize it in such a way
that its anomalistic character is erased. Revolution resists all attempts to synthesize it with the
world we encounter, so it is impossible to be truly faithful to revolution. Fidelity requires being
able to see some essence or promise within revolution that compels one to action. Similarly,
developing a program for revolution implies the ability to chart a path between it and the state.
Yet within the anomaly of revolution no such path or promise exists. The fidelity that is often
claimed by revolutionaries is more accurately a fidelity to the appearance of revolution in the
state. Although revolution must be held apart from the state to be truly revolutionary, it must be
able to be made manifest for revolution’s possibilities to come to fruition.
It is important to note that revolution does not form a binary opposition to the state. This
preserves revolution’s independence insofar as binaries carry a logic and an order from which
revolution must exempt itself. Jacques Derrida describes this well, saying “an opposition of
metaphysical concepts (e.g. speech/writing, presence/absence, etc.) is never the confrontation of
two terms, but a hierarchy and order of subordination.”50 Signs, as Derrida demonstrates, do not
have intrinsic meaning, nor do they receive it by allusion to an external referent. They gain their
meaning through the play of differences between them and the signs surrounding them51—
especially those with which they share a direct opposition.52 However, this logic cannot apply to
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revolution, for unlike the hierarchical oppositions and networks of significations Derrida
describes, revolution is not encountered on the same strata as the state. The relationship between
revolution and the state is one of exception, not opposition. Revolution is beyond the state, but
not necessarily against the state; it is non-state without being anti-state. Were the latter true, the
path of revolution would be easier to chart because revolution would consist of a contradiction to
the state. Revolution’s coordinates would be nowhere, no when, and nothing rather somewhere,
some when, and some thing. If it were anti-state, revolution would be the opposite of what is
counted and measured within the state.
To avoid a dualism between the state and revolution, and the host of problems that would
accompany such a division, it must be the case that the two do not have a stable, consistent
relationship. Revolution cannot be in relationship to the state, even as a negation of the state,
because its nature as exception extracts it from any bond; instead, their association is unclear,
hazy, and ambiguous. Revolution appears to move away from the state in an endless number of
directions, with no one direction being definitive. The purpose of revolution lacks definition
because there are many possible ends without any particular one being more authentic. Because
revolution removes itself from the logic of the state, it should it should be understood as lacking
any definitive label or designation. The anomaly of revolution can be seen from the state only
obliquely and indirectly.

Modeling Revolution 2: Changing the changes in the world
The definition of revolution must include a discussion of revolution as it is encountered
in the state. How is it that revolution is able to affect the state, causing changes that are rightly
celebrated—or justly condemned—from the USA to China? Defining revolution as anomaly
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captures its separation from the state, but it also appears in the world. In doing so revolution and
the state become associated, though the connection is not one of mechanistic causality or
teleological determination. Rather, revolution appears in the state as a catalytic change, a
change that changes the changes within the world. Every variation of the state describes a range
of means by which change is introduced in the world. Thomas Hobbes delineates a series of
affects which alter both the moods of individuals and the orderliness of states. Michel Foucault
describes how alterations in the power relations that create subjects lead to new practices for
tracking mental health or discussing sexual behavior. The result of naming such changes is that
the state is able to “reestablish ideologies of command and authority”53 by hiding the possibility
for other changes. It sets up a “transcendent power”54 that colonizes the “plane of
immanence.”55
As a catalytic change revolution undoes and redoes changes by modifying or removing
them and in the process replacing them with others. It speeds up and slows down processes in
the state, dissolving the old and producing new mechanisms for change. It restructures not just
the things in the state but the state itself. Revolution is not just an intensification of existing
forces or the quickening of the rate at which society’s possibilities are produced, for the changes
of revolution are qualitatively different from the changes of the state. To say otherwise ignores
the radical creativity of revolution.
Some of the traits unattributable to revolution (such as establishment of a legitimate
sovereign) may appear to be true of revolution when seen from the perspective of the state. In
applying itself to extant forces and values, revolution seems to operate with a program.
Nevertheless, revolution is not expressing a determinate character when it acts as catalytic
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change. Rather, it is applying its destruction and creativity to the status quo. One way to
conceive of this incursion of revolution into the state is to think of it as undoing the specific
“world horizon” that is furnished to us by a state. According to Merleau-Ponty, a world horizon
is a context or unity in which novel phenomena appear. This “horizon of all horizons” 56 is open,
incomplete, and allows for many different appearances; at the same time, however, it emphasizes
convergence instead of radical difference and sees all potential changes as latent possibilities
within the horizon itself. Revolution does not operate with a world horizon itself, but is able,
from the perspective of the state, to completely rewrite and add on to any extant world horizon.
If the rewritten world horizon spreads enough that it becomes widely accepted as the norm, it
will ultimately become a new state to replace the old. As catalytic change, revolution associates
with the state, is of the state, but is not subjugated to the state. It maintains its independence and
irreducible novelty.
This ultimately leads to a possibly contentious claim, but one supported by my analysis,
which is that revolution can create ex nihilo. To grasp revolution’s potential implies that
revolution does not simply rearrange the material within the state or produce new beings using
the substance of old ones according to natural laws. It produces what was literally not a
possibility prior to it, or what was inconceivable before its advent. This is different from saying
that revolutions produce possibilities that were conceivable but not actualizable, or that they can
bring about what before was only a dream. It means that they can bring about what was neither a
logical possibility nor an actuality, they can create what was neither a dream nor a reality.
Revolution shifts the terrain of existence rather than redrawing its boundaries. In doing
so, it creates new impossibilities and new dreams alongside new realities. This is not to say that
God-like revolutions create entire worlds down to the smallest detail, but they do create the
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outlines of worlds out of nothingness that in turn produce people, objects, and forces in
fundamentally new ways. Revolution creates states ex nihilo using new methods for the
articulation and arrangement of such things in the world, creating beings out of each state’s
unique framework. My claim is that outside the framework for a particular world there is
nothing, or nonbeing, the nature of which we necessarily must grapple with. Beings are
conditioned by their state, revolutions yield the particular conditions of a state, and outside of
that there is nothingness.
Although it is possible to posit in simple terms the ex nihilo creation of revolution, a
bipartite answer is needed to identify that to which ex nihilo creation is applied. One cannot say
that revolution operates only on the state without bringing revolution back to the state—this time
by limiting revolution to reorganizing what was already there. Yet it is also impossible to say
revolution operates on nothing without raising the question of how revolution is able to affect the
state. Revolution can connect to the state without limiting it to that domain if we draw a
distinction between the operations of revolution qua anomaly and revolution qua catalytic
change. As anomaly, revolution is defined by creativity, and not attached to the state in any
necessary way. What it operates on is unclear and inexact, and any impact it has on the state is
encountered indirectly. But as catalytic change revolution operates directly on the state, and
possibly all the changes, forces, and systems within it. It creates ex nihilo, but that creation is
only measurable from and in relation to the state it operates on. Revolution manipulates the
state, but it also extends into a beyond that from the state’s perspective is unclear and indefinite.
What at first glance seems to be lacking in this model is a place for thoughtful political
action. It seems there is little to be done if revolution can rewrite the world from the outside in
one, sweeping manner. But withdrawing revolution from the state does not mean radical change
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is wholly beyond our control. Though such a view is perhaps a necessary consequence of
situating revolution outside the state (where nothing can control of dominate it), revolutionaries
can play a role in channeling the flow of radical change. The direct control revolutionaries have
in other models of revolution is replaced in Dynamic Anarchism with an ability to shape the
manner in which revolution occurs (even as they are shaped by it). One must be attentive to
participate in revolution effectively, for by ignoring a revolution’s currents and holding
dogmatically to a prescription for change one becomes blind to the many possibilities revolution
offers. This is why specific demands are anathema to revolution, for you cannot demand in
advance what you are unaware of, and to create demands using concepts or institutions drawn
from the prior state lays the ground for the return of that state after the revolution. The May 68
slogan of “Demand the Impossible!” better captures the openness found in revolution, though
even that can be interpreted as a nebulous antipathy towards the state rather than as a call for
constant attention, activity, and critique. Demands, if there are to be any, must be open to
change without endangering the transformation sought within the state.
Revolutionary action takes place in a world of incomplete and inaccurate information, so
while demands can (and often are) given prior to revolution, there is no guarantee that they will
be relevant or useful following it. If, on the one hand, revolution cannot be controlled, yet, on
the other, we are not destined to be like Hegel’s Owl of Minerva, coming “always comes too
late”57 to do anything but describe what has already been, what can revolutionaries achieve?
First, activism and protest spread revolution’s message. And although revolution is not tethered
to anything in the world nor motivated solely through subjective affectations, rebels play an
important role in increasing or augmenting the scope and impact of revolution’s catalytic
changes. The broad range of tools within a revolutionary’s belt affect how the revolution is seen
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and taken up, and whether revolution will renew itself or taper out. The most effective
revolutions are those that cascade from place to place, revitalizing themselves each and every
time they reaches a new population or area. Revolutions do not need leaders to form their
message, but participants to sustain and extend their impact.

Discovering the outside of time
The exceptionality of revolutions implies that there is no simple temporal or spatial
description of revolution. A complete account of revolutions demands an account of how
revolution—both as anomaly and catalytic change—relates to temporality and, to a lesser extent,
spatiality. Some theories address this issue by portraying events as instantaneous. Events are
not part of a situation but follow a logic of their own, and because they operate as an exception to
the norm they are singular in nature. To characterize events as temporal is to include them
within the situation, since temporal language drawn from the situation carries with it an ontology
that events resist. But instantaneous events except themselves from a situation’s temporality and
retain their singular integrity. Events can prescribe a new understanding of time, yet they
themselves lack a temporal structure. To avoid presenting events as part of a particular state of
affairs, or undermining the deep-seated shift that events supposedly produce, theorists of events
avoid describing events in the same terms as situations. Such a concern is entirely warranted, but
nevertheless does not necessitate seeing events as instantaneous.
The bipartite model of revolution I propose exempts revolution, in the mode of anomaly,
from a situation’s temporality, but, in the mode of catalytic change, allows the revolution to be
described—though not perfectly captured—using temporal terminology. Revolution’s
appearance in the world entails that it provisionally acquires a temporality, though there is no
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guarantee that the temporality will hold. This does not mean that revolutions are eternal, for the
same reason that exempting revolutions from the world does not make them nothing.
Designating revolutions as eternal implies normativity inasmuch as infinite time is logically
opposed to sequential or unfolding time (compelling revolutions to obey the logic that
accompanies binary oppositions). To claim events are eternal does not avoid their encapsulation
in a world, it just avoids their encapsulation in our world by placing them in another. Events0
should be seen as a-temporal in the sense of having no designated temporality and thus being
outside of time altogether. The encounter with the temporality of revolution is an encounter with
the absence of time inasmuch as time, in such a context, is indeterminate and unnamable.
Nevertheless, the encounter of revolution from inside the world takes place within a temporal
structure, and as such it is possible to say that the experience of revolution is one which can be
designated temporally.
The temporality of revolution as it is experienced has elements of both itself and the
world it mixes with, but properly belongs to neither. It results partially from what revolution
introduces into the world, and partially from what was already in the world. As anomalies
revolutions are a-temporal, but seen from within the state they can be instantaneous or seemingly
without end. Similarly, revolutions are not localized within the state, but can appear to be so.
They do not originate from a specific place, and cannot be reduced to a set of spatial coordinates,
as they except themselves from the state’s spatiality. Specific settings may play a symbolic role
in revolutions, but this does not mean that they limit, cause, or determine anything. Squares,
parks, and streets are a vehicle for the expression of revolution. But like temporal designations,
locations within the state can change, and any attempt to situate revolutions within the world will
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not capture them perfectly either. It is only possible to conditionally localize revolutions in
terms of their origin and effects on the state.

The pathway to a new theory of revolution
The Dynamic Anarchism model of revolution takes its cue in part from contemporary
theorists who have begun the process of thinking through the structure of events. The most
salient question concerns the nature of an event—what is its fundamental being, how does it
appear, and to what degree can we know or experience it? To answer these questions requires
knowing how events relate to the world, and how they exempt themselves from its otherwise
smooth functioning.
Before venturing into the contemporary discussion of events, it is necessary to
demonstrate the importance of disconnecting revolution from the state by revealing how theories
of revolution that fail to do so cannot capture the exceptionality of revolution. To that end, I will
begin my investigation by critiquing two schools of thought that make this mistake, Social
Contract theory and Marxism. Social Contract theory, the first unified school of thought to
isolate revolution and treat it separately from war or civil unrest, believes that the rational study
of politics reveals an how to build a government which obeys natural laws and respects
individual rights. It sees the role of revolutions as the overthrow of unjust institutions. Social
contract theory’s strategy of measuring the state against ideals of freedom and justice provides an
important tool for critiquing the state’s existence. But, with the exception of concepts like
sovereignty and the state, as well as John Locke’s innovative uses of concepts like ‘people’ and
‘power’, it offers very little for a comprehensive analysis of revolution. Most social contract
theorists spend little time discussing the stages of revolution, environments in which they occur,

23

specific tactics employed by revolutionaries, connections to economics or other fields, or figures
that appear in it.
Marxism, the most well developed strain of thought in revolutionary theory, claims that
the modern society inevitably develops in due course as the result of material processes working
out the contradictions they form. Under Marx’s historically driven understanding of society,
revolution is a product of historical forces like poverty, alienation, property, and the desire for
wealth. No longer is it just a corrective, for Marx says past revolutionary developments have led
to negative as well as positive results. Ultimately, revolution will teleologically resolve all the
contradictions in society, bringing humans back to their true species being and destroying
society’s artificial institutions. Marxism undermines many of Social Contract theory’s illusions
Social Contract, but does so through the development of a materialist state organized around
permanent processes, actions, and needs. Some of Marx’s faults are corrected by later iterations
of Marxism, though none fully escapes the inscription of revolution into a predetermined world
and subjugation of it to a telos or program. I will focus on three variations on Marxist thought:
(1) the Communism of Lenin, Trotsky, and Mao, (2) Benjamin and the Critical Theorists, and (3)
post-war French Marxism, which can be subdivided into the structuralism of Althusser and the
humanism of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.
My own theory will be revealed through a detailed comparison with important evental
theories that specifies which concepts are adaptable to the study of revolution. Theorists like
Badiou, Kuhn, Foucault, and Deleuze will be examined in light of their additions to both evental
and revolutionary theory. Their transposing of transcendental structures into immanent ones
helps us think about how states can be rewritten. In addition, they emphasize how figures,
subjects, and objects are the result of accidents, pre-subjective processes, and discursive
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formations. Particularly anathema to these thinkers are schematic expressions of revolutions
which accentuate figures, stages, and agency in an attempt to prescribe a revolutionary formula.
Instead, they emphasize differences, productive forces, multitudes, and powers. The resulting
focus on newness leads them to examine revolution’s creative potentials. Revolution plays an
important role throughout the political philosophy of evental theorists, although thus far it has
been connected to the methodologies with which these thinkers work.
After laying out the theory of Dynamic Anarchism, this investigation will shift from a
study of the form of revolution to its practice in order to show the relationship of Dynamic
Anarchism to the strategy of revolutionaries. I will concern myself primarily with writers who
develop tactics and strategies for revolution. In order to provide a comprehensive analysis in
both depth and breadth I will closely examine three considerably different schools of thought: the
tactics of the French and American revolutions, guerrilla warfare, and black radicalism
(particularly that of twentieth century America). Particular attention will be paid to canonical
figures like Tom Paine, Maximilien de Robespierre, Che Guevara, Mao Tse-Tung, W.E.B.
DuBois, and Malcolm X. Such figures, while perhaps ascribing to a political doctrine, are more
concerned with practical actions and organizing. Their chief concern is whether or not their
tactics will be effective while still reducing harm. Because notions of human rights, justice, and
equality motivate these thinkers they are not pure pragmatists who see no limits on what
revolutionaries can justifiably do. But because of the practical nature of their beliefs their
thought cannot be reduced to any of the earlier theories. Instead, they use theory as a tool—one
among many—for the achievement of their goal.
At the end of this theoretical trajectory, it will clear that revolutions themselves are in
need of a revolution. Great strides have been made by studying how society experiences
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revolution, developing tactics and strategies to master it, and avoiding the various pitfalls of
revolutions can fall into. But over time the space set aside for revolution has been strewn with
the detritus of other theories and leftovers from fetishists of revolution. To unlock the bonds
holding revolution back we must find it a new ground. At the beginning of the twenty-first
century, we may be at the beginning of a seismic shift. Signs shows that unless we fix the harms
of human civilization, the natural world and the vengeance of the injured of the world will, quite
simply, leave us without the ability to fix much of anything. The historically low levels of faith
in government reveal how dissatisfied people are with minor reforms and demonstrate the need
for a movement that can create a better society from top to bottom. Within that context, I submit
this analysis of revolution as a step towards an understanding of the nature of revolution, within
the larger path we must follow in the creation of a free and egalitarian world.
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Regulating Revolution: Nature, the Sovereign, and the Social Contract
The dawning of revolution
In the heady days of the French Revolution, just prior to the Reign of Terror, Louis SaintJust put words to what was becoming a common view at the time: “It is impossible to reign in
innocence. The folly of that is all too evident. All Kings are rebels and usurpers.”58 At Louis
XVI’s trial the prosecution’s words were no less profane when Maximilian Robespierre declared
“Regretfully I speak this fatal truth—Louis must die because the nation must live.”59 And just
slightly earlier the American revolutionary Tom Paine penned a similar truth, saying “Of more
worth is one honest man to society, and in the sight of God, than all the crowned ruffians that
ever lived.”60 In Europe and the American colonies, a shift had happened. A previously
impossible truth was becoming not just feasible, but necessary. The beliefs and methods of the
revolutionaries were incompatible with old structures. The world of the divinely endowed
monarch was dissolving even as it fought its last battles along the ramparts of its palaces, and in
its place the ideas of social contract theory were achieving a foothold among the former subjects
of the King, who were taking up the mantle of citizen and autonomous individual. Though there
were many battles yet to be fought, many discussions yet to be had, many endeavors yet to be
undertaken, ineluctably the passage of time was making more and more certain a new political
reality—that no longer could the King be allowed to keep his head.
It had for centuries been taken as a fundamental truth that the sovereign ruler was
endowed by God with the authority to rule, and that no other defense of the sovereign’s power
was needed. The first intervention social contract theory makes into this strain of thought is to
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cast doubt upon that proposition by questioning the validity of justifying one’s rule with God,
advocating instead a turn to reason.61 A politics that begins with reason discovers the natural
ground of society as well as the appropriate distribution of rights and responsibilities. The right
foundation prevents political collapse by indicating laws that regulate the political relationships
in society,62 preventing excess and channeling state resources. Within these laws numerous
associations and policies are possible, and social contract theory remains neutral about them as
long as they don’t adversely affect individuals’ rights or the sovereign’s power. If and when
revolution enters this world, it enters for the purposes of serving these larger goals, becoming a
mechanism within a larger program of society building. It resets the system by bringing a
deviant society back to its starting point. Yet because revolution can easily go awry social
contract theorists place it in a world of rules that govern its impact. The appropriate limits of
revolution, its function, and its goals, are supposed to be obvious from the dictates that are
revealed when reason contemplates nature. But drawing revolution into the well-regulated world
of the social contract opens the door for a crisis, for revolution inevitably destabilizes the
political systems of social contract theorists by undermining the structures of the natural world
and the state. This crisis compels many changes in the social contract as theorists try to resolve
it, yet it is ultimately unsolvable as the problem comes from the ground of their political systems.
Social contract theory is based on the claim that human society is composed of separate
individualities. It washes away genealogical hierarchies and the chains of command that
identified earlier political systems, substituting instead a space characterized by isolated units
arranged uniformly and identically along a flat and otherwise undifferentiated surface. Whether
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the unit is the individual, family, or society, in the state of nature all start with the same faculties
and remain relatively unchanged even after forming the social contract. Hobbes says “nature
hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one
man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is
reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable”63. Rousseau is
explicit: “Which people, then, is fit to receive laws?... [A] people without deep-rooted customs
or superstitions.”64 Social contract theory “[sweeps] away ecclesiastical power and privilege at
the same time that it [curbs] sectarianism and religious dissension”65 and refuses to posit “any
particular branch of humanity [that possesses] a special gift or genius to enlighten and instruct
others”.66
Contracts and rationality are, respectively, the proper mode and proper articulation of
relationships within the social contract world. They demarcate the figures and forces found
there. All relationships must aim towards a reciprocal exchange formed and maintained by two
autonomous individualities, and measure up to the dictates of reason. When rationality and
contracts arrange the disparate units within the world, they create normative values that sanction
anyone or anything not properly standardized. The political systems of Hobbes and Locke are
grounded according to the “general rules of reason”67 or the dictates of “natural reason”68, on the
one hand, and consensual agreements69 or mutual transferring of right,70 on the other. Reason
funnels, channels, and puts to good use the affective and irrational elements of society by
properly situating them so that they do not interfere with rational governance. It is universally
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identified with progress and improvement,71 though thinkers differ as to its ultimate goal.
Spinoza believes the ultimate goal of reason—open to anybody—is liberty and equality, while
Hobbes argues that rationality’s goal of stability is safer when stewarded by an elite few.72 All
believe reason can produce a rationally organized society, though the name and nature of that
society differs from thinker to thinker. Hobbes refers to the “generation of a commonwealth”73
through contracts, Locke to the creation of “political societies”74, and Grotius to entering “civil
society.”75 Requiring political relationships to fit the form of a contract pushes non-contractual
relationships to the margins of the political world. Naturally existing relationships lack political
significance unless preceded by a contract which orders power within society. Hobbes criticizes
the familial relationship as incapable of grounding a well-functioning society76, but preserves it
within his commonwealth because of its usefulness in raising children. Yet it is recast as a
contractual relationship instead of one of natural right.77 Locke says that “every man hath a right
to punish…and be executioner” in the state of nature78, but upon entering the social contract that
right passes to the executive power in order to secure the “peace, safety, and public good of the
people.”79 The irrational and non-contractual is put to work producing the egalitarian and
rational society of which social contract theory dreams.
Social contract theory’s temporal order is defined by lack of change, for the same
dilemmas, possibilities, and choices that confront the state today confronted every prior state.
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Time is cyclical—as leaders pass and societies come and go, each individual is able to choose
again from the same options that previous generations did. Locke believes history confirms this
view of time, since by “looking back as far as records give us any account of peopling the
world…we commonly find the government to be in one hand”80 and that “all peaceful beginnings
of government have been laid in the consent of the people.”81 Though more open to change than
Locke inasmuch as he rejects the idea that any law is eternal82, Rousseau sees a natural tendency
in all governments to “pass from a greater number to a smaller number, that is, from democracy
to aristocracy, or from aristocracy to royal government.”83 For him the “principle of political
life”—the sovereign authority expressed through executive and legislative powers—keeps all
states functioning.84 The social contract is ubiquitous. New adults always confront the question
of joining or leaving the state, and new states must deal with the same threats that endangered
previous ones. Social context may affect which answer is appropriate (Rousseau emphasizes
how the particularity of nations alters how individual freedom is recognized)85, but the general
outline of the social contract system applies to all humans universally. Paine sees all hereditary
systems as bad86, Locke proclaims a universal “spiritual” equality87, and Spinoza believes that
ceding one’s ‘natural right’ upon entering society is something that each person must do no
matter the circumstances.88 Time is measured by the repetition of patterns and the need to
understand both the dangers and potentials of every alternative.
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Perils of the Social Contract
Social contract theory’s spatial, temporal, and relational boundaries regulate the world,
but they cannot contain the destructive force of revolution. While necessitated by social contract
theory’s innovations, revolution is always at odds with the social contract system. Because
sovereigns are no longer the origin of reason, public goodness, and nature, they do not found, but
rather exemplify, justice and order. This means that citizens can petition the sovereign for
redress of grievances where it has failed to meet the standard of fairness reason demands. In
extreme cases, the sovereign can be overthrown. Hugo Grotius, as early as 1625, says Kings are
liable for damages if they do “not use such Means, as they may and ought, to prevent Robberies
and Piracy”89; and, as late as 1776, Tom Paine tells the British colonies that “a government of
our own is our natural right.”90 The sovereign can embody reason, but cannot be reason; there is
always a potential for a gap between the dictates of reason found in nature and its instantiation
by the state. Because the goal of the social contract is a state that approximates the optimal
framework discovered in studying nature, it is necessary to renew the connection between the
sovereign and nature when they diverge. Sometimes the renewal comes from the sovereign,
which may set up systems that monitor whether it has deviated from natural law, but it is not
able—and often is not willing—to address every deviation. Revolution enters the social contract
world as a force which can reestablish the sovereign’s embodiment of rationality, and its fidelity
to the social contract, on those occasions when the sovereign has failed to carry out the duties
nature prescribes. When carried out correctly, it prevents corruption and maintains the longevity
of the social contract.
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Hobbes is an exception to this, as he holds that revolution (or rebellion) is too
unpredictable and too destructive to ever be countenanced.91 Revolution violates the principle of
reason that prevents us from doing anything destructive to our lives. In addition, though the
sovereign is bound to not cause injury or injustice to their subjects92, this is not because they are
party to a contract but the result of a social contract produced by the common agreement of all
people within the commonwealth. Thus a tyrannical ruler cannot break the social contract as
they never agreed to it; and while they may violate the rules governing their behavior, that
situation is preferable to revolution.
The political and social conditions of Europe illuminate why social contract theorists
began to rethink revolution. Political conflicts, enlightened rulers amenable to intellectual study,
and new avenues for trade created the right conditions for new political ideas. Disagreements
over who should rule inspired Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke, who each saw their texts as being
useful for mediating conflicts like the Thirty Years War, English Civil War, and Glorious
Revolution, respectively. And while Spinoza did not write in response to a political crisis, he
lived during the Dutch Golden Age, an era characterized by technological, artistic, and scientific
innovation as well as significant expansion in trade and communication. Given the
advancements society was making independently of a divine monarch, it is no wonder that
Spinoza was led to rethink old doctrines. If starting with the rational individual could yield
profound philosophical insights, what novel political concepts could it yield? Even social
contract theorists whose work was not brought about by a crisis were influenced by the
development of a new intellectual culture. Rousseau was aided by the French philosophes,
Locke relied on the newly developed intellectual infrastructure in Scotland, and Tom Paine
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found support in the ongoing exchange of ideas found in the colonies. The growth of civil
society and its importance mirrors the increasing significance the populace has in social contract
theory, just as the appearance of enlightened sovereigns exemplifies social contract theorists’
models for what a virtuous sovereign should look like. In Hobbes’ time Elizabeth was the model
for an enlightened monarch, just as Grotius advocated for Louis XIII and Locke defended
William III’s claim to the throne. The historical appearance of new political and social
conditions meant that a new ground for politics needed to be formulated, one which could
accommodate the situations social contract theorists were seeing. Revolution, just like the idea
that the sovereign’s power derives from the people, needed to be addressed philosophically.
Social contract theorists lessen their unease at incorporating violent revolution into their
political systems by monitoring it closely. Revolution creates the potential for a power that can
act without regard for the sovereign, since if the population can justly act against a corrupt
sovereign then it can embody reason in the sovereign’s place. The populace that acts in
revolution can become a sovereign power itself. It is paradoxical for there to be two sovereigns
under the social contract (which was established for the purposes of uniting people “into one
body [with] a common established law and judicature”93 that is “not subject to another’s
Power.”94 Because revolution has the potential to undermine the social contract’s basis, it only
appears as an anti-sovereign. Revolution calls citizens to oppose the sovereign’s laws when
necessary, but does not itself create laws, and it acts independently of the sovereign only insofar
as its actions resist sovereign power. To preserve the state, social contract theorists limit what
grievances can be legitimately addressed by revolution. Small injustices (such as serving in the
army) are beyond revolution as lawful expressions of a sovereign’s authority, while massive
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changes (such as the abolition of property) cannot be effected since they would contradict natural
law. An inevitable result of combining revolution with the social contract is that revolution is
incapable of acting upon the social contract in order for the integrity of that agreement to be
maintained. Social contract theorists—Hobbes excepted—claim that revolution is only justified
when the sovereign breaks the social contract. But does the inclusion of revolution within social
contract theory lead to problems? What if revolution cannot rein in the sovereign’s excesses
working within the confines of social contract theory? What I intend to show is that social
contract theory creates a paradox that puts the stated goal of revolution in conflict with social
contract theory’s descriptions of ‘nature’ and ‘reason’.
I will begin by elaborating the boundaries of and variations within the social contract
world. Because each one of social contract theory’s subdivisions necessitates a different
relationship to revolution, I will show how the relationship to revolution changes depending on
how the state is described. The first subdivision comes from the two different ways thinkers
discuss the beginnings of contracts, including the state of nature, the state of war, and general
provisions recommended by each thinker.
Next, I will examine three ways social contract thinkers formulate civil society, including
how they envision equality and the relationships between figures such as the sovereign, the
people, and slaves. In the process of reviewing the different strands of social contract theory, I
will point out the role revolution plays and how it ultimately authorizes but does not revise the
state. I will examine the image of revolution that each theory returns, including any particular
stages they give to it, any formulation it has, and any causes that commonly lead to it or effects
that stem from it.
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Third, I will discuss the problems that inevitably prevent social contract theory from
producing a civil society governed by reason and equality.
Finally, I will show how these problems compel a new theory of revolution and thus pave
the way for Marxism. This analysis will reveal the devices, the rules, and the dangers inherent
within social contract theory with regards to the state and revolution.

Capturing our Natural Freedom
The inevitable first step social contract theorists take to establish their doctrine is
formulating a natural ground out of which the state will arise. All the artificial constructs of the
state are pulled away and the essential human form is laid bare. Lacking laws, governmental
institutions, and social conventions, humans are found to be in “a state of perfect freedom” (ST,
8) which “prohibits nothing but what no one desires or no one can do”95 and where “the notions
of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have…no place.”96 The absence of rules in this state
of nature may at first seem advantageous, but the license it offers produces conflict and war.
Even though social contract theorists do not all believe that license is absolute—only Hobbes
believes everyone has the right to everything97 while by contrast Locke believes that men do not
have the right to harm others98 and Rousseau questions slavery99 and the principle of “might
makes right”100—they all agree that the lack of a power that can enforce rules is a problem. This
gives rise to an agreement amongst every person in the state of nature to forego their natural
power, set down laws, and abide by the judgments of a sovereign power. As John Rawls notes,
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accompanying the institution of a sovereign power is the creation of an inviolable concept of
justice which, rather than allowing that “the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the
larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many,” only institutes an injustice to “avoid an even greater
injustice.”101 Such a system of justice originates from “the principles that free and rational
persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality”102
and not from arbitrary or inequitable judgments. Rules of justice are developed to limit one’s
freedom in return for security and order.
But do the limits on freedom only begin with the social contract, or are they latent within
the very description of ‘natural humans’? People within the state of nature are defined very
narrowly, using characteristics that obligate specific behaviors or actions. Most social contracts
expect people in the state of nature to be governed primarily, it not exclusively, by their rational
self-interest. People who engage in war do it for their own defense103 or gain104, only forming
alliances for the “advantage of both parties.”105 Even raising children is calculated and not
altruistic, for parents should expect children to return “respect, reverence, support, and
compliance” in exchange for their “care, cost, and kindness.”106 Rousseau is the one exception
to this, as he sees familial interest as another principal motive. Though preserving oneself is
both within man’s nature and “Man’s first law,” the care a father has for his children is another
driving force preceding any organization of society107. Social contract theorists also know that
one who is ‘free’ within nature will inevitably want to form a society. Hobbes says men
“naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,” and so their “finall Cause” is “the forsight of
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their own preservation, and of a more contented life”108 in civil society. One may initially desire
to live alone, but obstacles will build up until, according to Rousseau, “the human race will
perish if it doesn’t change its mode of existence.”109 Simple passions like desire, love, and grief
lead to felicity, misery, and war110, just as a desire to “live in a…more agreeable Manner”111
leads to seizing property and, ultimately, the social contract. Living freely within the state of
nature means one desires preservation, glory, and wealth; that one is willing to go to war to
preserve property; and that the only way to satisfy these desires, without risking death, is through
a social contract.
The world is also restricted in the state of nature. The descriptions of nature provided by
social contract theorists delineate a limited number of operations and forms the world can take.
Arranging the world through disparate spatiality and cyclical time, and animating it through
rationality and contracts, gives the world an eternal order it cannot surpass. This order is
consonant with the defining characteristics of individuals found in the state of nature.
Humankind’s natural self-interest and desires are explicitly attached to the limits of the
world. Rousseau says that man must “watch over his own preservation” and that “as soon as he
reaches the age of reason…he becomes his own master.”112 Spinoza connects men’s self-interest
with their nature, saying “it is a universal law of human nature that no one neglects anything they
deem good unless they hope for a greater good or fear a greater loss, and no one puts up with
anything bad except to avoid something worse or because he hope for something better.”113
Spinoza concludes that “no one will promise without deception to give up his right to all things,
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and absolutely no one will keep his promises except from fear of a greater ill or hope of a greater
good.”114 The character of a contract, which has force when it is in one’s interest and becomes
void when it is not115, comes directly out of natural law. Grotius’ legitimate causes of war
require a clash of interests between disparate individuals, such as when “Securities are demanded
against a Person that has threatened an Injury” or “Punishment [must be] inflicted.”116 The
world produces an individuals’ natural environment and possible choices, while the actions of
natural individuals maintain the features of the world. The two sides work synchronously to
produce and regulate the entire state of nature. Everything that does not conform is marginalized
or goes uncounted. The presentation of the state of nature as a space of freedom takes place
within a grid that carefully screens what characteristics a free person can express and controls
how the natural world appears. For the natural world to seem free, it must confine everything
that is in it.
Social contract theory has two schools of thought regarding what is natural. One
articulates nature primarily along lines of self-interested autonomy, and the other largely along
lines of familial reciprocity. What is likely, what is possible, and what is justifiable within
nature depend upon the degree to which some sort of natural organization of individuals can be
posited. Grotius, Hobbes, and Spinoza fall into the first perspective—which I am naming the
isolate perspective—that sees nature as lacking any concept of justice or virtue, where one acts
primarily according to one’s self-interest. Locke, Rousseau, and Paine fall into the second—
which I am naming the relational perspective—where there is a more natural organization to
human society that conditions more generous actions and a normative framework.
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“Isolate” philosophers believe reason shows that the state of nature lacks any necessary
human relationships, and that the dominant mode of relating to one another is in terms of one’s
rational self-interest. Hugo Grotius says Natural Law comes out of the rational investigation of a
thing’s essence and is enforced by God.117 Natural Law is infinite, eternal, unchanging,
immanent within the world, and evident to reasonable people with common sense.118 It reveals
that “man is by nature a mild creature.”119 though the unsociable have “grown so by addicting
themselves to Vice, contrary to the Rules of Nature.”120 Instincts121 and a predilection to protect
one’s property ineluctably lead to war, which nature allows for the preservation of one’s
belongings and natural condition. Warring over property is just inasmuch as property is a right
of ownership122 and war a dispute by force that repels violations of rights.123 A state develops
once free and autonomous individuals come together “to enjoy peaceably their Rights, and for
their common Benefit.”124 It establishes the legal framework which ensures the protection of
one’s rights and limits one’s actions to protect others. A sovereign, unaccountable to any human,
acts as lawmaker, magistrate, and judge in regards to “the making and repealing of Laws”125 and
affairs concerning “the publick Good.”126
Hobbes’ state of nature is more unpleasant, for in it men live a “nasty, brutish, and short”
life where people are constantly propelled into quarrel because of competition, diffidence, and
glory.127 Because there is no concept of justice one has the right to do whatever is in one’s
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power128, resulting in a constant drift towards war (which is bolstered by humankind’s
inadequate reasoning powers129 and the lack of any concept of property or privacy within the
Natural world130). Reason recognizes this natural situation is untenable and forms Natural Laws
that dictate the proper organization of society—laws compelling individuals to seek peace,
renounce their claim to everyone and everything, and set up a sovereign who will ensure
compliance.131 Both Grotius and Hobbes emphasize the close proximity of nature to war and
that protecting what one views as one’s own is a major cause of war. They disagree about which
considerations give rise to Natural Law. Grotius believes it comes from investigating the nature
of things (or acts) while Hobbes believes it comes from the contemplating what is needed to
preserve human life.132 For both, the proper function of an object is given by the relations it
forms with the rest of the world and how reason summons us to respond.
Spinoza does not start out far from Hobbes, for he puts forth an account of how in nature
right and power are equal. As ‘natural right’ is equal to God’s power (and because God is allpowerful), in nature one has the right to do whatever is in one’s power.133 Reason plays no
necessary role in determining action or behavior at this point. This existence is tenuous, for one
is in danger of losing one’s property, family, or life. Reason enters Spinoza’s considerations
upon the formation of society, as reason naturally leads individuals to choose the protection of
society over the “hostility, hatred, anger, and deceit”134 of individual living. Spinoza is
distinguished from Hobbes by his treatment of the problem given to reason in the state of nature.
It is not only a matter of seeking peace by renouncing the power one possesses but also of
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preserving one’s right to express their reason and thought freely. The purpose of the state is “to
allow [peoples’] minds and bodies to develop in their own ways in security and enjoy the free
use of reason, and not to participate in conflicts based on hatred, anger, or deceit…”135 Instead
of focusing on the war and misery of the natural state, Spinoza conceives of nature as a germ of
enlightened discourse and reasonability which blossoms into a wholly different civil society than
the ones Hobbes and Grotius envisioned.
“Relational” thinkers like Rousseau and Locke associate nature with the familial, arguing
for a natural organization characterized by impartiality and cooperation that leaves one without a
vehicle to express one’s thought publicly and an effective means of protection. Locke insists that
reason requires the establishment of a commons by compact, since food, drink, and other
necessities for subsistence were given to all of mankind. It is only because of this commons that
property, which originates by “taking any part of what is in common, and removing it out of the
state nature leaves it in,”136 can be manufactured. Rousseau claims there is a “natural bond”
between parents and children that becomes an association of choice later.137 Because war is “not
a passionate and hasty, but a sedate settled design upon another man’s life”138 it will not happen
for minor reasons. Locke epitomizes nature as a state of equality, where “all creatures of the
same species and rank…should also be equal…,”139 but says there are various mechanisms that
put individuals into unequal relationships. Paternal power or skill are natural forms of
inequality140, while the election of a sovereign power is artificial (though it refers back to
paternal rule).141 Rousseau’s state of nature is articulated in much the same way. Everyone
135

Ibid., 252.
Locke, Second Treatise, 19.
137
Rousseau, Social Contract, 50.
138
Locke, Second Treatise, 14.
139
Ibid., 8.
140
Ibid., 31.
141
Ibid., 56.
136

42

starts their life tied to their father, lacking an immediate state of equality but with an equal
potential for liberty. Equality is gained when children no longer need their parents for their
preservation, at which point the bond is replaced with reciprocal freedom and equality.142 In
civil society everyone begins free and equal. They surrender their freedom when it is to their
advantage so as to give the sovereign a paternal position.143 There is some natural disparity, but
those able to depend upon themselves are free and equal with respect to one another, entering
into civil society by choice in order to benefit from its protection. Rousseau claims the family is
the basis for the original social covenant144, and that civil society is natural inasmuch as it
follows the family, but artificial when it moves beyond that. Locke sees a stronger difference
between the two, for while both have a compact at their heart, it is only political society that
wields the legislative power of life and death.145 Thus while the first society was between a man
and woman, new powers needed to be found to produce political society. Both believe reason
advocates the development of civil society for comfort, safety, longevity, and peaceable living.146
Tom Paine is similar to Locke and Rousseau, for he argues that humans are created
equal147, that special kinships are shared148, and that reason leads to forming societies that supply
one’s “natural wants” and satisfy one’s “social affections.”149 Paine is unique among
“relational” theorists for attributing kinship to the entirety of mankind. A natural community
precedes and grounds the formation of civil society. Like all social contract theorists, Rousseau,
Locke, and Paine point to reason as the origin of the rules structuring the natural world, but they
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each disagree about the degree to which individuals can be relied upon to reason correctly.
Locke and Rousseau argue that structural bulwarks must act as safeguards against natural biases
and inclinations that pervert reason.150 Paine argues that reason, wielded publically by a
democratic government, is by far the finest way of protecting society from its possible ills.151
Both isolate and relational social contract theorists arrange the state of nature to contain
embryonic states in the form of rational individuals, paternally controlled families, or natural
communities. These groups, after they form the post-social contract civil society, are the same
groups that wield the force of revolution and condition revolution’s very existence. The power
controlling revolution becomes the same power expressed in the state, as the state and revolution
are formed by the same authority. The manner of control differs depending on how each theorist
depicts nature. The isolate perspective discounts any relationship not defined by mutual
exchange on the basis of self-interest, including natural groups (Hobbes holds that when it comes
to the social contract familial relationships are irrelevant until after the institution of the
commonwealth)152, but the relational perspective only disallows the development of unnatural
groups not based on kinship. For Grotius and Hobbes, a subject who wants to disagree with the
sovereign must have standing, which comes from having suffered a direct slight at the
sovereign’s hands. Hobbes’ possible slights involve issues of “Debt, or of right of possession of
lands or goods, or concerning any service required at [the sovereign’s] hands, or concerning any
penalty corporall, or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law.”153 Slights Locke recognizes
include those accepted by Hobbes, but also a sovereign’s violation of a society’s right to
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property154 or to provide for itself.155 In these latter cases one’s standing comes from mankind’s
inalienable rights, which a sovereign must respect. In other words, when thinking about the
propriety of opposing the sovereign, one’s reflections should stop at the limits of one’s personal
interest—for Grotius, Hobbes, and Spinoza—or one’s communal interest—for Locke, Rousseau,
and Paine. It is almost impossible to justify a revolution using isolate theory since only
individual grievances can be brought before the sovereign. Spinoza differs from Hobbes and
Grotius in that he does allow for free speech in his state provided one does not advocate
rebellion, meaning subjects can disagree with a sovereign’s policies even without having been
slighted by them. However, Spinoza does not ground this freedom of speech in the rights of
mankind, or in public welfare. It is an isolated individual who deserves this right by virtue of
being a free thinking individual, not by being part of a larger community.156 The shared
discontent that frequently provokes revolution is recognized by relational theory, but only when
it stems from a natural group like a family, commonwealth, or community. Both perspectives
give no consideration to dissent originating from racial, gender, or class based offenses. Even
sympathy with the plight of the suffering is excluded. Acting with reference to these alternative
interests makes one irrational and incapable of forming contracts, someone whose very presence
is excluded even from the state of nature. Rawls’ original position excludes anyone who is
envious or affectionate157, incapable of acting according to agreed upon principles158, interested
in another’s interests159, or possessed of “irrational” biases involving “pointless or arbitrary”
traits like skin color or gender.160 Only “general facts about human society”—political affairs,
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economic theory, psychological laws, etc.161—should be known when deciding what rules to
follow, meaning that an appeal to solidarity based upon “arbitrary” or non-generic aspects of
humanity is unacceptable. Rawls believes violations of the law—revolution included—are only
justified when a society or government deviates from the reasonable standards of justice
uncovered while contemplating a generic picture of humanity.162 Rawls develops this concept of
reasonableness in contrast to the idea of rational self-interest. Rationality concerns individuals
calculating what is to their advantage and acting based on that determination. Reasonableness
calls for individuals to act based upon fair rules for exchange—sometimes sacrificing what is to
their direct advantage—as delineated by the considerations that take place within the original
position.163
For social contract theory, any revolution which refers to an alternate logic besides that of
rational self-interest (or, for Rawls, reasonableness), contracts, disparate individuality, or cyclical
temporality, is prima facie indefensible.

The Covenant that Binds
Leaving the state of nature is depicted as a major transformation, potentially the biggest
one in the history of society. With the exception of Rousseau, for whom the covenant is a
regretful necessity, social contract theorists portray the agreement binding society together as a
significant accomplishment. It is the point where a new lifestyle, a new way of interacting, is
created—one which will be sustainable rather than destructive. Locke describes this event as
coming “out of a state of nature”164 to “make one body politic under one government, put
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[oneself] under an obligation, to every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the
majority.”165 Hobbes calls it a transference of one’s natural right166 through a contract which is
enforced by the establishment of a common power other than nature.167 Even with his
ambivalence, Rousseau admits that the creation of the social contract amounts to a new “mode of
existence.”168 This focus on the momentousness of the contract hides how, despite these
descriptions, one never leaves the state of nature. Passing into society does not erase nature, nor
are the many feelings, desires, and interests of nature left behind. Rather, nature is channeled by
society for the purposes of building an ordered world. Society attempts to make nature useful by
identifying what within nature is applicable for the purpose of building a lasting state. The social
contract does not pull humans out of nature—it authorizes a part of nature, both in the sense of
legitimating it and reproducing it. Nature thus pervades and surrounds the state, and the state
does not efface nature but consolidates it. Together, the state and nature produce a more
comfortable place than the state of nature.
Social contract theory can be divided into three different schools when it comes to the
state—radicalism, liberalism, and conservatism. The oldest of these three perspectives is the
conservative vision of thinkers like Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes, which proposes a
hegemonic sovereign that leaves little room for engagement with the multitudes of people
composing society. Liberal social contract thinkers like Locke and Rousseau take much from
conservatism, but differ because they view humans as more accommodating and less in need of
the sovereign’s protection. The liberal tradition depicts a society where the multitude has a
greater role in governance and where the people are more independent of the sovereign. The
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closest one gets to a society of indispensable freedom is the radical social contract theories of
Spinoza and Tom Paine. They argue for sweeping reform, fundamental liberty and equality,
limits to sovereign power, and a naturalism that sees humans as parts of an organic whole rather
than solitary stewards within the world.
It is interesting to note is how the societies each thinker lived in correlates with the school
they fall into. Grotius and Hobbes lived in societies threatened by civil conflict, as Hobbes’
England was torn apart by a civil war where it is estimated that hundreds of thousands died while
Grotius’ Dutch Republic (which was at the time controlled by the Holy Roman Empire and
France) was torn apart by the Thirty Years War. In both societies, there were many powerful
advocates for an absolute monarchy and not much in the way of empirical evidence about how a
constitutional system would function. By contrast, Rousseau and Locke each lived when there
was less civil strife, for even though the Glorious Revolution took place in Locke’s lifetime there
were comparatively few casualties (it is sometimes referred to as the bloodless revolution). In
addition, constitutional governance had taken root in both of their societies to a limited extent,
and so both had some direct experience with what it was like and how it worked. The difference
between the two is that Locke’s English government was more hospitable to Enlightenment ideas
than Rousseau’s France. It was the schools and intellectual societies in France which cultivated
new ideas and scientific study in that country. Finally, both Spinoza and Paine lived in relatively
free societies. At the time of Spinoza’s life the Netherlands were a republic, while during
Paine’s lifetime the colonies became a representative democracy. While there were elites in both
societies (mainly as a result of wealthy merchants or traders), politics was free from the
restrictions that defined most early modern European nations. There was a lot of
experimentation, exploration, and creativity to be found. As how much the sovereigns of each
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thinkers’ society intrudes upon daily life roughly maps onto the type of government they
proposed, all three schools of thought can be seen as responses to the types of events, issues, and
ideas at work during their lifetime.
Conservative thinkers emphasize a centralized power system, dominating structures that
allow only for limited change, and a preference for monarchy or aristocracy. Grotius’ discussion
sovereignty’s nature emphasizes how important it is that sovereign power—the power to
legislate, judge, and execute law—be unified, most plausibly under one man.169 The implication
that the sovereign could be anything other than one person is not found in Grotius at all, while
Hobbes reluctantly allows that the sovereign could be a group of people as long as, within that
group, sovereign power is still unified.170 Any other form of government is subject to fracturing
and eventual collapse.171 The sovereign is above the rest of society to such a degree that it
cannot be punished by society—only by God.172 The authoritarianism of the sovereign in
Grotius and Hobbes is best explained by the relatively small role of reason in nature, for while
reason exists and drives individuals towards the social contract, the affectivity found within
nature—the fear of attack, the stress of providing everything for oneself—often overwhelms it.
The actions of irrational individuals, and their prominence in nature, indicate that no true unity of
purpose can exist prior to the establishment of the sovereign, so for this reason the contract
Grotius and Hobbes describe is not a pact with a society but a pact between individuals from
which the sovereign emerges.173 The unity that exists between people is subsumed into the will
and judgment of the sovereign, which becomes the actor for every individual in the
commonwealth. Government works best when the monarch acts with the community’s interests
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in mind, and any social reform must take place under the guidelines laid out by the sovereign, for
it is always wrong to try to place society—or any common good—above the sovereign. To
reference a power over the established monarch as a justification for one’s actions is a recipe for
chaos and the inevitable collapse of society.
Liberalism argues for a freer and more representative society, undergirded by a moderate
amount of restraints to prevent slipping back into the state of nature or war. Freedom and
equality are tempered by artificial structures that mediate human excess. Because democracy
assumes an equality between humans that cannot ever exist,174 Rousseau’s just society requires
that the general will be mediated and properly enacted by a legislator. As long as the
government follows this will, the specific form of government can be determined by the people
governed in view of their society’s context.175 Rousseau’s general will is comparable to Rawls’
‘reflective equilibrium’ that, as the consideration of the “shared fund of…basic ideas and
principles,” provides the foundation for a comprehensive theory of justice.176 Locke mitigates
the democratic elements of his philosophy with references to the need for a legislative authority
separate from the people. He is skeptical about locating power entirely in society’s hands, for
there needs to be some sort of distance between the people and the ruler, and a sense of
permanence to notions like justice and authority. All this is not to say that Locke and Rousseau
express the same philosophy in different language. Rousseau has faith in the deliberations of
educated citizens to reach the public good and believes that the actual laws of a state must be
measured up against this general will. By contrast, Locke measures laws against their ability to
protect natural rights like property, and defines the common good as the protection of these
rights. Thus while the legislative power is sovereign in Locke, in Rousseau it is the body
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politic.177 Because the governments of liberal philosophies follow the general will (for
Rousseau) or common good (for Locke) without their actions being dictated solely by it, there is
a more egalitarian distribution of power than in conservatism while still maintaining a normative
structure guaranteed by reason. Locke provides the people a role in governance178, but requires
that they use the channels of legislating and governing designated by reason. He says “This
legislative is not only the supreme power of the common-wealth, but sacred and unalterable in
the hands where the community have once placed it.”179 Rousseau’s typology of the various
forms of governance exemplify normativity, for “the government under which…citizens increase
and multiply most, is infallibly the best government,”180 implying that there is a happy medium
between the authoritarianism of monarchies and the strife characteristic of democracies.181
Finally, radicalism argues for a society organized not by legal buttresses against mob
rule, but by the free expression of thought and the protection of man’s natural rights. Sovereign
power begins when individuals transfer their rights and powers to society, and it is only by doing
this that they are able to prevent the alienation of their natural rights.182 The sovereign is
obligated to work for the public interest, as reason dictates that the purpose of combining power
is the collective welfare of the individuals comprising society. Because the sovereign forms by
giving one’s rights and power to society, democracy is the ordinary form of government. It is
the unmediated form of the commonwealth, a “united gathering of people which collectively has
the sovereign right to do all that it has the power to do,”183 and “society governing itself without
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the aid of secondary means.”184 Every government must maintain fidelity to this fundamental
equality or it violates the rational directives of nature. Spinoza says sovereign power may be
exercised by one person or many, but needs to be grounded in democracy and free expression.185
Paine agrees with grounding society in these values, but contra Spinoza claims that monarchy
and aristocracy degenerate into ignorance and confusion, and only representation can adapt itself
to the different ideas in society.186 Radicalism frames freedom as total and separate from any
possible remnants of tradition or history. Spinoza believes “it is impossible to deprive men of
the liberty of saying what they think,”187 while Paine says “men are born and always continue
free, and equal in respect of their rights.”188 Even those who exercise sovereign power are not
raised to a higher class, for their status comes with the responsibility to act in the public interest
(which for Spinoza’s means administering the state using reason,189 and for Paine aligning the
government’s policies with the interests of the people190). There is less a ruler can do
unilaterally, and a greater capacity for participation in governance, in radical thought. Because
Spinoza and Paine think citizens can be trusted to act rationally, they make reason indispensible
for the continued success of the commonwealth.191

Authorizing Control
The differences between the conservative, liberal, and radical traditions come from the
part of nature that each chooses to authorize and expand to the whole of society. The
conservative tradition maintains that a strong sovereign and a monarchical system of governance
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create the best chance for an ordered community. Any division or opposition within the
sovereign is liable to create civil unrest, and so the sovereign must be completely united.192 The
place of unity within the state of nature described by Grotius and Hobbes is the autonomous
individual, who is the only being able to make decisions and enter agreements. The sovereign in
the conservative tradition is an authorization of the natural, rational human; it is the individual
writ large. Revolution is disliked by conservatives because it implies an unnatural equality
between the interests of the sovereign and the people in the state when the peoples’ interests
should be subordinated to the sovereign (similar to how the autonomous individual may have
numerous desires, but those desires are supposed to be subordinated to the rational self-interest
of the individual). Though Grotius and Hobbes barely treat revolution, their brief mentions of it
demonstrate how they believe it to be among the most inexcusable forms of insolence, and rebels
themselves are but “insolent rebellious Slave[s]”193 or irrational romantics194 who deserve swift
retribution. The closest Hobbes and Grotius get to accepting revolutionary sentiment is their
listing of legitimate grievances that subjects may bring to the sovereign for redress.195
The philosophers of the liberal tradition recognize a larger collection of interests, but
remain bound to a hierarchical social organization. Natural order stems from arrangements
where people are generally equal but maintain different levels of power. Both Locke and
Rousseau mention families as a natural hierarchy that contributes to political power. Mankind is
composed of individuals with different skills and strengths, who grow up in different
circumstances, all of which contribute to natural inequalities.196 These natural differences are
vital for the preservation of the state, and are the part of nature the liberal tradition authorizes.
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Some people are better at ruling, some at judging, and some at legislating; expertise should be
recognized and empowered, but not at the expense of individuals having a say in governance.
The relative equality of all men is tempered by natural human hierarchies to produce a state that
is neither authoritarian nor disordered. Important to Locke’s and Rousseau’s thought is the
recognition that, while hierarchy itself is permanent, the particular ordering of individuals within
hierarchies is not. Children outgrow their parents’ authority, and the unskilled can become more
skilled with practice. Hierarchy remains, but who is dominant or submissive changes; because of
this Locke and Rousseau see within the state a natural tendency towards change and renewal.
Liberals accommodate revolution more than conservatives because there is nothing
inherently unnatural or indefensible about overturning a particular order as long as the overall
organization of the state remains. Revolution is not just another form of conquest, Locke says,
because revolution ends the government from within rather than through outside forces,197 and
unlike conquest it can be a healthy expression of people’s discontent.198 Locke explicitly
justifies revolution by specifying which governments are legitimate under the social contract, for
a legitimate government that becomes illegitimate loses the consent of the people and can be
overthrown. The peoples’ voice is not heard only at the founding of the social contract; it is a
continual presence that the government must take into account.199 Rousseau, like Locke,
believes revolutions carry both good and bad possibilities; they are not to be universally
inveighed against, but neither should they be completely welcomed. Revolutions carry a
potential for great violence to which people react in horror200, but they can also return the state of
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things to its natural order.201 Because states have a tendency to degrade, forestalling the dangers
of revolution requires constant affirmation of civil society in order to prevent corruption202,
though if this fails to happen revolution may be the best option. Both liberal theorists argue that
one must be attentive to ensure revolution is approached constructively, not destructively.203
Finally, the radical school of thought sees order located in the free interaction of the
whole society. An individual is only autonomous in the context of other autonomous
individuals, and hierarchies are a danger if not properly regulated by people who can critique the
excesses of the rulers. What is natural are interactions between individuals in society who are
motivated by diverse interests, purposes, and desires. It is this part of nature which the state
authorizes by recognizing the inherent value of protecting the right to express oneself freely.
Despite particular hierarchies, nature’s best quality comes from preventing anyone’s power from
becoming too great, so a state that wants to preserve the interactions of a community must rein in
the sovereign’s influence by countering it with that of the numerous individuals who compose
society.204 The state, like nature, must develop laws and mechanisms to share power and prevent
tyranny. There is a fundamental recognition of an individuals’ ability to question the sovereign
and its policies enshrined in Spinoza’s and Paine’s systems. Spinoza is reluctant to validate any
calls to abolish the state,205 yet Paine claims that revolution is justified if it is necessary to
preserve the free expression of rational thought.206 They both allow citizens to question the
sovereign unconditionally, but while Spinoza is ambiguous about the possibility of revolution
(he is silent on how the people should respond when the leaders fail to uphold their side of the
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contract, implying that only in such instances it may be justifiable for others to seize control207),
Paine argues that when such measures do not produce change in accord with universal principles
of justice, then revolution is allowable.208
These three ways of organizing the state each lead to a different relationship to
revolution, but the similar assumptions they begin with ultimately produce the same two
paradoxes for all of them. The first paradox occurs at the moment when the state has deviated so
far from its professed goal that a revolution becomes necessary. Ostensibly, when a revolution
overthrows a sovereign, it does so for the purpose of undoing a state that has become corrupt and
broken its contract. Revolution finishes this task by returning everyone to where they were prior
to the state, allowing them to begin anew. Locke says that revolutions “introduce a state of war,
which is that of force without authority,”209 where there is no social contract and some
individuals have designs upon the lives of others. Rousseau says that revolutions return things to
their natural order.210 Yet as revolutions undo the state, they end up reinforcing the very power
structure that the state rests upon. When a sovereign becomes corrupt, revolution’s role is not
just to undo the sovereign, but also to return people back to the natural framework that will
produce a proper state. Revolution is the expression of a peoples’ right to question the
legitimacy of a government that has broken the social contract.211 Once the contract is void, the
people in the state are returned to nature, and, from there, speak through revolution to call forth a
state that can protect the peoples’ rights, property, and liberties.212 To complete its task,
revolution becomes an expression of the state as it should be, one which is not opposed to the
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natural order. Revolution ends up in tension, for while it is meant to herald the downfall of the
state, it ends up actually becoming the voice of the state. It must support state power even as it
opposes it, and is never able to speak with an independent voice. In the social contract,
revolution is always already captured by the voice of the state.
Another paradox that forms when revolution is put into a necessarily reciprocal
relationship with the state (while also being grounded in a natural world) is that the ostensible
beginning and end of the state are put in tension with one another. Upon adding revolution to the
world, the state is no longer an absolute force. The state is the result of the people and the
contract they form, but at the same time the state acts upon the people through the laws and rules
that it puts in place. The citizen of the social contract state is both the author of and subject to
the state—she or he plays a dual role of both standing in judgment of, while also showing fealty
to, the state.213 These two roles are always in tension with one another, for the citizen must place
oneself within the state to act according to rules, yet beyond the state’s control to legitimately
assume the ability to critique it. In addition, as a subject of the state, the citizen is prohibited
from violating certain rights and liberties that of necessity are inalienable parts of each
individual. However, it is the citizen, as author of the state and through his or her reflection on
nature, that designates the rights and liberties that are off limits, as well as how the state oversees
the protection of them.214 The specifics of policy are decided and implemented by individuals
representing the commonwealth,215 who aim such laws at citizens216, yet the authority of any
legislative power inevitably rests with the citizens who originally constituted the body politic.217
Citizens holds dual roles of subject and author that forbid them from altering, yet put them in
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control of, how rights and liberties are handled by the state. They must be able to undo
everything they are forbidden from in order for both of their roles to be actualized, yet the
impossibility of this puts citizens in the delicate position of navigating their dual roles as
judiciously as possible, and never be able to reconcile them. In sum, the foundation of the state
is divided against itself inasmuch as the state is meant to affect the very thing that creates it.
This paradox is the result of withdrawing the attribute of infallibility from the state and thereby
creating the possibility for individuals to question, modify, and in certain cases, overthrow the
sovereign.
These paradoxes are not completely unrecognized by social contract theorists. At times
they mention the inconsistency of saying that individuals create the sovereign but can have only
a small effect upon its policies, and the futility of a revolution that only sets up another restrictive
government of the type that was overthrown. Yet they place the origin of these paradoxes in the
idea that nature has not yet been properly described, or that the origins of the state are
inadequately understood.218 The history of social contract theory shows a continued attempt to
re-describe these topics in such a way that gives revolution more leeway without overturning the
world of the social contract itself. By the time Paine writes, the people have much more control
over governance, and the criteria that must be met to legitimize a revolution has diminished
substantially. Rationales justifying revolution are much stronger than at any previous point.
Nevertheless, revolution is always limited to the role of speaking for the social contract world, as
the state and revolution are in every instance tied together through their joint origin in a fixed
nature. Revolution is always prohibited by social contract theorists when it is seen to transgress
the boundary between order and chaos, in the process becoming a disruptive presence that
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unsettles the sustainability society works to produce.219 This can be seen as part of the larger
Enlightenment task of eliminating difference and irrationality by binding experiences together
into one consistent system.220 Fred Evans, in The Multivoiced Body, mentions this, saying that
the West has traditionally adopted a “fearful…attitude towards chaos.”221 Nature and revolution
are not independent of one another; rather, nature always limits revolution, and because of this,
the paradoxes of the social contract remain.

The Voice from Outside the Social Contract
Though revolution can lead to moments of chaos as one sovereign is replaced by another,
ultimately it speaks for order. As framed by social contract theory, it is produced by the same
natural context that leads to the state. The idea of the social contract was developed in response
to a series of political crises in the Western world for the purposes of answering the questions of
when and how rule is justified. But in developing this idea and those that accompany it, were
other important ideas forgotten? Who or what is outside of social contract theory? The answers
to these questions require analysis of the regulations of the social contract, which purposefully
eliminates references to groups, temporalities, relationships, rationalities, and juridical
frameworks that do not properly legitimize the sovereign.
In their haste to eradicate the stratification of society prevalent in Medieval political
theory, social contract theorists push to the margins categories of individuals who are counted as
non-people, beasts, or property. The supposedly non-stratified world of social contract theory
becomes, in practice, a highly stratified world in its process of othering what cannot fit into the
meticulously spaced zones of individuality that define citizenship. Such biases manifest clearly
219

Paine, Rights of Man 2, 342-344.
Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Enlightenment, Princeton University Press, 2009, 22-23.
221
Fred Evans, Multivoiced Body (Columbia University Press; New York, 2008), 24.
220

59

within the state of nature, where (with the exception of Hobbes, for whom the distinction
between man and animal comes from the way matter combines itself to form different motions in
humans than in animals222) every thinker articulates a clear ontological line that separates
humans from beasts and material objects—or that which is worthy of consideration from that
which is not. Beginning with Political Liberalism, Rawls welcomes pluralism as “a permanent
feature of the public culture of democracy”223 while admitting that anyone part of a democratic
plurality must possess “common human reason” and “similar powers of thought and
judgment.”224 He excludes from the public sphere anyone incapable of thinking in conformity
with the rationality he recognizes as belonging to all persons, such as those who make judgments
based on irrational characteristics like class, race, or gender. Fred Evans, in The Multivoiced
Body, makes this point by demonstrating how Rawls’ account of political liberalism becomes a
universal doctrine since it must be privileged when it conflicts with the family or private realm.
He concludes that Rawls, to be consistent, would have to “proclaim that his doctrine is universal
and founded on reasons binding for everyone,” a position Rawls would presumably not want to
take.225 Since by definition it is impossible to have a contract with that which is incapable of
rational thought, establishing ontological norms is a necessary part of the social contract world.
Charles Mills reveals how a historical and epistemological Racial Contract sets up spaces that
exclude non-whites, saying
The supposedly abstract but actually white social contract characterizes (European) space
basically as presociopolitical (“the state of nature”) and postsociopolitical (the locus of
“civil society”)…This space is our space, a space in which we (we white people) are at
home, a cozy domestic space…By contrast, in the social contract’s application to nonEurope, where it becomes the Racial Contract, both space and its inhabitants are alien.226
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The homologous spaces that found the social contract, and the natural world in which those
zones are first related one to the other, form an exclusionary world; a world that, by making
reason the price of admission, turn the ability to create contracts into a racial privilege.
Non-whites are not the only ones excluded from the social contract. In Carole Pateman’s
examination of contract theory and sexuality, she notes that:
The original pact is a sexual as well as a social contract; it is sexual in the sense of
patriarchal—that is, the contract establishes men’s political right over women—and also
sexual in the sense of establishing orderly access by men to women’s bodies. The
original contract creates what I shall call, following Adrienne Rich, ‘the law of male sexright’. Contract is far from being opposed to patriarchy; contract is the means through
which modern patriarchy is constituted.227
Mill and Pateman point out that excluding groups that don’t fit the criteria of people is a danger
internal to social contract theory. It is a reflexive function of founding a world on disparate and
homologous individualities, and this is why both Mill and Pateman emphasize the coextensive
nature of the social contract with the Racial and Sexual Contracts.228 Though Mill is writing an
account of a contract that is a historical actuality while Pateman is trying to map out the internal
dynamic of an implied contract229, this aspect of the social contract holds for both. Yet exclusion
from the social contract is not simply the result of drawing lines that categorize—it comes from
deeply isolating certain groups by predetermining them to not meet the criteria for consideration,
as social contract theorists have done to blacks, Native Americans, and women. Blacks are
systematically portrayed as incapable of engaging in the rational exchanges demanded by the
social contract as a result of their race.230 Native Americans are forever caught in the ‘brutish’
state of nature by both Hobbes and Locke, their culture insufficiently developed to be classified a
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civil society.231 Women, by virtue of their differences from the ideal citizen, are marked as
unable to even make the leap from nature to society while retaining their sovereignty.232 Social
contract theorists describe marriage as a situation where “the rule…naturally falls to the man’s
share,”233 and men as natural rulers since “the head of state bears the image of the father.”234
The social contract does not just bring together the community of the “free” and the “equal,” it
segregates at the margins of society the “non-social” to prevent the contamination of the social
contract world by the irrational, infantile, and dangerous. For these unfortunate individuals, the
social contract becomes the hegemony, the commonwealth the despised elites, and the
ontological line an invisible barricade that can never be crossed.
The cyclical temporality of the social contract only reinforces this divide. Because the
same choices present themselves over and over, it becomes necessary to reproduce the
exclusions of the social contract continuously. There is no possibility for change in the vital
structures that compose the world, which is why, as Pateman points out, “Locke takes it for
granted that a woman will, through the marriage contract, always agree to place herself in
subordination to her husband.”235 While the passing of time may bring new struggles for
democratic liberalism, Pateman points out that for contract theorists such struggles will always
exclude women’s liberation since “the subordination of wives to their husbands [is] seen as
natural.”236 (Hobbes again must be excepted from this generalization. He sees no good reason
for the subordination of women to man, saying “whereas some have attributed the Dominion to
the Men only, as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it,”237 claiming that
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historical contingencies have been the primary reason why men are dominant over women.) The
repetition of exclusions is vital to the survival and perpetuation of society, so the social contract
must constantly maintain its exclusionary measures. Depending on the level of the threat and the
means at one’s disposal, certain measures may at times be preferred over others, but the
existence of such measures is a constant. Mills claims “the police, the penal system, the army,”
are necessary to “maintain the racial order and detect and destroy challenges to it,” concluding
that “one has to recognize [the long bloody history of brutality against blacks] not as excesses by
individual racists but as an organic part of this political enterprise.”238 Similarly, Pateman argues
that the systematic subordination of women to men indicates that “the past and present content of
the marriage contract reveals the underlying assumption that women are not free and equal.”239
The passing of time presents only limited possibilities for change as the essential components of
politics always remain.
Rationality works with the spatiality and temporality of the social contract world to
exclude. Those outside the social contract are assumed to be resistant to traditional logic.
Attempts to engage them rationally are doomed to fail, as the semiotics produced by social
contract theory are incomprehensible to those incapable of being categorized as a disparate and
rational individuality. Beyond the social contract, one is not simply different, but subject to “a
basic inequality…in the capacity of different human groups to know and to detect natural
law,”240 “lacking in essential rationality,”241 “[excluded] from the original pact,”242 and
“[excluded] from the status of ‘individual’ in the natural condition.”243 Once barred from reason,
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contracts, and individuality—and thus unintelligible to the social contract—one can be
legitimately attacked or enslaved. Those incapable of rationality are by definition absurd, and
thus foolish, evil, or (inasmuch as their interests are always at odds with the public’s) rebellious.
The rational response to such ‘barbarity’ is ownership, destruction, or enslavement—acts that
represent taming or incorporation of marginalized people into the social contract world. Slavery
is not an alternate contract, but the employment of the excluded. A slave is a captive kept in
chains244, left in a perpetual state of war245, who is not governed by any covenant. When slavery
doesn’t work or is found to be unjustified246, the only alternative is the destruction of all potential
enemies to civil society.247 Carole Pateman analyzes the logic of enslavement, saying
…slavery came about because an example of subordination and ‘otherness’ had already
developed. ..Men must have observed that women easily became socially marginal if they
were deprived of the protection of their kinsmen or were no longer required for sexual
use, and so men ‘learned that differences can be used to separate and divide one group of
humans from another’248
The Sexual Contract contains within it an implicit recognition that women are different enough
from men that the social contract does not apply to them, demanding the enslavement (primarily)
of women. Social contract theory constantly attempts to mobilize the marginalized as it spreads
its doctrine of universal equality and freedom. When an entity is not rational enough to be
incorporable as a citizen, it gets incorporated as property, as a slave, or as an enemy, and forever
barred from participation in society.
Pateman’s analysis of women and slavery within the social contract is exemplary, but she
fails to take into account that, when it comes to women who are hostile to civil society, the
Sexual Contract treats such women as enemies and seeks to destroy rather than enslave them.
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Such treatment is only an exacerbation of the traditional attitude as in both there is a mutual
feeling of enmity, and both are employed as needed by the sovereign. Emma Goldman is an
example of this. Her antagonistic relationship to the US government and the male establishment
led to her condemnation as “dangerous” and a person of “undue harm.”249 Instead of being
enslaved, she was ostracized, imprisoned, and deported.
While the crucible set up by the rationality of the social contract justifies the oppression
and subjugation of women and minorities, the contract governs the relationships made with such
supposedly ‘non-humans’ after the creation of the civil state. Even though women and
minorities are not conceived of as autonomous individuals, and thus unable to make contracts,
social contract theory governs the relationships formed with them. Signatories of the social
contract uphold its clauses by developing strategies that protect them from ostracized groups like
blacks or women. If the group being discriminated against is portrayed as a threat, then the
sovereign can deploy the power of war or slavery, while if the group being discriminated against
is portrayed as infantile, the sovereign can deploy Locke’s paternal power. The contract is a
vehicle for the systematic and methodical victimization of groups of individuals within society.
It relies on the justification of rationality but operates independently, as unlike rationality it deals
with the actual exchange of goods or services and the production of actions. Multiple actions are
legitimated and encouraged, everything from the reasoned and mutually beneficial relationships
that organize the arrangement of property in Locke to dictatorial relationships governing how
and in what manner the sovereign can enslave or kill others. For blacks, contracts promote
enslavement and violence, ostensibly for purposes of justice and harmony but in actuality for the
purpose of regulating their place within the larger civil society. Charles Mills’ says “[Violent]
acts have to be seen not as arbitrary, not as the product of individual sadism…but as the
249
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appropriate moral and political response—prescribed by the Racial Contract—to a threat to a
system predicated on nonwhite subpersonhood.”250 The systematic program of discrimination
against blacks is conditioned by a contract that legitimates coercion for the defense of society. It
is an exchange between citizens to form institutions such as the police, prisons, and army, that
guard against and use as needed the black population (in the case of war-making power or
enslavement), or alternatively to care for them given their inability to care for themselves (in the
case of paternal power).
In many ways the Sexual Contract is similar, in that the marriage contract has
traditionally aimed to encourage a type of fidelity and slavery from women251, though the forms
of domination expressed in the Sexual Contract are more about exclusion and cultural
manipulation than overt violence. Contracts are for the most part unchangeable, as they are
based on reason’s reflection on the status of individuals, groups, and objects, and are not
alterable through the predilections and peccadilloes of others. Pateman’s discussion of marriage
emphasizes this:
A married couple cannot contract to change the ‘essentials’ of marriage, which are seen
as ‘the husband’s duty to support his wife, and the wife’s duty to serve her husband’.
The relation of protection and obedience cannot be legally altered, so that, for example, a
married couple cannot contract for the wife to be paid by her husband for her work as a
housewife.252
Contracts, for the social contract theorist, articulate what is necessary for a reliable and wellbalanced society. Change is only allowed in those situations in which it does not disrupt the
fabric of society. For those too irrational, foolish, or emotional to be autonomous individuals, a
systematic hierarchy must be established over or against them—not because they agreed to such
treatment, but because such treatment is implied by their very being.
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The outside of the social contract is irreconcilably opposed to the inside, and the
measures that exclude one from the other are wholly a part of the system rather than incidental
additions. The tension produced by the regulations of the social contract create a world that must
maintain its egalitarian and ordered character by denying equality and order to whatever does not
fit. And, just as the paradoxes inside the social contract produce attempts at reform, so too does
this outside call for change. The voice of the excluded and marginalized can become a voice for
revolution—one which questions the legitimacy of the social contract. The revolution
recognized by the social contract does not capture the entire potential of revolution; outside the
boundaries of that contract, the anarchic revolution that social contract theorists fear still waits.

Spilling over the edges of the world: why revolution and nature cannot be regulated
Social contract theory’s engagement with revolution ultimately fails, but it is not without
value. As the first political tradition to take revolution seriously as a possibility, it grapples with
what revolution is and how it can be justified. It does not take the established order of society
for granted, thereby opening a new space to think about how people can engage one another
beyond the confines of sovereign power and creating the possibility of a two-way relationship
between sovereign and subject. The separation of the people from the state brings forth
revolution, which requires new concepts (e.g. limits on sovereign power to justifications for
dissent) to deal with the potentials and dangers that follow. Social contract theory provides the
basis of a particular theory of revolution.
The failure of social contract theory with regard to revolution comes from its attempt to
regulate what is incapable of being regulated. Revolution is situated alongside, but opposed to,
the state. Both are drawn from nature, which limits revolution while creating paradoxes in the

67

state. These paradoxes lead to more calls for change and further attempts to separate the state
from revolution. At the same time, revolution can originate from outside the social contract,
meaning that the limited place provided for revolution within the social contract fails to fully
exhaust the capacity of revolution. Revolution destabilizes the social contract world from within
while undermining it from without. Social contract theory fails to anticipate that regulation of
revolution and nature is doomed to fail. It tries to capture the essence of nature, of humans, and
of the state while allowing for degrees of variation, but it does not account for the possibility of
radical change. Nature develops and shifts beyond the limits of social contract theory’s natural
laws, and when it does so people, the world, and society change as well. Social contract theory
describes only one possible world, and its regulations are easily rendered irrelevant upon the
alteration of human relationships, the development of new technologies, or any one of a whole
host of other potential changes. When it comes to the regulations of the social contract,
revolution is just as easily an expression of nature’s ability to surpass these regulations as it is of
citizens’ discontent with the sovereign. Social contract theory is premised upon an untenable
assumption that nature has static laws (or, in Rawls’ recasting of social contract theory, a view of
justice as a regulative idea). Placing revolution in this world inevitably leads the social
contract’s theory of revolution into a dead end. The attempt to regulate nature grounds one form
of power to the exclusion of all others, and revolution becomes just another expression of the
same power found in the state. Revolution is irrevocably bound to the state, with the voice of the
people yet to be heard.
To solve this problem, philosophy must develop a new treatment of revolution. This
treatment must not regulate nature, but recognize its ability to change and develop. Revolution is
an expression of this change and development, and the natural world must be seen as a part of a
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larger system. This is where Marxism enters, providing an alternative articulation of revolutions
that responds, in part, to the lacuna found within social contract theory. Marxism provides a
more sustained engagement with revolutions, including them directly within the process by
which governments form, rather than as a stop-gap when governments go awry. From this point
on, while social contract theory loses its monopoly on theories of revolution, some of its
concepts are incorporated into other projects. It is an ironic legacy of social contract theory that,
while its theorists were most concerned with legitimating sovereign rule, one of its most
enduring contributions is beginning the discussion on how that rule can be put to an end.
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The Trajectory of Marxism: Streamlining the Revolutionary Program
The Assimilation of Revolution
The zealots and foes of Marxism are legion. Its powerful friends and formidable enemies
have each experienced inspiring victories and crushing defeats. The label of Communist that in
some contexts raises individuals to the status of the elite will in others expose them to brutal
punishment. To be the target of Marxists is potentially terrifying, for they do not see revolution
as an inclusive and measured transition that only regenerates extant avenues of power.
Revolution is inevitable and necessary to create the communist society to come. It is jarring,
visceral, and always looming until the moment it breaks. Because the repressive “institutions,
mores, and traditions” of European countries are so entrenched, “the lever of [the worker’s]
revolution” must not be nonviolence, but “force.”253 There is an urgency to Marxism that stems
from its calls to create meaningful progress through concrete praxis and constant engagement. A
better society must be collectively built, not entrusted to abstract philosophical reflection. To
enter the world of Marxism is to enter a battleground composed of actual relationships and
conscious thoughts, where historical and scientific analyses are animated with a “revolutionary
fervor and desire for change.”254 Marxism provides no space for dispassionate observation, no
means for excepting oneself from the oncoming conflict between capitalist accumulation and
communist equality. When revolution comes, everyone will be swept up. Should they make it
to the other side, they will find not the utopian worlds of abstract thinkers but the real community
of which they have always been a part.
Marx worked for the liberation of the working class by studying the material realm. He
sought to use his discoveries to undermine capitalism’s harsh conditions. The ideals of justice
253

Marx, “The Possibility of Non-Violent Revolution” in The Marx Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker (New York:
W.W. Norton and Co., 1978), 523.
254
David McLellan. Marxism after Marx (New York; Harper & Row, 1979), 3.

70

and equality alone are incapable of bringing about this end, because it is one’s actual conditions
that truly stimulate change. A real account of politics must return to the material world and
study the conditions that gave rise to each age of humankind. Authenticity is found in the
concrete relations expressed within one’s material situation (e.g. classes, needs, abilities, and
means of production), not formal identities (e.g. nationality or religion).255 Ideological concepts
such as those found in social contract theory or capitalist economics reproduce oppressive
systems despite their ostensible devotion to principles of freedom and justice. Recognizing this
fact reveals strategies for overturning such oppressive systems. The magnitude of this realization
presents the world anew as fundamentally inequitable, and as the fantasies dissolve in front of us
it becomes clear that only radical change will set everything right again. Only revolution has the
capacity to overthrow the ruling class and its supporting ideologies, and only revolution will
bring humanity to its next stage of development. When freed from its ideological bonds,
revolution can go beyond just fixing the problems with the state, it can move the world forward
along its inevitable trajectory. Marx sees each stage of existence as part of a sequence, and no
government or economic system is fully intelligible until viewed as part of a larger, historically
unfolding progression.256 Failed social orders did not simply lack the right prescription—they
needed to fail for us to evolve. As a vehicle for numerous historical changes, revolution must
play a central role in this theory. Whereas the social contract keeps revolution at the margins as
a potential, Marx presents revolution as an integral part of human development.257 A sovereign
cannot prevent radical change by keeping to the social contract, for it is sovereignty itself—and
the fixed system it heads—that attracts the potency of revolution.
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Marxism has a specific target in the creation of an egalitarian world and describes a
definite path to get there. It is primarily because society is not organized in a manner that allows
for the full expression of our nature that previous social systems led to oppression, poverty, and
suffering. Revolution’s goal is the overthrow of the pernicious capitalist order and the institution
of a society that both recognizes the material needs of every human and provides for their
fulfillment. “[F]rom each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”258—that is the
maxim a liberated society must follow. Where social contract theory portrays revolution as a fix
to a system in crisis, Marxism wholly absorbs revolution into its workings. Revolution is given a
more prominent and active role, but at the same time it is overwhelmed with the meanings the
Marxist project prescribes. The attempt to salvage revolution by giving it a more prominent role
only further draws it into the state, for the revolution Marx describes speaks for Marx’s ontology
and metaphysics. Ultimately, Marx’s revolution confirms the trajectory of his world, and proves
that the relationship between the material and the ideological is exactly as he described. Even
the different interpretations of Marx’s thought, with all the innovations they bring, cling to the
basic outlines of the Marxist world and the trajectory it entails. While revolution remains
incorporated into Marxism, it is incapable of speaking with its own voice.
As many individuals have noted259, defining Marxism has grown more difficult over time
as it is constantly reinterpreted. This chapter does not seek to solve this problem, but as I want to
be clear what is at stake at different parts of the chapter, I will use the following terminology:
“Marxism” will be used to refer to the set of Marx-inspired philosophies genealogically related
to one another (such as those I will be dealing with later in the chapter), “Classical Marxism”
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will be used to refer to Marx’s own philosophy, and “Historical Marxism” will be used to refer to
the political ideology of Marxism and its specific history.

Making politics friendly to revolution
Marx undermines the social contract by framing his theory around a concept of nature
that is sensuous, non-ideological, and objective.260 Nature is not static, but an external world that
affects humankind just as humankind affects it. Because no natural essence grounds living
creatures Marx’s discussion of nature begins at the first concrete encounter between humans and
nature, neither having been theorized in advance.261 Humans are not formulaically free and
equal individuals262 who can be conceived apart from nature263 as simple abstractions264; rather,
understanding them requires understanding the physical reality in which they live.265 Humans
are defined by “the totality of the actions whereby they reproduce their own material
existence.”266 Starting in the most primitive human societies the differences between men and
women grow, “by virtue of natural predisposition (e.g., physical strength), needs, accidents,
etc.,” into a division of labor.267 This first division becomes the blueprint for other divisions, and
as new tasks are apportioned to segments of the populace a hierarchical class system forms. 268
Marx views space as highly stratified, for human civilization has throughout its history has been
composed of conflicting groups in dominant-submissive relationships. “The history of all
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hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles,”269 Marx and Engels notoriously
proclaim. Human consciousness has yet to reflect upon a world not riven by the clashes of
hostile groups.
The groups that compose society are the products of material conditions. When material
conditions change, old classes pass away as new ones take their place. No particular division of
humans is permanent, for the factors producing social groups constantly change. The causes
motivating change vary, but are always rooted in objective and non-ideological conditions. The
influx of colonial resources into European countries during the 17th Century, combined with
increased demand for new products, created the industrial era’s division of labor (boss vs. factory
worker) as well as new tools like looms, ships, and levers.270 Massive amounts of natural
resources and industrial machinery erased national identities, religions, and traditional moralities
in order to “[create] everywhere the same relations between the classes of society.”271 Changes
in geographic location, technology, and availability of material wealth, produced the capitalist
classes of bourgeoisie and proletarian which replaced the feudal divisions of lords, vassals,
knights, plebeians, and slaves.272 The capitalist doctrine and modern concept of human were
developed to justify these transformations of society, just as new ideologies are developed in
response to every significant change in the material world. Such ideologies present the world as
a given, not as a product of industry, society, and the activity of previous generations.273
Ideologies disguise the world by developing artificial concepts, hiding the forces that developed
the predominant worldview, and presenting themselves as irrefutable truths. As Peter Osbourne
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says, “Ideologies are systems of ideas that misrepresent society…For Marx at this time, German
philosophy was the German ideology because it was the primary means through which German
culture (mis)represented the world to itself…”274 Each new ordering of human society is
accompanied by new ideas as humans continually try to come to terms with the actuality of
nature and the human condition. Ideologies motivate human actions that, in turn, produce the
world (for example, estrangement from our nature erases animal needs and produces a need for
work275), but they also result from the material world. The dialogical relationship between
ideology and the material means it operates in constant connection with physical objects, not
apart from them. It is a grave error to see ideological changes as unrelated to social organization;
the two fields are intrinsically linked.
Marx rejects definitions of humanity that see individuals as “egoistic” and “in [their] true
nature only in the form of the abstract citizen.”276 Humans must be conceived of materially as a
“corporeal, living, real, sensuous objective being[s] full of natural vigour.”277 Marx’s
materialism focuses on concrete subjective action through a study of the context that provides the
actions with their meaning or significance. Marx examines actions within their social situation,
looking at how human activities and human relationships reciprocally form each other. Capital
shows that human labor—and the commodities it produces—are only valuable inasmuch as they
are appreciated by society278, yet only through the process of producing commodities for
exchange is society put in a position to apply value to them.279 Such trends are identifiable
because they occur on a massive scale, and as a result constitute a predictable process. As Eric
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Fromm puts it, “Change is due to the contradiction between the productive forces (and other
objectively given conditions) and the existing social organization. When a mode of production or
social organization hampers, rather than furthers, the given productive forces, a society, if it is
not to collapse, will choose such forms of production as fit the new set of productive forces and
develop them.”280 Historical trends can be anticipated by studying the contradictions between
production and society, then extrapolating what will be needed to solve them. The material
realm is a realm of actions and relationships. As their product, thought is generated by this realm
and represents a relationship one takes towards oneself or society.281 These actions and
relationships produce the world and its contents. They act as homogenizing forces, for each set
of actions and relationships dictates a different arrangement of society, and when a new set is
developed a new dictation is dispersed throughout. Productive forces, technologies, and
practices carry a compulsion to conform, which occurs both on an individual and societal level.
The development of industrial machines transformed workers into machines themselves,
nurturing their “helpless dependence upon the factory as a whole”282 and transforming society
from one characterized by manufacture to one characterized by industry.283
New homogenizing forces, like those that produced the factory, create bonds and rifts
between individuals. Marx’s accounts describe both the contradictions and the similarities that
develop in each era. In every situation, the relationships that exist are classifiable either in terms
of association or of antagonism. The modern bourgeoisie are supported by the “executive of the
modern State” in their fight against the proletariat, yet in the past the bourgeoisie shared with the
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serfs a common enemy in the nobility.284 Peasants in the industrial world are not identifiable
with the proletariat, yet their interests are the same and in the future the two will unite against the
capitalist.285 Such associations are overshadowed by the larger contradictions produced by
conflicting classes, such as those between the lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, or
capitalist and proletariat.286 It is by understanding relations of association and antagonism that
Marx predicts times of radical change. In non-revolutionary times, the relations are dynamic and
flexible, and the conflicting groups have not yet been able to recognize their common interests in
order to form a political program. Revolutions occur when the interests of competing classes
become so divergent that sustainability is no longer possible even in the short term. At this
point, the relations of antagonism and the relations of association both catalyze the revolution, as
the former push each class towards militancy, while the latter encourage solidarity.
The ongoing alterations of the world reveal that, for Marx, temporality is the succession
of systems. Individual systems often have their own unique means for measuring time stemming
from material conditions, but the principal way of tracking the passage of time in Classical
Marxism is through the replacement of one system by another. Particular arrangements of
society do not present time objectively. The ways time is measured for the purposes of paying
wages in Capitalism did not exist in feudal societies,287 while Newtonian mechanics is connected
with capitalism as a theoretical precondition for it.288 Engels sees Kantian and Newtonian
systems—including their concepts of time—as stages within a Hegelian-like system that
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privileges process.289 Social systems measure time for their own interests, and each time one is
overthrown a new standard for time develops. The only persistent concept of time Marx leaves
us with presents time as a movement leading from one arrangement to another. For Marx,
“history is nothing but the succession of…separate generations,” each of which “[continues] the
traditional activity in completely changed circumstances” and “[modifies] the old circumstances
with a completely changed activity.”290 Because the specific ways time is tracked are social
traditions and not objective measures, Classical Marxism follow the changing social systems that
produce each particular schema. Social systems are arrangements of subjects, objects, and
relationships, and as such are not monolithic. This is a necessary consequence of Marx’s
rejection of abstraction, for consistency demands that Marx define history in terms of “material,
empirically verifiable [acts]…which every individual furnishes” rather than “a mere abstract act
on the part of…the world spirit.”291 History, the only constant measure of time Marx provides, is
neither abstract nor definable in terms of one single measure; it is plural, renewing, and revealed
through the ongoing shifts in material relations.292 As Kolakowski writes, “Strictly
speaking…there is no such thing as time in itself but only relations of succession (before and
after), 'time' being a secondary abstraction from these.”293
Marx’s framing of his system in terms of conflicting groups and successive systems is
accompanied by motive forces that determine how and why things change. One essential aspect
of Marx’s thought is the notion that subjects and objects follow a trajectory which terminates at a
predetermined endpoint.294 Society must be studied scientifically before any trajectories can be
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determined295, but it is a fact that all objects in a particular context aim at a definable goal.296
The end at which things aim does not come from essences or utopian ideals. It originates from
the interactions between objects and subjects situated in the same world.297 Nothing outside or
behind one’s everyday actions and material situation determines this sequence of events, yet
given the state of society there is no other possible telos but the one Marx describes.298 Marx’s
telos is produced from below rather than instituted from above, yet it is a defining principle of
the world he creates. The capitalist world is ripe for revolution because “by driving hitherto
isolated workers into mills and factories, modern industry had created the very conditions in
which the proletariat could associate and combine into a dominant force.”299 Individuals may
play different roles in realizing society’s goal, but everyone is pulled along by the collective
weight of history as if caught in a tidal wave, with no hope of changing a direction determined
by forces far outside their control.300 Revolution is no exception; it results from many
interactions that each express a purpose and becomes part of the social context that gives others
purpose. The purpose revolution expresses is always a reconciling of contradictions301, for it is a
massive restructuring that only appears at moments of transition. It is produced not by a system,
but by the contradictions a system creates.
Classical Marxism outlines a world more accommodating to change than social contract
theory’s. It is adaptive, interconnected, and self-motivated. Revolution is no longer used as a
stop-gap, for the supersession of boundaries that the social contract is designed to prevent is an
essential characteristic of Marx’s world and something to be embraced. Marx’s revolutions do
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not confine change within specific parameters, but direct it onto a productive path. They stem
the tide of destructive forces, motivating new social arrangements when the current one becomes
untenable. Though capable of massive shifts, revolutions have historically only led to
incremental changes. In the introduction to Marx’s The Class Struggles in France, Engels says
previous revolutions have only “resulted in the displacement of one definite class rule by
another;” any marginal advances were overshadowed by the fact that, because “the proletarian
masses…were still absolutely in the dark as to the path to be taken,” their initial zeal quickly
degraded into “a revolution of feeling as soon as illusion evaporated and disappointment set
in.”302 Only now, after the modifications of previous eras, can a true communist revolution
(which will finally “bring [humankind’s] ‘existence’ into harmony with their ‘essence’”303)
occur. Revolutions have a clear social function—they provide a new organization to society that
resolves previous inconsistencies and errors. Even when unsuccessful they can have a profound
effect by opening “fractures and fissures” in society while denouncing the “abyss” which awaits
if no action is taken.304 Revolutions “are the driving force of history”305 which act like elemental
powers conditioning Marx’s world. The boundaries of the social contract are replaced in
Classical Marxism with a trajectory, the endpoint of which revolution must ensure.
Classical Marxism avoids many of the problems of social contract theory by embracing a
historically evolving model of human nature. But does it capture the full possibilities of
revolution by grounding it in a material world and endowing it with a telos? Revolution may not
be put to work enforcing the ideal state of social contract theorists, but nevertheless its role as a
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motive force makes it speak for the forthcoming communist state. Because Marx’s revolutions
treat as unimportant anything not connected with the larger goals of the Marx’s project, they
limit other forms of emancipation by privileging their own. The state Marx describes—
ineluctably aimed at creating a communist society—dominates the discourse of emancipation.

Guiding revolution from behind the scenes
Marx reshapes the terms of political debate from a focus on justice to a focus on human
existence. In so doing he casts liberal political theory—and its inauguration in the atomic
individual possessed of rational thought and selfish desires—as ideological.306 Political theory
must capture the becoming of human existence, not rest on a set of regulative ideas.307 Such
ideas form enclosed systems of power around static concepts of humanity, yet in reality they are
a piece of the larger movements of society. They must be understood within the context of the
material environment that produced them. Revolution is centralized in Classical Marxism as it
enables Marx to connect different social hierarchies into one schema that presents them as part of
an ongoing progression. Because enclosed systems of power are really part of a larger unfolding
order, their inadequacy and downfall must be part of this larger order too. Revolutions are not
the system in moments of crisis, but the system working as it should. Rather than being driven
by the social contract, revolutions are the counterpoint to non-communist societies and the
classes that compose them, able to solve the inevitable problems that such societies intrinsically
carry. The larger order that is ineluctably revealed in exigent moments narrows and focuses
revolutionary possibilities. Overthrowing particular governments draws society closer to the
point where it recognizes itself as it is, dissolves all classes, and creates a sustainable system for
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all. Revolution is still stewarded by the state, but rather than authorizing the same government
that preceded it, revolution now operates as part of the same program as the state. The processes
by which the world develops lead to communism, and both revolution and the state are
committed to that goal, even if they are unaware of this fact.
Marx believed that during his lifetime he saw instances of the coming worldwide
revolution which would overthrow the capitalist order, and his understanding of revolution is in
part informed by these events. Both the Paris Commune and the Revolutions of 1848 happened
during his lifetime, and both reflect concerns similar to those he writes about. The Revolutions
of 1848, while having little direct impact on governance, developed a consciousness among the
lower classes that persisted long after the revolutions were put down. Similarly, the Paris
Commune was one of the first attempts to create a truly socialist society, complete with
elections, feminist initiatives, workers rights, and the separation of religion from governance.
These revolutions were notable for the way they saw class and living conditions as important
issues that revolutionaries should address. Demands should deal with concrete material
conditions, not just formal aspects of governance. One also sees the concept of socialism
developing, for despite the similarity in demands made by both revolutions the people running
the Paris Commune had a better formulated idea of how society should function to be inclusive,
democratic, and egalitarian. Finally, the harsh way in which each revolutions was put down
indicates how hostile established states were to transformative change, and how dangerous they
felt these new ideas to be. These concerns are all reflected in Marx’s writings, for just like these
revolutions Marx deals with material conditions, believes communism will develop over time,
and is skeptical that will states reform themselves or accept revolutionary demands. The practice
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of revolution undergoes a shift in Marx’s lifetime that parallels how Marx’s concept of
revolution differs from earlier ones.
Marx sees revolutions as a cure for ideologies. Throughout his work he describes
revolution as “the alteration of men on a mass scale,”308 the abolition of “the political character
of civil society” which “set[s] free the political spirit,”309 and the result of “material elements”
and “productive forces” rather than ideas.310 Revolutions are both part of society’s progression
and moments of becoming that destabilize repressive ideologies. They occur when conditions
are such that the ideology of the present is at odds with the extant material forces.311 Though
previous revolutions wound up producing new ideologies and class divisions, the coming
communist revolution will abolish both.312 Revolution is a moment of anti-ideology. It may
lead to a new ideology, but its principle function is to undermine established ideologies. Yet
Marx imbues revolution with an ideology itself by fixing its trajectory. His descriptions of
revolutions contain both form and direction, as by Marx’s account they must occur in a certain
way and aim at the same telos. Marx insists that peasants must be turned into proletariats before
any revolution will succeed in overturning capitalism313, that the next major revolution will be
economic in nature314, and that the state by necessity will be supplanted by worker councils.315
Marx overloads his revolution with excessive preconditions in order to ensure a seemingly
natural transition to communism. As Bernard Yack writes, “[Marxist revolution] does not arise
necessarily out of the social experience of workers; workers must view their experience from a
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particular philosophical perspective, they must have a particular understanding of man’s
humanity and the obstacles to its realization, before they will even long for a total
revolution…let alone actually revolt.”316 Marx speaks prophetically of revolution. Communism
is for him inevitable and imminent because “society can no longer live under [the] bourgeoisie
[as] its existence is no longer compatible with society.”317 The same unalterable laws that
determined why and when the bourgeoisie revolted against feudalism also determine the nature
of the proletarian revolution. It is necessary that revolution follow these rules for Marx to make
the case that it fits into his larger project. As Kolakowski writes “The future liberation on which
[Marx’s and Engels’] historical optimism was based was not merely a matter of abolishing
poverty and satisfying elementary human needs, but of fulfilling man's destiny and ensuring his
dignity and greatness by giving him the maximum control over nature and his own life.”318 The
anti-ideological voice of revolution hides the ideological program that projects the creation of a
classless, communal society onto every occurrence of revolution and portrays communists as the
essential saviors of workers. The confines of the social contract are gone, but revolution is still
dictated by the materialist framework that Marx places beneath the state.
Marx envisions revolution as predictable. For that to happen, revolution must follow
certain knowable rules, necessitating that facets of the world remain outside revolution’s reach.
Such parts play a role in shaping how revolution occurs, keeping it on track within the program
Marx describes. Revolution results from unsustainable material contradictions, such as when
propertyless slaves are pitted against the property owners in communal societies, or when feudal
towns must overcome resistance from the countryside to expand.319 It is able to radically change
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material conditions in response to contradictions, as happened when the increasing amount of
trade between countries transformed society from a feudal hierarchy to the capitalist opposition
between bourgeoisie and proletariats.320 The material conditions that produce the productive
forces which form particular social arrangements are, in times of revolution, radically altered to
create a new normality. What does not change is the character of the material world, which from
beginning to end is the realm where social arrangements, ideas, and states originate. This
character functions as an axis around which the world moves, but is itself stable and independent
from the shifts and reversals Marx describes. For example, the Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844 define nature as man’s “inorganic body” inasmuch as it is “his direct means
of life” and “the instrument of his life activity.”321 Humans have real desires, emotions, and
needs, though the illusory notions of wealth or status found in capitalist societies turn these
authentic expressions of our humanity into “abstract conceits” and “imperfections.”322 The
Manifesto of the Communist Party says ideas stem from man’s material existence323, while The
German Ideology provides 4 premises—that existence is dependent upon satisfying needs, that
satisfying needs leads to new needs, that the perpetuation of one’s existence leads to the
development of families and social relationships, and that social relationships occur in certain
modes or forms which determine the direction of history—which specify how to approach
writing a materialist history free of “political or religious nonsense.”324
Throughout Marx’s works a fixed character is given to the material world. Certain
aspects of individuals’ relationships to themselves, or between humans and nature, always
behave according to permanent rules. Revolution is enormously effective at reorganizing the
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material world to produce new technologies325, governments326, and products327 but it is
incapable of altering the basic facts of this world. As long as humans exist they will have wants
that must be fulfilled. Ideas are always a product of materiality. Social orders will develop via
the same processes that produced those preceding them. The material world is torn in two. One
part is unchangeable and furnishes the material laws Marx describes; the other part contains the
entities, forces, and relationships present in any particular social arrangement, and is where
revolution operates. In a similar vein, Bernard Yack claims Marx’s project relies on a dichotomy
between “human powers and material forces” that sees the latter as indifferent to human
purposes and the former as capable of being consciously directed.328 This division of the
material realm has a critical impact on revolution. Marx describes revolution as though it is
produced by and produces all the entities and relationships found in the material realm. Yet a
whole host of indispensable, permanent entities mark off parts of the material world as
inaccessible to revolution. Marx’s revolution operates only on parts of the material world (such
as social arrangements and political systems), which allows the other parts (such as human
nature and the relationship between the material and ideal) to maintain the consistency of the
material realm. By wielding revolution as a scalpel, Classical Marxism radically alters some
things and perpetually keeps others the same. The positioning of revolution in this way makes
revolution operative for Marx’s larger program by only subjecting some parts of the world to
revolutionary ire.
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So sure are Marx, Engels, and the early Marxists that they know the path revolution will
take329 they are dismissive of revolutionary projects incompatible with their communist vision.
These ideological undertones have unfortunately so pervaded the communist movement that for
many it is an expression of their devotion to undertake dangerous actions, including some which
Marx would no doubt reject, to bring about Marx’s communist state. These claims have been put
forth on many occasions. For instance, some feminists criticize Marxism as patriarchal, while
others have tried to revive Marxism as a tool for feminism.330 Similar critiques have been
leveled at Marxism by race and queer activists.331 Meanwhile, Humans Rights Watch and
Amnesty International have both criticized Cuba’s ostensibly communist government for
repressing the population, imprisoning dissidents, and executing political prisoners.332
Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago333 documents numerous abuses of Stalin’s nominally
communist state.
Putting revolution in service of the communist project, while excluding from discussion political
or ethical concerns attached to illusory ideologies, creates the perilous potential for sanctioning
brutal actions. No moral codes can justly restrain revolution if it can fundamentally alter the
material conditions out of which ethics arises, and concerns over proper treatment of those here
and now seem quaint when measured against the ultimate end of all history. The attempt to think
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revolution through becoming—rather than capture its being—deftly avoids the problems of the
social contract, but the mechanisms Marx uses to do so result in new dangers.

Rearranging the Marxist Trajectory, Part 1: Science vs. Organizing Principle
The revolution Marx envisioned did not happen as quickly as he predicted, and while his
faith never wavered, as Marx grew older he accepted the likely necessity of a long struggle.334
His philosophical progeny spread throughout the world, bringing the message of working-class
liberation and communal ownership. Along the way, paradoxes, inconsistencies, and biases
compelled a retooling of some basic principles, while new philosophical and scientific
discoveries called for attempts at synthesis. Since Marx’s death, his disciples have reformulated
his project many times, adapting it strategically while trying to preserve its basic message. To
see the effects of these alterations on the Marxist vision of revolution, and to check whether they
escape its contradictions, I will trace the development of Marxism through the party-centered
conceptions of it by V.I Lenin and Mao Tse-Tung, the phenomenological variations of Jean-Paul
Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Louis Althusser’s structuralist interpretation, and the critical
articulations given it by the Frankfurt School. Rather than recounting their philosophies
wholesale, I will focus on the modifications each thinker makes to Marxism’s foundations.
There are two principal ways in which the Marxist project is modified. First, the laws
guiding its operation are adjusted. This includes the functioning of the dialectic, the manner in
which ideology and materialism operate, and the method for producing a communist society.
Second, the structure of Marxism is revised. This includes the overall shape of the world,
relationships between established parts of the Marxist world (such as between the dialectic and
individuals), and the specific places forces like production and exchange are located. In the
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former, it is the process of Marxism that is engaged, while in the latter, it is its form. In regards
to process, Lenin, Mao, and Althusser treat Marxism as a science, while Sartre, Mealeau-Ponty,
and the Critical Theorists treat it as a universal organizing principle. In regards to form, each
thinker locates Marxism within a world substantially different than the world Marx himself
describes. However, the degree to which the world is definite and determinate, and what about
the world can be known, differs from theorist to theorist. The version of Marxism each thinker
returns is ultimately located in a different world than Marx and Engels described. Though this
results in new characterizations and roles for revolution by each thinker, in no theory does
revolution fully escape the trajectory Marx prescribes. The nature of the state to which
revolution is attached varies; but that it is attached to a Marxist state endures.
Those that emphasize Marxism’s scientific character focus on how it works as a system
to provide substantive knowledge about the social realm. Vladimir Lenin’s interpretation of
Marxism formalizes many of the disparate elements of Marx’s writings, codifying them into a
doctrine and expanding on a number of topics Marx left undeveloped. What is of importance to
Lenin is distinguishing the exact path needed to get to communism and rejecting any formulation
of Marxism that turns it into a policy or general approach to politics.335 Marxism, as treated by
Lenin, is a prescription, arrived at scientifically, that accurately recalls the movements of history
in order to foretell the future. The “withering away of the state” that Marx and Engels refer to is
necessarily “impossible without a violent revolution.”336 Any sort of strategic alliance or
commonality with the bourgeoisie is a fundamental illusion, as the overthrow of the bourgeoisie
“can be accomplished only by the proletariat.”337 Similarly, Mao Tse-Tung claims that the
revolution will only succeed upon firmly uniting “all the nationalities, democratic classes,
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democratic parties, people’s organizations, and patriotic democrats” around the Communist
Party’s “fundamental law—the Common Programme.”338 This view of Marxism has been
verified, Mao says, “not only because it was so considered when it was scientifically formulated
by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin but because it has been verified in the subsequent practice of
revolutionary class struggle.”339
Marxism, for both Lenin and Mao, is demonstrably true as an objective and impartial
description of the state of society. It exists independently of any form of constructivism, and its
prescriptions have a scientific validity that has been achieved through the application of the basic
principles that motivate humanity. Žižek discusses how Lenin thought that “while ordinary
individuals are caught in historical events which surpass them, blinded to their true meaning, so
that their consciousness is ‘false,’ a revolutionary cadre has access to the true (‘objective’)
meaning of events, that is, his consciousness is the direct self-consciousness of historical
necessity itself.”340 This manifests itself most clearly in the doctrinaire way in which they
understand the dialectic, for both Lenin and Mao believe the dialectic is an observable
phenomenon which operates in a determinate manner. When incorporated into the study of
history, Lenin says, the dialectic produces a field as accurate as any of the natural sciences.341
Mao goes one step further, emphasizing that every instance of motion results from a dialectical
progression between the internal contradictions that make up every object.342 Contradictions are
universal—their particularity comes from the fact that they exist differently in particular
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objects343 and that within each situation there is always one primary contradiction surrounded by
numerous secondary ones.344 Because the dialectic operates according to formal rules, Lenin and
Mao emphasize teleology and the ability of the Marxist project to provide a definite
understanding of the past, the present, and the future. Lenin predicts the necessity of two stages
of communism (one where differences of wealth exist without exploitation345 and a later one
where the state is gone and freedom reigns346), while Mao is certain that communism is the only
way that human civilization will survive.347 Lenin and Mao interpret Marxism as a discipline
that describes in absolute terms how society operates, and which conclusively determines
society’s trajectory. There is one revolutionary project that leads to communism, and any other
paths will result in failure.
Though Marx sounds many of the same notes as Lenin and Mao, it is important to recognize that
Marx himself was far less programmatic than either Lenin or Mao, and on numerous occasions
puts in qualifications to his predictions and methods. For example, he admits that sometimes
revolutions may be accomplished peacefully348, that future events will occur differently in
different countries, that communists should partner with groups that do not have the same
aims349, and that different countries require different tactics.350 It is also worth mentioning that
Marx’s ideal vision of communism was much less violent towards the bourgeoisie than Lenin’s
or Mao’s projects.351
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Similarly, Louis Althusser claims that Marxism functions as a “science of history” 352
which subjects social formations to a systematic and rigorous analysis. But while Lenin, Mao,
and Althusser each say that Marxism is a science353, they differ in their understanding of how
that order is arrived at and its relationship to the external world. Whereas Lenin and Mao argue
that the external world obeys laws and that Marxism avoids ideology by studying the material
world, Althusser argues that because it is impossible to ever truly grasp the external world or to
practice science without a motivating ideology, Marxism must be constantly critical of any
received doctrine.354 Science means something very specific for Althusser, as he does not
conceive of it as an empirical exercise but as a multi-leveled process of abstraction whereby
different types of generality get transformed from ‘facts’ into ‘theory’.355 Everything that a
scientist works with is generalized to some degree, including immediate sensations, for even they
are only comprehensible once they have been articulated through words.356 The work of a
scientist is to transform the ‘facts’ that comprise the most basic level of generality into concepts
and theories that have explanatory power. Marx’s scientific project is not to describe the real
qua one’s sensations, but to operate on several levels and through several stages of generality to
construct a knowledge about the social world.357 Importantly, Althusser avoids rooting Marxism
in any concept of what it means to be human, claiming that Marx gave up any such notion after
1845.358 The scientific approach that Althusser sees in Marx’s work necessitates a critique of
any received doctrine, including those that come with a static or essential concept of human
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nature. For him, all such ideas are ideological in nature.359 The true starting point in Marx’s
science is materialist praxis, and its purpose an ongoing critique of ideological assumptions of all
kinds.
Other Marxists claim that viewing Marxism as a science is too superficial, and that
Marx’s doctrine acts as an organizing principle. For those who hold this view, Marxism is not
just an approach or a method that uncovers or systematizes how the world functions—it is the
process by which the world becomes consistent. When conceived as an organizing principle,
Marxism is not something that distills and formalizes reality, but the mechanism by which the
reality we experience forms. French existentialists Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre
reject the Leninist, Maoist, and Althusserian approaches by questioning the possibility that the
world can be given an objective form in the manner that Lenin and Mao believe, or that Marxism
can constitute the subject in the way Althusser claims. Sartre argues that things in the world are
in themselves meaningless as they are capable of an infinite number of different appearances,
and so the transcendental ego is necessary to provide them with any value.360 Similarly,
Merleau-Ponty states that any quality can only be apprehended within “a whole perceptual
context”361 which affects how it is perceived, and that meaning in sensation must be understood
as “a process of integration in which the text of the external world is not so much copied, as
composed.”362 For both, the subject is an integral part of any experience of the world, and no
knowledge can be developed without it. Thus there is no possibility of neutrally observing the
external world, or studying it scientifically without at the same time constituting it. Marx’s
system can only be saved by changing it from a means of studying the world to a means of

359

Ibid., 223.
Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1956), 5.
361
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception (New York: Routledge, 1968), 9.
362
Ibid., 10.
360

93

producing the world. As the principle by which the world is created, Sartre claims Marxism
incorporates everything, including human consciousness and the dialectic, into its theory.363 As
Merleau-Ponty shows, the failure to do this inevitably places knowing outside dialectics (and
thus outside the Marxist system), giving it an absolute character and placing Marxism in tension
with itself.364 Dialectics must be able to explain its own development as well. For Sartre, this
means that it needs to be able to justify itself without referring to anything outside it.365 To refer
to external forces implies a separate order beyond dialectics, one which works according to an
old model of motion that sees movement as an accidental occurrence. Dialectics provides the
only explanation for motion that conceives of it as an internal principle366, and only by justifying
itself will dialectics not end up invoking an absolute foundation that precedes it. Sartre’s
dialectics is not a science, as unlike science it cannot refer to principles or beings outside itself;
instead, dialectics is the only principle that must be determined a priori and without relation to
anything else.367
Merleau-Ponty agrees with Sartre in his criticism of materialist dialectics qua science, but
diverges in part on the role dialectics plays within the world. For Merleau-Ponty, dialectics is an
organizing principle of the world, but not the organizing principle of the world. According to
Martin Jay, Merleau-Ponty denies that there is any “normative totality which could be used as
the critical vantage point from which the present might be judged.”368 For Merleau-Ponty,
Marxism is “essentially descriptive” and “used to make sense of what was,” but whose task is
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infinite in nature.369 Materialist dialectics appears at the intersection of subjects in the world, as a
principle by which a field of experience is formed and by which objects and subjects are always
opening themselves to others.370 Unlike Sartre, Merleau-Ponty does not think dialectics is
totalizing, and in fact argues that the dialectic itself is dialectical inasmuch as it goes through
stages371 without ever reaching a final totality.372 Though the dialectic is constituted, MerleauPonty emphasizes that the relationship between the external world and the subject does not leave
the outcome of history radically open. History is ambiguous and yields no definite meaning, yet
it has an vague trajectory that is revealed in moments of crisis. This trajectory does not
determine, but rather guides, society, while at the same time human actions affect the course of
history. The movements of history and the significance of human action are so interwoven that
at a certain point they become indistinguishable. It is for this reason that we can neither lose the
dialectic—and the idea that it has a telos—nor the idea that humans are free to their own
destiny.373 Even though no totalizing ever occurs, the dialectic encourages or motivates history
in a vague direction while being open to a modification of the ultimate goal.
The critical theory of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer is comparable to the works
of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty inasmuch as they all resist seeing Marxism as a science of the world
by emphasizing the dialectic’s ability to call into question the coherence of the world. But unlike
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Adorno and Horkheimer do not ground the dialectic in the
constituting capacity of subjects. Instead, they see dialectics as an inherent, real, and necessary
process grounded in the nature of the world. As Adorno writes in the introduction to Negative
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Dialectics, dialectics is not programmatic or rule based, but real and existent,374 so it should not
be reduced to a set number of steps or to an operation. Dialectics is becoming—not just in the
sense that things are constantly moving from place to place or gaining and losing qualities, but
that things are constantly not what they are.375 Dialectics is a process by which newness enters
the world, and through it any identity is open to radical change. As Adorno puts it, dialectics is
the manner in which “all concepts, even the philosophical ones, refer to nonconceptualities.”376
Yet this is only half the process, for dialectics continually traps the nonconceptual in the
conceptual since any attempt to point to something outside the conceptual inevitably requires a
concept to complete itself.377 Dialectics cannot follow a program, a rule, or any conceptual
model without limiting itself, thus negating its very purpose. Because of dialectic’s openness,
Adorno questions the need for a predetermined end in communism378 and, like Althusser, posits
instead a need for constant critique in order to keep all concepts dynamic.379 As Martin Jay
writes, “Adorno…seems not to have hoped for the complete overcoming of reification, that
special bugbear of Hegelian Marxism. Yet in much of his writing, he used reification as a term
of opprobrium, contending, for example, that ‘dialectics means intransigence towards all
reification’.”380 There is no positive content to dialectics that can be permanently delineated, as
the nature of dialectics is to sublimate anything of that type. Adorno radicalizes Marx’s dialectic
by removing it from the traditional Marxist program. Dialectic becomes a principle in itself.
This perspective on dialectics, while reminiscent of other Marxist philosophers, ultimately
separates Adorno from all of them. In his description of scientific Marxism, Althusser only talks
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about the different levels of generality that come out of an encounter with the world. Dialectic is
one such abstraction, and it constitutes a theoretical practice. By contrast, Adorno talks about
dialectic not just as a theory, but as a force which mediates between the conceptual and
nonconceptual. Similarly, at first glance there seem to be a number of similarities between
Merleau-Ponty and Adorno with regard to their descriptions of the dialectic’s openness,
inclusion of the nonconceptual, and application of critique to the dialectic itself. Martin Jay
writes that both Merleau-Ponty and Adorno “proposed an essentially negative dialectic without
the likelihood of any positive resolution”381 and felt that the idea of a harmonious end to history
was a idealization of death.382 A.T. Nuyem argues that both Adorno and Merleau-Ponty claim
the nonconceptual (or non-reflective) make reflection and thought possible.383 The primary
differences between the two thinkers are twofold. First, Merleau-Ponty grounds his dialectic in a
constituting intersubjectivity and life-world (which, according to Herbert Reid, is why MerleauPonty can give a more convincing account of social change)384 while Adorno denies the dialectic
is constituted by subjects at all (he says the dialectic precedes subjectivity and is part of the how
the world operates).385 Second, Merleau-Ponty believes that the dialectic furnishes us with a
vague, incomplete, yet somewhat positive trajectory while for Adorno that trajectory is always
only towards negativity and nonidentity.386
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The debate over how Marxism operates is connected with the question of the world’s
being. Each Marxist thinker mentioned above modifies the form the world takes as a part of
their attempt to update Marx’s theory, and while they each retain a large majority of Marx’s
insights in regards to how the world is experienced, their descriptions of the world in itself differ
radically. The fundamental character of the world goes from being law-driven and determinate
to unknowable and contingent as one moves through the different Marxists.
First, Lenin’s analyses are grounded in a belief that the world obeys specific laws, that it
can be described accurately without bias, and that a study of these descriptions and laws will
reveal the right (and the only realistic) revolutionary project. Lenin underscores this in stating
“there is no trace of Utopianism in Marx” since “[Marx] takes the actual experience of a mass
proletarian movement [the Paris Commune] and tries to draw practical lessons from it”387—in
particular the requirement of armed revolt against the state. The laws that the world necessarily
follows are described by Marx. No room for variation exists in this program, for to open the
program to different ideas is to bring about “eclecticism and absence of principle,” resulting in a
lack of revolutionary theory without which “there can be no revolutionary movement.”388
Althusser describes Lenin’s faithfulness to Marxist thought in a couple essays, claiming that
Lenin saw the materialist dialectic as the “one thing in the world which is absolute”389 and was
“profoundly convinced” that every philosophical worldview “represents the class struggle” Marx
laid out.390 The foundations of Marxism were for Lenin an unquestionable truth. Mao’s
Marxism is also grounded in a determinate world. For him, dialectical materialism is an
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objective rule operating in the world in predictable and determinate ways. As he says, “The fact
is that the unity of identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living,
conditional, mobile, temporary and relative…Reflected in man’s thinking, this becomes the
Marxist world outlook of materialist dialectics.”391 For both Lenin and Mao, neither the
objectivity of the world nor the idea that the laws it follows can be clearly delineated are open for
question. The world, as we observe it, is what is.
The determinacy of Lenin’s and Mao’s world is questioned by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty
as it fails to account for the role of the subject in producing its experience. Perception,
consciousness, intentions, and other factors play a role in creating the world as it is encountered,
including creating the Marxist schematic that explains phenomena like alienation, property, and
capital. Marxism does not exist independently of this constituting project but is an intrinsic part
of it, as the dialectic is necessarily a part of what is generated. So while the world itself is not
determinate like Marx imagined, the world as it is experienced is Marxist in nature. Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty reconcile Marxism with phenomenology by stating that while there is no world
without a constituting subjectivity392, and while meaning comes out of an interactive process
between the subject and the phenomenon within a particular situation, it is still the case that the
manner in which the world is created follows particular processes. It is not possible for the
world to appear in whatever way a subject chooses it to, as while the subject plays a constitutive
role in composing the world they are also thrown into it and composed by it in turn.393 An
interaction of opposing material forces—the Marxist dialectic—is a prerequisite for the
appearance of the world. For Sartre, this is true because the knowledge of the world is only
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possible through a dialectical relationship394 between the unknowable external world395 and the
subject (similar to Merleau-Ponty’s view that the development of history comes from an
encounter between the ambiguous trajectory of history and the constituting power of
individuals396). Such knowledge is not ordered and structured, but totalizing and synthetic. In
other words, there is no possibility for objective knowledge—that is, knowledge not constituted
by a subject and which definitively captures the external world—since every subject is of the
world they want to understand, but can only develop objective knowledge by holding the world
and themselves apart. The subject and the external world are in constant dialogue, which is why
Sartre claims that the encounter with the world, from a phenomenological perspective, inevitably
implies the Marxist dialectic.397 The dialectic does not work in a realm that can be scientifically
observed from afar, for it sweeps up everything in its path. Though coming from a similar
perspective, Merleau-Ponty rejects this view as it negates alternative possibilities in its constant
push to capture everything. For Sartre, the dialectic, and as a result all beings and all knowledge,
aim at drawing together and incorporating everything into one cohesive whole398; it is a constant
process of unification. Merleau-Ponty’s dialectic is as much an opening onto new differences as
it is a bringing together of differences into a coherent unity. What Sartre claims is a inexorable
push for unity is for Merleau-Ponty a vehicle for bringing separate entities into dialogue with one
another, the result of which is the possibility of new meanings, significations, and contexts.399
The dialectic is necessary for a unified field of experience inasmuch as such a field can only be
formed by differentiating one element from another, yet any meaning resulting from the field is
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only temporary. The same is true for knowledge of the dialectic, which is constantly being
superseded.400 Merleau-Ponty opposes any systematization or institutionalization of the
dialectic, as doing so would reduce the dialectic to what it establishes—a field of knowledge.401
Dialectic cannot be enshrined within the proletariat nor terminate at the end of history without
becoming flat and lifeless—in a word, nondialectical. Whereas for Sartre the dialectic is the
only process by which the world develops, for Merleau-Ponty it is a necessary, but not the sole,
means by which the world becomes cohesive.
Relative to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, the constituting subject plays no role in the world
Althusser creates. Rather than look into subjectivity for a new grounding of Marxism, Althusser
tries to establish the conditions that must be necessary for the world to operate as described by
Marx. This means foregoing experience and beginning with the world as a complex whole,
made up of many smaller relationships and contradictions.402 It is, as Martin Jay says, a whole
which has “neither a genetic point of origin nor a teleological point of arrival.”403 Althusser
claims it is impossible to delve beyond this complex whole, or even to elaborate it further, for the
world is given as a complex, structured unity and not as an original, simple unity.404 The lack of
simple unities means there are no essences and no concepts from which particular instances of
things are drawn; rather, instances are at the base of any abstraction or generality developed. As
the complex whole of the world is impossible to experience without concepts, Althusser posits
ideology as an irreducible part of the world.405 Althusser claims ideology is an artifact of
culture, meaning that it acts as a lived relation between man and the world, and not a function of
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consciousness.406 Humans require ideology to engage the world, and so their experience of
reality is nothing other than social relations, which get their meaning from real and concrete
interactions within the complex whole of the world.407 It is impossible to approach the real with
no concepts, for while the real is what exists apart from human knowledge, it can only be defined
with human knowledge.408
In addition, Althusser says ideology turns individuals into subjects and allows them to
recognize themselves as such. It is through ideology that we learn how to function in society, as
it constantly “hails” us to engage with others by taking on certain roles.409 In our engagements
with friends, teachers, police officers, and other members of society, our behavior begins to
conform to the expectations of society as we are rewarded or chastised for our actions. Ideology
is thus the mechanism by which we recognize that we are subjects, and that certain things are
demanded of us. Althusser reverses the Sartrean and Merleau-Pontean subject-ideology
relationship, as ideology constitutes the subject rather than vice versa. Yet he agrees with them
that there is no possibility of objective knowledge, insisting that there is no getting outside
ideology. Ideology constantly surrounds us and conditions our knowledge and actions, so much
so that even saying one has escaped ideology is a function of it.410 Because ideology lets us
recognize the existing state of affairs it is a vital part of our social existence411, not something
that can be gotten rid of. The point of Marxism is not to begin with abstract ideas and search for
their confirmation, but to forge new concepts in your encounters with real objects.412 And
because human knowledge is pulled so much from culture and society, rather than being
406
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determined by intentions, perception, and consciousness, the influence an individual has over
how the world is presented is, according to Althusser, much less than Sartre and Merleau-Ponty
claim. To be truly faithful to the relationship to knowledge and the approach to praxis of Marx’s
project, we must return to the conceptual architecture of Marxism itself.
The Critical Theorists continue the trend of questioning the possibility of objective
knowledge, though their critique does not rest on an examination of the subject or the ideological
lens through which the world is seen. Of all the post-Marxist thinkers, they say the least about
the world, refusing to posit it even as a dialectically constituted phenomenal realm or a complex
whole composed of contradictions. Any description of the world—even the minimal ones given
by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Althusser—would, if taken as foundational and necessary,
become incapable of being superseded by the dialectic. A contradiction would appear, for this
necessary foundation would both be held apart from the world inasmuch as it is not subject to
dialectical sublimation, yet be a part of the world inasmuch as it is the only essential piece of it.
Horkheimer corrects for this by claiming the world has no necessary meaning which can be
objectively found. All ideas are socially determined,413 and no model is excluded from these
influences. The world can only be grasped from a socially conditioned perspective, as no theory
can exist apart from the mediating influences of culture and history.414 Though an external world
can be posited, the role it plays in composing the world we experience is unknowable since any
theory dealing with that topic would be prejudiced by history and culture. As Jay writes,
Horkheimer “always acknowledged the existence of a natural object irreducible to the
objectification of a creator subject and resistant to all attempts to master it conceptually.”415 This
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view separates Horkheimer from the view held by Merleau-Ponty. Horkheimer believes our
knowledge of external objects is only negative whereas Merleau-Ponty claims an ambiguous
positive knowledge. And while Merleau-Ponty claims that the horizons that disclose the world
to us have an irreducible social element,416 Horkheimer says that it is theory (as a product of
society and culture), rather than our experiential dialogue with the world at the bodily level417,
which primarily forms the world. For Merleau-Ponty, the world we experience is constituted
when we are called by the external world to complete it, and in doing so to form a complete
Gestalt. This is possible because in its most basic form the subject and object—the perceiver and
the external world—are not independent but completely inseparable.418 Horkheimer rejects this
approach, as for him it is impossible to know absolutely the relationship between the subject and
object, including whether the two are intricately linked. Because our knowledge of subjects and
objects are always affected by society and culture419, and because there is no way to excise the
influence of society and culture from knowledge, Horkheimer does not believe it is possible to
say what the primary relationship between subjects and objects is.420 The phenomenological
foundation that Merleau-Ponty wants to give for our experience does not for him arise from
society and culture, and the knowledge that the body is “a general medium for having a world”421
is not a socially conditioned concept (even though for Merleau-Ponty the body is, ontologically,
irreducibly connected with the other bodies in society). By contrast, Horkheimer does not
believe any theory of the subject, object, and their relationship can ever found knowledge or
experience, as each one is conditioned by society and culture. Because all claims to a
416
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fundamental ontology, even a thoroughly social one such as Merleau-Ponty’s, are so
conditioned, there is an “irreducible tension between concept and object”422 that makes any
theory of beginnings suspect.
Yet Horkheimer is not advocating a pure and absolute relativism such that any idea about
the world can be applicable at any time. Such a claim reduces the view of the world to a
function of subjective reason (the type of reason which makes rational actions possible through
deduction, inference, and classification423), and leads to fascism inasmuch as all views—even
those which are hegemonic or intolerant—are allowed in.424 This is because subjective reason is
individualized, able to operate within any particular world without being beholden to it. To
prevent the fascism that could come from an approach that privileges personal or group interests
over the principle of social cohesion, Horkheimer argues that the world should be kept a function
of objective reason, which aims at denoting the structures inherent in reality.425 Both subjective
and objective reason are socially constituted and contingent, but only objective reason works to
understand the composition of the world. Horkheimer believes that by keeping the world within
the sphere of objective reason it is possible to preserve a notion of a world that is common to all.
In other words, the idea that the world has absolute meaning should be retained, just not any
particular idea of what that meaning is.426 To some degree, an ‘anything goes’ approach remains
inasmuch as what can be true is unconstrained by external influences, yet it does not come at the
expense of, but rather enhances, community. This, again, contrasts with views held by
individuals like Merleau-Ponty, or, in the world of science, David Bloor, who both posit different
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mechanisms to prevent absolute relativism. As mentioned above, Merleau-Ponty says our beliefs
and experiences are conditioned in part by the world just as we condition the world, while for
Horkheimer such a claim cannot be known. Similarly, Bloor would oppose the relativism of
Horkheimer with the claim that there is an unknown yet ordered external world—or a “common
core of people, objects, and natural processes”—that calls into question any claims that we can
ever know something absolutely or completely.427 Horkheimer does not think we should
abandon a ‘common core’, but unlike Bloor he does not think there is only one ‘common core’
against which our knowledge is continually measured.
The world is not something that can ever be satisfactorily defined, but the attempt to
define of the world cannot be given up without a completely relative world resulting. This is
different from Althusser, who, while admitting that knowledge about the world is ideological and
never truly captures the real, nevertheless believes that certain concepts are more accurate than
others. His advocacy for a scientific approach leads him to advocate for concepts that are
“practical” and forged when “you are face to face with your real object.”428 Such concepts
developed are not eternally valid, but as products of a “science in development”429 are subject to
change. Yet for a period of time they are more accurate than abstract or utopian concepts
developed apart from the real. Critical Theory, unlike Althusser, does not claim that a
methodological devotion to the real determines which ideas are dominant, as such a claim
assumes an outside world against which your ideas can be measured, and which is not the
product of cultural prejudice. Ideas may be more or less accurate at a point in time, but it is due
to historical circumstances, rather than epistemological superiority, that they become so.430
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Apart from any contingent meanings we invent, the only things that can be said about the world
are that it is not separate from thought and theory431, and that it is not static but is changing.432
Unlike the subjects or contradictions that compose the other post-Marxists’ austere worlds, these
two characteristics do not form a theory of the world, but act as critical operations that call into
question any such theory. Apart from the movement of the dialectic the world is unknown, and
our necessary attempts to try to know it will inevitably fail.

Rearranging the Marxist Trajectory Part 3: New Revolutions
Each thinker responds to the possibilities and challenges their theory raises with new
revolutionary strategies. As both Lenin and Mao believed themselves to be updating Marx’s
program for their particular situation (respectively, imperialist Russia and colonialist China),
they each adjusted Marx’s vision for revolution and the particular role the communist party plays
in it. Lenin’s belief that the revolution requires a vanguard party to succeed is drawn from
Marx’s writings, but plays a more centralized and programmatic role in Lenin’s vision than Marx
ever intended. As Lenin says, “A small, compact, core, consisting of reliable, experienced and
hardened workers, with responsible agents in the principle districts and connected by all the rules
of strict secrecy with the organisations of revolutionists, can…perform all the functions of a
trade-union organization.”433 Professional revolutionaries are necessary434 to bring together the
variety of people, jobs, locations, and interests in society and unite them behind a common
purpose. Power should be centralized, but with connections throughout society. Unlike Lenin,
Mao does not view the Party as sacrosanct. Dedicated revolutionaries are needed to bring about
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the transition to communism, but Mao’s ultimate goal is to institute a “New Democracy” where
all people are encouraged to participate in politics regardless of party affiliation.435 Mao’s wellknown saying that one should look to the communist party to find bourgeoisie436 implies that
communists should continually go to the peasants and workers in society to reinvigorate their
revolutionary fervor and commitment to democracy. A successful revolution must undergo a
transition towards socialism, which necessitates a renewal from outside to prevent the
bourgeoisie from undermining it.437 Were the revolution to become controlled by the
Communist Party, it would lead to another bourgeoisie, and not to a recognition of the dynamic
contradictions inherent in the materialist world. Another difference between Lenin and Mao is
that while Lenin believes communism requires an immediate and unwavering opposition to the
bourgeoisie, Mao believes that for the revolutionary program to succeed in China the bourgeoisie
and peasants must first unite to throw off their colonizers. Left mostly untouched by Lenin and
Mao are the materialist, dialectical, and ideological components of Marxism, as they focus
primarily on developing and formalizing the revolutionary program.
The possibility of developing such a revolutionary program is endangered by the
philosophies of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Writing in response to the events of the USSR and
the doctrinaire way the Soviets applied Marxism, their claim that knowledge and the knowing
subject undergo dialectical progression438 means that a revolutionary program is not easily
predicted, systematized, and localized. Merleau-Ponty believes Marxism is torn between two
views of revolution, one which sees it as an incidental expense of historical development (i.e. as
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progress) and one which sees it as a permanent overturning (i.e. as rupture).439 Inasmuch as
Marxism wants revolution to escape the situation it comes from yet tries to make it obey another
situation, revolution is put in tension as both pro and anti situation. Its very nature means that it
is both necessarily correct about what needs to be done yet possibly wrong at the same time.440
This leads to a revolutionary antinomy whereby the Marxist revolution, which is created to resist
power441, produces revolutionaries—completely convinced of the justness of their cause442—who
work to create a recognized and ordered power structure. Thus the revolutionaries in the USSR
ended up using revolution to justify a governing body that was completely unrevolutionary.443
What is needed, according to Merleau-Ponty, and what will be truly revolutionary, is a noncommunist left that resists the problems of both capitalism and communism. This left should not
follow a plan dictated in advance, for to be true to the nature of the world the ambiguity and
plurality inherent in our experience must be incorporated into the revolutionary program. If
Marxism is to be revolutionary, it must be open to reinterpretation. Just as Merleau-Ponty claims
the meaning of paintings must remain open, Marxism must be recognized as an “advent” that
leaves itself open to “a future man not even outlined in our present life”444 (that is, to the
possibility of new things to come not predictable by the present). Like Merleau-Ponty’s
hyperdialectic—the ‘good dialectic which does not resolve everything or follow a set path, but
embraces ambiguity and partial synthesis while admitting the possibility that “progresses” can be
made445— Marxism should not contain absolutes or be formulaic, but be willing to surpass itself.
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Similarly, Sartre demands that resistance occur not via a vanguard party or doctrinaire program,
but a revolutionary praxis that transforms collectives into revolutionaries.446 Sartre’s philosophy
is a philosophy of action that demands the development of a praxis to bring about a different
situation, in part through the development of new group identities.447 Sartre and Merleau-Ponty
both separate Marxism from its programmatic elements, and as a result try to reconceive of
revolution as something without a particular doctrine, but which follows from such a doctrine’s
absence or undoing. Revolution is not a formula, it is an event in the world that exceeds any
formal system.
The high degree of skepticism Critical Theory proposes in order to be faithful to the
constantly changing world means no revolutionary program is wholly endorsed. Many of the
Critical Theorists were themselves witnesses of revolutionary activities,448 and held a sympathy
for revolutions, but were skeptical of dogmatic programs of revolution.449 Their experience with
the Nazis had shown them the danger of fascism that arises from dogmatic adherence to a
political program. Critical Theory was presented by Horkheimer as a revolutionary tool in the
sense that critique, when properly formulated and inserted into society, can be the catalyst for
change.450 Small, incremental progress being unsatisfactory for the achievement of a better
world, a revolution must move beyond the schema at work in the present, a task which critique
can help to begin. Yet the danger of fascism that follows from a complete openness means that
to some extent there must always be some schema at work in revolution, even if the schema itself
is problematic. The insight of Critical Theory is the identification of the antinomies—between
chaos and dogmatism, between critique and fidelity, and between totality and otherness—at the
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heart of the Marxist project of revolution. The practice that Critical Theory recommends is to
stay in between the bounds of the antinomies to avoid the dangers that come from embracing one
side or the other. Revolution is a constant, ongoing exercise, in need of regular criticism and
renewal.
Althusser’s comments on revolution were made as a response to the French Communist
Party’s dilution of Marxism into a liberal humanism. Althusser believes Marxism is a scientific
theory capable of transforming the structure of society, not a ideology aimed at determining what
policies best fit the constitution of the subject. Part of Althusser’s concept of revolution is his
emphasis on how it is vital to ensure the theory of Marxism is correct, for theory is a potent
weapon in the promulgation of communism.451 The other place Althusser discusses revolution is
in “Contradiction and Overdetermination,” where Althusser uses the example of the Russian
Revolution to discuss how revolutionary conditions originate. The key point he makes is that
revolution is not the result of a general and hegemonic contradiction imposing itself on society,
but rather the “fusing” of many disparate “circumstances” and “currents” into one “ruptural
unity.”452 The general contradiction (such as that between the proletariats and bourgeoisie) can
perhaps define the revolutionary situation, but it cannot bring it about. A revolution is enacted
from below, as the surging, shifting masses of people begin to reflect similar contradictions
throughout. As more and more of the relationships within society become defined by the same
contradictory characteristics, the opposing groups become unified, merging together until a
revolution becomes inevitable. Althusser is careful to claim that these relationships are not pure
phenomena, but, as Marx would say, derived from the relations of production and conditions of
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existence in society.453 Althusser uses the term “overdetermination” to emphasize how the
contradiction that brings about a revolution, even as it determines society, is itself determined by
the various instances within the social body. It is “overdetermined in principle.”454 The Russian
Revolution, Althusser claims, was the first industrial nation to undergo a communist revolution
because of how prevalent, overwhelming, and thus exacerbated the contradictions between the
elites and the workers were.455
Althusser’s other relevant discussion in regards to the question of revolution is his
recommendation about how radicals can use ideology productively. Because ideology and
practice are intimately intertwined, even a slight misunderstanding of a concept can significantly
affect the outcome of an event. A successful revolution is one that has a well developed theory
that underlies it, while a revolution lacking a strong articulation is easily subverted or
undermined. Words and concepts are for Althusser sites of struggle—the way they are used
represent continual battles between the bourgeoisie and proletarian masses. Althusser’s
revolution is one that operates not only in the streets, but in the textbooks and classrooms of the
university. It carefully constructs ideas and concepts as weapons that can be used to undermine
oppressive systems. The Marxist revolution will only succeed “on condition that it fights both
about very 'scholarly' words (concept, theory, dialectic, alienation, etc.) and about very simple
words (man, masses, people, class struggle).456

Beyond the Marxist Revolution
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The astute diagnosis by these Marxists of the paradoxes and contradictions in Marx’s
program yields important revelations about the nature of revolution. But can revolution be saved
simply by varying the character of the Marxist world? Addressing the problems coincident with
an overly doctrinaire revolutionary program or a mechanistic view of history gives revolution
some independence to explore different possibilities, but as long as the Marxist trajectory
remains is revolution truly free? Or is it possible that the variations of Marxism free up new
possibilities only by placing others beyond the bounds of revolution?
An interesting feature of these variations on Marxism is their increasing engagement with
contingency and nothingness. Whereas Marx’s accounts in The Communist Manifesto, The
German Ideology, and Grundrisse are histories of necessity, their retelling by Lenin, Mao,
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Althusser, Adorno, and Horkheimer increasingly presents Marx’s
discoveries as outgrowths of his time which now must be rethought. Not just that, but as
illustrated by Sartre’s claim that negation conditions the possibility of individuals becoming
socially engaged457 and Adorno’s claim that philosophy draws its legitimacy from the
negative458, the role of nothingness is of increasing concern to Marxists as a condition for the
possibility of their projects. Nothingness, as portrayed by these thinkers, is what keeps
Marxism—and philosophy as a whole—going, as it represents the irreducibility of the material
world to any program or doctrine. To varying degrees, every Marxist thinker mentioned
attempts to prevent the solidification of Marxism into an orthodoxy by preserving the dynamism
of its structural elements like ideology, revolution, and dialectic. Lenin and Mao update the
description of how the communist revolution will occur, taking into account contexts (such as
the continued existence of peasants in some industrial societies and the worldwide scope of the
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European imperial system) that Marx himself was unaware of. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty apply
the dialectic to the very constitution of objectivity and the knowledge of it that humans have.
Althusser presents a world that is unknowable aside from its being a whole composed of
contradictions. And Adorno removes any sense of identity between the material and the
conceptual, presenting the dialectic as an ongoing encounter between the two. Each theorist
seeks to maintain Marxism’s ability to speak substantively of social and political systems while
beginning from foundations often vastly different from the one Marx did. In order to take into
account all the potential contingencies of history and philosophy, the certainties of Marxism has
become increasingly minimalist while its method extends beyond the limits of knowledge to the
point where nothingness is encountered.
Yet as a foundation for revolution, even these revised theories fall short. Revolution still
follows a dialectical pattern, and is conditioned by a stable, if mostly unknown, world. As
dialectical, revolution is always a harmonizing force, bringing together the polar opposites of a
dichotomy even as it creates new ones. Marx says the reconciling of the feudal classes leads to
capitalism and the opposition between the worker and the bourgeoisie459; Lenin believes that
overthrowing capitalism will at first lead to a contradictory form of communism where everyone
is treated equally rather than according to their ability and need460; and Sartre believes
reconciling an individual with their history ultimately requires the development of new structures
that oppose the individual to their group membership.461 Revolution’s transformational and
creative power is limited by the nature of the dichotomy itself, and the potential changes that can
occur upon the dichotomy’s supersession. The revolutions conceived of by Marxists, because
they are motivated by class conflict, are circumscribed by the nature of class such that other
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concerns become secondary or ignored. Few Marxists have theorized issues of race, gender, or
nationality except inasmuch as they can be attached to the Marxist critique of capital, nor
articulated a vision of revolution that does not position the working class as the primary architect
and beneficiary. Systematic disparities or programs of injustice unrelated to class are
unimportant, as they will ostensibly be solved upon the reconciliation of class disparities, once
humans are returned to their actual lives and the conditions of their existence. Even among
contemporary Marxists who substantively diverge from Marx on the question of telos and the
program of revolution, this difference between the ideological and actual remains, and revolution
is always portrayed as an attempt at harmonizing these two realms. Social or political concerns
that do not primarily deal with the relationship between these two realms are irrelevant to
Marxism, while revolutions that occur in relation to such concerns do not even qualify within
Marxism as revolutions. Instead, the natures of the ideological and actual operate as a given to
condition what counts as a revolution. And a truly transformative revolution, which could
radically change the rules governing the ideological and actual, is impossible.
Revolution is always put in service of Marxism’s larger program, whether that is the
overcoming of class inequality or the continued attempt to find an objective meaning in the
world. Marxism, unlike social contract theory, does not attempt to capture revolution in a
predetermined world, but it does attempt to describe a normative operation—the dialectic—by
which revolution always functions. This operation can greatly affect the overall shape of the
world, but is itself never affected by any changes in the world despite its location there. Though
Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies claim the dialectic affects itself, and that the form of
the dialectic is not formulaic, this only varies the specific shape of the operation, but does not
overturn it. The dialectic itself, in its most generic form as the contestation between and
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reconcilement of two opposing forces, persists. Revolution is embraced by Marxism and
presented as a function of the world. It is synchronized with the world’s basic structure such that
revolution reaffirms a dialectical and materialist outlook even when it opposes itself to specific
shapes that society takes. But in making revolution conform to the Marxist project, it becomes
bound to the goal of Marxism to return the ideological to the actual. New things can be created
in the process of achieving this goal, but radical change is still only a means to an end. It is not
the boundaries of the world, but its trajectory, to which revolution is put in service. Revolution
remains chained to the state.
The failure of Marxism implies that to incorporate revolutions into definite systems, even
if there is no definite world to which it is yoked, is still problematic. The rules of the systems
become constraining, leading to the privilege of certain concerns and the ossification of
processes governing change. Recovering revolution requires excepting it from the world and
finding a description that does not subsume it under a larger project. Spaces wholly removed
from the world, from its processes, and from its movements must be uncovered. The profound
impact Marxism has had on history and theory has maintained many of the chains of the state
even as it worked to remove them. Only beyond Marxism, once the notion of trajectory has been
left behind, will we be able to begin thinking about how to remove these bonds.
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From out of Oblivion: Evental Thought and the Liberated Revolution
Breaking with the state
The desire for radical change has found expression many times, and in many ways,
throughout the generations. Revolutionaries have advocated for complete liberty and equality,
an egalitarian distribution of resources and power, and an end to corporate greed and political
malfeasance. Yet the actual results brought about by radical groups often differ, sometimes
substantially, from their rhetorical visions. The frustrating, fascinating curiosity of revolution
lies in its inability to be predicted, irreducibility to normative rules, and impossibility to
manufacture. Iconic tomes of revolutionary thought have been unable to yield much in the way
of a consistent and foreseeable program of revolution, while the tactics that once worked well
yield vastly different results when applied in another time and place. Revolutionaries are
constantly returning to the beginning and heading out in a new direction. A dogmatic and
unthinking revolution peters out into disconnected, inconsistent actions that lack a firm message,
and is easily appropriated by the state it opposes. Finding a transformative revolution will
require a new approach to the subject.
Thus far this investigation has yielded several points: 1) the liberation of revolution
requires separating it from all states, 2) separating revolution from the state entails conceiving of
change as an agent or motive, and 3) this agent or motive of change cannot use revolution either
as a means to any particular end or by putting it in service of any one thing. The strain of
thought most helpful for this project consists of theories that attempt to disconnect events from a
necessary ontology or epistemology, and which see events as producing massive changes within
the state. I call this “evental theory.” What sets evental theory apart from other theories of

117

revolution is that it portrays radical transformations as restructurings of the rules determining
what exists, not as reorganizations of what is into new groups. According to evental thought,
dangerous and unjustifiable states arise from essentializing the relationship between the state and
its conceptual ground rather than from having an inauthentic relationship to that ground. If
politics has an intrinsic ground, the states built on top of it will always be remarkably similar. To
be capable of producing massive transformations, revolutions must be beyond the order that
defines the state. Consequently, and in order for radical change to be possible, the state—
understood as an order that defines both what takes on political significance and the manner in
which it does—is wholly contingent. No entities, relationships, or ideas inevitably remain in it
forever. Though the state persists, no part of it will out of necessity do so. Looking at the ways
evental thought makes this case will provide clues about how to liberate revolution.
There is a difficulty that all evental theories must deal with. As citizens, we live within
the boundaries of the state; we are only citizens inasmuch as we do so. Our understanding of
politics is constituted by the character of the state in which we live (even a Communist living in
a capitalist state organizes their actions, policies, and political knowledge as a response to the
state in which they live). If revolution is defined by its novelty, and founded on a ground that is
not the state, how is it possible for us to encounter it such that it can play a meaningful role in
our society? As the Althusser-inspired political tradition would put it, how is it possible to
“think the new”?462 This problem is composed of several, interrelated issues which must be
addressed before a complete answer is possible:
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1) What grounds the possibility of evental thought? Why is it possible to claim that events
have this massive transformative power?
2) What is the nature of an event? What characteristics does it have, and what language is
appropriate for describing it?
3) What is the state? What logic defines it?
4) What relationship does the event have to the state? How is it possible to trigger such a
massive and transformative action, and what are the effects of that action?
Despite the similar approaches evental thinkers take to understanding revolutions, there are
multiple disagreements within the corpus of evental thought that ultimately yield different
political visions. Before describing Dynamic Anarchism’s theory of revolution in the next
chapter, I will recount the framework of evental thought, drawing out the disparities between
each thinker, by posing to it these four questions. This will provide a basis for comprehending
Dynamic Anarchism and how it diverges from extant evental theories. To make my explanations
of evental theory clear, I will be framing my answers to these questions around Alain Badiou’s
philosophy, bringing in other theorists to draw out the conflicts within evental thought. The
thinkers I reference are not unified by adherence to any particular political tradition, and at times
strongly disagree with one another. I draw on them because they each have a theory of radical
change that can be categorized as evental (though they do not comprise the entirety of that list),
and because a discussion of their theories will best situate the eventual introduction of my own.
Finally, a couple of terminological notes. First, in previous chapters, I have used the
words “state” and “world” fairly interchangeably. This is in part the result of my attempt to
tailor my language to those whom I am quoting from, and in part to emphasize the pervasiveness
of the state as a totalizing entity that determines both the space in which and the nature of how
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politics occurs. However, for the sake of consistency and clarity, in this chapter and the next I
will revert to using “state” rather than “world,” and will endeavor to make my summaries of
other authors reflect this change. It must be kept in mind that the term “state” refers to the order
which politics takes as such, and not just a juridical framework or set of people inhabiting a
commonwealth. This should be differentiated from the sphere of politics and the apparatus of
politics. Next, while I emphasize contingency (both here and in the next chapter), this does not
mean that any combination of things is possible at any point. What is contingent is the defining
order and operation of the state, but this does not mean that any composition of the state is
possible at any time. The theorists I cite below hold similar views of contingency (that is, what
is contingent is the characterizing form the state takes, not the entirety of its composition). When
I explain my theory in the next chapter, I will further elaborate upon both of these concepts.

Question 1: Grounding Radical Change
Answering the first question about the grounding of events requires looking beyond
appearances, as the theories of evental thought present a radically changeable state. Very little is
absolute or universal. New objects and ideas produced by radical shifts remake the state and its
contents in fundamentally new ways. Foucault studies how madmen that were seen as vehicles
for lyrical truth before the 17th century become patients to be locked up and studied in order to
uncover psychiatric truths.463 Said delineates how the Orient transformed from an object of
study to a danger to be controlled because of changes in commerce and politics throughout the
19th century.464 Beings, subjects, institutions, practices, ideas, and meanings all undergo radical
alterations due to events. Badiou begins his argument for radical shifts with the claim that the
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attributes, characteristics, and parts of a thing are encountered prior to the idea that there is a
being in which they inhere. He describes his insight by saying “what presents itself is essentially
multiple; what presents itself is essentially one,” concluding that if being is naturally one and
multiplicity a fiction we end up with the contradiction that we are able to engage with a being
beyond what appears. Yet because it is not contradictory to hold that being is essentially
multiple and the unification of being only what we declare it to be, we must hold that “the one is
not.”465 Everything we encounter as a single being has only been declared such, and is not
actually so. To put it another way, unity is a function of appearing and not a natural part of
being. This is why, in his later work The Logic of Worlds, Badiou claims that what counts as a
unity is the result of a transcendental which is neither subjective nor constitutive, but rather a
special logical machinery which can account for “the intra-worldly cohesion of appearing” (i.e.
the appearance of ones)466. Because our knowledge of a being’s attributes is conditioned by the
decision to count it as a being, it is possible that any particular understanding of the state
(defined by Badiou as a set in which all the parts are counted as one and the structure of the set is
counted as one) is radically alterable were we to follow a different set of rules in determining
what counts as a being. Badiou grounds radical transformations on the premise that any
organization of the state depends upon a changeable set of rules that determine how to cut up,
divide, and categorize multiplicity. Multiplicity should not be understood as a meaningful realm,
as the nature of multiplicity prohibits comprehending it as a single thing. Badiou says “The
multiplicity from which ontology makes up its situation is composed solely of multiplicities…In
other words, every multiple is a multiple of multiples.”467 As Oliver Marchart explains, for
Badiou definitions “do not refer to any empirically given ‘object’ outside the processes of
465

Alain Badiou, trans. Oliver Feltham, Being and Event (New York: Continuum, 2005), 23.
Alain Badiou, Logic of Worlds, trans. Alberto Toscano (Continuum; New York, 2009), 122.
467
Badiou, Being and Event, 29.
466

121

thinking.”468 The ontological primacy of multiplicity removes the need to think about what
meanings being possesses as such, and opens being to many possibilities.
Other evental thinkers replace the transcendental rules that determine what counts as a
being with the notion of difference. Derrida claims that meanings originate from interactions
between and differences with others, so it is impossible to develop a discourse about a being (or
to have any knowledge about it whatsoever) without looking at how it relates to what surrounds
it. In addition, the potential meanings of a word, gesture, or sign of any kind are open and
always “to-come”. We can only ever make a meaning present by referring to its fundamental
absence.469 Because there is no central locus of meaning everything becomes “a system in which
the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a
system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the
play of signification infinitely.”470 The implications of this are that there are no essences to be
discovered. Evental theorists emphasize that one cannot approach the world with the assumption
that there are constants to what constitutes a subject, society, or state. Historical events and
objects have no meaning, no essence, and no form apart from the context from which they arose;
our ability to see meaning, essence and form in them is conditioned upon the possibility of them
to be different. As Foucault explains, “So many things can be changed, being as fragile as they
are, tied more to contingencies than to necessities, more to what is arbitrary than to what is
rationally established, more to complex but transitory historical contingencies than to inevitable
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anthropological constants.”471 Though similar in their understanding of meaning, Foucault and
Derrida differ with regard to the strategies they use to investigate the production of meaning and
from the fields to which they apply their investigations. Foucault looks at how changes in
discursive formations and power-regimes transform concepts like subjectivity, punishment, and
sexuality. Derrida studies how discussions of philosophical theories invoke a whole
“metaphysics of presence” and impose privileged binaries. Applying his Deconstructive method
to questions of democracy, linguistics, and death, he overturns the privileged binaries within
them by demonstrating how what is present or privileged is conditional on the absent and
subordinated, and that fundamentally different orders are necessarily possible. Radical
transformations are possible because that which conditions meaning leaves open the possibility
for the new.
All evental thinkers conceive of their systems as transhistorical, inasmuch as each system
operates both within yet persists apart from any particular socio-historical context. This means
that while Badiou’s rules governing what counts as one, Foucault’s power relations, and
Derrida’s play of signs change moderately in response to their context, they do not change as
radically as the beings they produce. Despite the ways they appear, their basic function and
mode of operation persist. Power is a constant in Foucault’s analyses from his genealogical
period onward, but his analyses show it functioning in diverse ways throughout history, from the
physical tortures affected on the body472 to the bureaucratic procedures that regulate society and
impose state racism.473 Similarly, for Deleuze and Guattari the plane of consistency and strata
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appear differently in biology than in linguistics but they always perform the same task. 474
Hannah Arendt explains this phenomenon by pointing to how the actions that produce the world
also spend their time in the world.475 Labor, work, and action—for her the “fundamental human
activities” of the vita activa476—enter the state because one encounters other humans performing
them. She also points to how we respond to the activities that produce the state by adopting
ideas about them, and says that the ideas we adopt can change how they function within society
(for example, Plato and Aristotle turned action into a means to an end, overturning the original
conception of it as an end in itself477). That the forces creating the state are open and plural in
their appearance explains why they are never fully theorized. For instance, Foucault says that he
is giving an analytics of power rather than a theory of it478, and Derrida claims deconstruction is
not a theory in itself, but the recognition of the fiction of origin (or the “trace”) that appears
whenever a theory is put forth.479 Evental theorists must examine productive forces anew at the
beginning of each new state.
Evental theorists ground the possibility for the event by developing methods that can only
be described in terms of how they affect the state. They use forces that can appear within the
state in numerous ways to emphasize that there are no subjects, objects, concepts, or institutions
that condition the state. Showing the contingency of all potential grounds is the first step in
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finding a way to decouple revolution from the state, for it clears the foundation of the state of
specific forms that could be used to resist transformative change.

Question 2: The Potential of the Event
With regard to question two, all evental theorists agree that true events are separate from
everyday occurrences. Many happenings transpire constantly which do not rise to the level of
event. This is because events shake up the foundations of the everyday and prescribe new
foundations in their wake. They are a rupture with the previous circumstances, and yield new
ideas, practices, and institutions that become the state’s foundation going forward. Alain
Badiou’s Being and Event describes the event as “a singular multiple”480 irreducible to any
situation and about which “ontology has nothing to say.”481 It is a “radical transformational
action” that “originates in a point” known as an “evental site.”482 Evental sites are obscured and
singular places within the state, and what counts as an evental site is contingent upon the state
itself such that there are no permanent evental sites. It is also worth noting that events will at
times take on the state of the situation rather than the situation as such. The difference between
the situation and the state has to do with what is presented (the situation) versus what is
represented (the state). For Badiou, events are incomprehensible until an “interpretive
intervention”483 arrives. This theory stays largely consistent throughout Badiou’s corpus. There
are some differences in terminology (e.g. Badiou does not use the term “interpretive
intervention” in Logic of Worlds, but says the event “sets off the stepwise recasting of the
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transcendental of the world”484), and new ideas that complement those in Being and Event (e.g.
Badiou’s typology of subjects), but in general this explanation of event does not change.
Interpretative interventions declare the event to be part of a new state by re-describing the
rules determining what exists. The insight that leads Badiou to describe events in this manner is
the fact of multiplicity, or the idea that there exist no ones or unities within the world.485 There
are only the unities that we declare. Yet as any declared unity is incapable of capturing the
totality of things (since no totality exists to be captured), there is always a remainder—what
Badiou calls the void—which escapes our declaration of something as a unified being.486 Events
occur when a multiple within the state is not fully presented, or when there are parts of it outside
the state. The inability of the state to explain this partially presented multiple means that the
state must be changed to fully present this multiple within the state. At that point, something
may happen that reveals a need to develop new rules about what exists (i.e. what can be declared
as a “one”). Events come from people within the state considering and reacting to the void
revealed by this partially-presented multiple. Standing in between the state and the void, events
demonstrate the need for an original or radically transformed state to be developed which follows
a new logic incompatible with the old one. Those who recognize the need for a new logic, by
remaining faithful to this need and disseminating the new logic, actively work against the extant
state. As Badiou says, “one can again think fidelity as a counter-state: what it does is organize,
within the situation, another legitimacy of inclusions. It builds…a kind of other situation,
obtained by the division in two of the primitive situation.”487 The event is a caesura that
originates from a particular place without conforming to it, and prescribes a new logic that
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through the actions of militants leads to a new state with new beings and practices. As Oliver
Marchart writes, “A political organization of militants (i.e. the subject in the field of politics) is
nothing but the collective product of a process of fidelity towards an event…A truth is produced
by the decision of a subject to remain faithful to an event.”488 Within the field of evental thought
it is the ideas of caesura and incompatibility, more than any other, that are used to describe
revolutions.
Like Badiou, other evental theorists emphasize the disconnect events produce and the
incommensurability of the preceding and subsequent states. Michel Foucault says of revolutions
that they both “belong to history” but also “escape from it,”489 while in On Revolution Hannah
Arendt describes them as new beginnings that interrupt preconceived notions of continuity.490
But whereas Badiou is concerned with the declaration of the event, Foucault tries to understand
events through a study of their effects. Foucault sees a difficulty in trying to unravel events, as
they do not come in the form of a single break but as a contemporaneous collection of several
transformations which may take centuries to unfold.491 For example, Foucault says that the
French Revolution acts as a “complex, articulated, describable group of transformations that left
a number of positivities intact, fixed for a number of others rules that are still with us, and also
established positivities that have recently disappeared or are still disappearing before our
eyes.”492 While it is a difficult task to pinpoint an event in space and time, it can be tracked
through its effects on society in the form of the discursive formations and regimes of power that
grow out of it. No matter what happened at the time of the event, it is possible, by studying texts

488

Marchart, Post-Foundational Thought, 123-124.
Michel Foucault. “Useless to Revolt” in Essential Works of Michel Foucault Volume 3: Power, ed. James
Faubion (New York: The New Press, 2001), 449.
490
Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1965), 18-19.
491
Michel Foucault. Archeology of Knowledge trans. (Routledge; New York, 2002), 193.
492
Ibid., 195.
489

127

written before and after it, to see how the event changed the state. Notable events develop new
and incommensurable dispositifs, or frameworks for knowledge493, that present us with entirely
different orders.494 Because the statements, ideas, and objects found within these orders obtain
meaning from their differences with others, in a new framework the same statement will not
necessarily mean the same thing it meant in the old. There is no common measure that allows us
to judge one framework right or wrong, but progress is possible when a new framework can
explain what were before considered anomalies without erasing the explanatory power of earlier
viewpoints.495 Thomas Kuhn takes a similar position about radical shifts in science. He
describes shifts as “reconstructions of the field from new fundamentals”496 that occur in periods
where there are significant anomalies unexplainable by science’s theoretical assumptions. Like
Foucault and Badiou, Kuhn claims every new paradigm is incommensurable with earlier ones,
for models and statements do not mean the same thing in one paradigm as they do in another.497
Fred Evans explains the notion of incommensurable paradigm by saying “We could possibly
translate the Newtonian’s idea of the conservation of mass into Einstein’s language about the
conversion of mass into energy (e=mc2). But we could not do so without considerable distortion
of the translated position.”498 Like Foucault, Kuhn does believe paradigms can be preferred over
others by their ability to solve more problems than earlier ones.499
These thinkers differ in the degree to which they conceive of the event as unified.
Badiou provides it with the greatest sense of unity, saying it is a recognized multiple that
prescribes a new set of operations for a new state. For him, the event is very clearly delineated
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from the situation that came before. Kuhn sees events as more ambiguous, as the anomalies
produced by the failure of a paradigm are not readily separated from that old paradigm. It takes
time to develop a conceptual and perceptual system that allows events to be seen. There needs to
be a process that brings about the event.500 Foucault says the unity of the event is a function of
the contemporaneity of numerous transformations, which over a period of time aggregate to
produce a massive effect. Any unity the event has is contingent. Badiou recognizes the event
more easily, as for him it occurs all at once in the form of a new multiple (that is, a being whose
parts have never been recognized previously as all belonging to the same entity). It is wrestling
with the effects of that multiple, and how to be faithful to it, that take time. By contrast, the
events Foucault describes take years, if not centuries, to be realized. Kuhn thinks they can be
relatively quick or excessively long to develop, depending on how quickly a new paradigm can
be developed and spread throughout society.501 As Ian Hacking writes, Kuhn became
“lukewarm about [the notion of] discontinuity, holding, plausibly enough, that even if some
revolutions occur in a trice, many others do not…The new-world problem is not about working
in a new world after a moment or a week of illumination and transformation.”502
The event is an important tool for thinking revolution as it erases the idea that there are
necessary meanings or figures that constitute the state. Instead, the state comes from processes
that draw connections, create relationships, and narrate themes in many different ways. When
these connections, relationships, and themes are shown to be significantly inadequate, events
create new ones. Events present the foundations of social contract theory and Marxism as
functions of these processes, and thus alterable given the right circumstances.
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Question 3: The Origin of Order
Just as evental authors use different methods to describe events, they approach the
question of the state’s constitution in several ways. The state is understood by Badiou as the
operations which determine how entities are categorized and counted, or the establishment of
transcendental rules by which things can happen and beings can function.503 As Badiou writes,
“The State is in fact the measureless enslavement of the parts of the situation, an enslavement
whose secret is precisely the errancy of superpower, its absence of measure.”504 This is the
political version of what Badiou refers to in Logic of Worlds as a “transcendental of a world,”505
or what in Being and Event he calls the “state of the situation.”506 It consists of the formal rules
by which things are included or excluded from presentation, or appearance. Using his set theory
inspired ontology, Badiou shows that the State is not concerned with individual people, but with
the organization that those individuals take. The state does not look at people as unique
members of society, but rather the class they belong to, their designated gender, their occupation,
etc. As Badiou says, “The State is simply the necessary metastructure of every historico-social
situation, which is to say the law that guarantees that there is Oneness, not in the immediacy of
society…but among the set of its subsets.”507 The state arises from the socio-historico situation
that determines what is and is not visible, but yet is separate from it.508 And inasmuch as it
determines how things are categorized within society in a top-down fashion, its function is
wholly repressive. Politics and revolution cannot be incorporated into the state, as that would
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turn them into forms of domination. To be liberatory and free they must be opposed to the state,
not functions of it.509 For Badiou, politics and revolution are instrumental in revealing the
workings of the state. As Adrian Johnston puts it, “…a genuine political event causes the
previously mysterious, spectral, and (most importantly) immeasurable excess of state power
suddenly to become something with a precise and known measure.”510 Or, to put it another way,
“Politics, thus, is the art of making the impossible possible…”511
While Badiou talks about the state as a categorizing operation, other evental thinkers talk
about it as a logic that intervenes to allow or disallow certain incidents, behaviors, or beings (and
thus, unlike Badiou’s state, it does deal with individual beings by controlling their formation).
Thinkers such as Foucault, Deleuze, Kuhn, and Arendt depict the state as a vehicle for
organizing society in a specific way. In doing so it has repression as one of its primary functions
(though, contra Badiou, not its only function). It is only via an outside force that the contingency
of the state can be shown and the authority of the state resisted. Hannah Arendt mentions many
dangerous forms government can take throughout her work. She describes tyranny as belonging
“strictly among the egalitarian forms of government; the tyrant is the ruler who rules as one
against all, and the "all" he oppresses are all equal, namely equally powerless”512. Alternatively,
totalitarianism creates “a deceptive facade of normality” that deceives the outside while
convincing its members “to believe that their convictions differ only in degree from those of
other people, so that they need never be aware of the abyss which separates their own world from
that which actually surrounds it.”513 Similar critiques are made in The Human Condition with
regard to bureaucracy, consumerism, and the nation-state (which she sees as inherently
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monarchical).514 Against these contingent forms of governance (her concept of which roughly
approximates my idea of the state) she opposes the potential for political action that arises when
people come together. The collective action of subjects is the ground that conditions opposition
to repressive governance. As Arendt says, the world we encounter (including any repressive or
dangerous systems) “would not exist without the human activity which produced it, as in the case
of fabricated things; which takes care of it, as in the case of cultivated land; or which established
it through organization, as in the case of the body politic.”515
Finally, Foucault’s state is the formation of discursive practices and power relations
immanent to the world. As he says, “power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of
objects and rituals of truth”516. The state is best understood within Foucauldian terminology as a
particular codification of power, or a specific episteme, that produces subjects, institutions, and a
society that cohere with its rules. For example, the monarchical power that defined punishment
in the seventeenth century produced a state with an absolute and infallible ruler517, while the biopower that appeared starting in the nineteenth century operates through a multiplicity of
institutions that invisibly disperse their power throughout society.518 The state, as a particular
ordering of power and knowledge within society519, is set up to allow certain practices and
statements within society while disallowing others. In this manner it is inherently repressive. At
the same time, because power always operates with resistance, it is always possible to oppose a
particular ordering of the state by contesting the processes that produced it (opposing power with
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power, or knowledge with knowledge). It is structurally possible, by referencing the outside, to
oppose the repressive power of the state.
An important corollary of each thinkers’ definition of the state is that its presence is
irreducible. To abolish the state is to abolish all political structure. The state is necessary, but
not any form of it, and evental thinkers are generally hesitant about prescribing an ideal form the
state should take. Arendt is the strongest advocate for the state to take a specific form, as she
calls for a republic based around the model of Ancient Rome. Badiou, by contrast, proposes an
abstract vision of communism that leaves much open to be decided. Foucault is the most reticent
about prescriptions, and refuses to endorse any form. Instead, Foucault will often suggest
possibilities, with the caveat that they must be critiqued. None of these thinkers say the state is
simply a political remnant of earlier philosophies that can be cast away. Despite the state’s
repression, it is only via participation in it that actions, ideas, or institutions are possible. Butler
describes this problem by saying that democratic politics are constituted through exclusions that
prescribe who can appear in the polity.520 Žižek agrees, saying that it must be clear that
universals are unavoidable.521 One cannot forego the state without becoming completely
incapable of relating to others or to oneself. Yet these thinkers disagree when it comes to the
amount of human agency involved in the formation of the state. While individual actions are
intimately involved in the production of the state, such actions are not entirely controlled by the
subject. Foucault relates actions back to discursive formations and power structures, claiming
that subjects are constrained by historical and social forces that restrict every action they
perform. Arendt’s statement that the state begins with the coming together of individuals
provides subjects with a modicum of greater control, as for her the ability of history and social
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forces to prevent the founding of a new state is not as great. Yet human political actions are
restricted to those of the vita activa, or “active life”. In both cases creating a new state is not an
easy task, for a revolution will only come from a movement that effectively utilizes the political
tools described by evental thought.
The evental concept of the state is important for a study of revolution by virtue of its lack
of permanent foundations. Evental thought shows how all of the state’s institutions, ideas, and
practices are open to structural change. The theoretical models that evental theorists use to build
the state reject the idea that any meanings or policies are intrinsic. There is a radical openness to
this approach that encourages the development of new models rather than constantly demanding
revolution return to the old. By thinking the state through these concepts, we are one step closer
towards escaping the rigid boundaries of the state.

Question 4: Connecting Order and Change
The fourth question about how the event and state interact boils down to a question of the
nature of change. What process or situation generates radical change, and how does such change
appear to those who live through it? Badiou draws out the nature of evental change by
contrasting it with three other types of change: modifications, facts, and weak singularities.522
Modifications are “the rule-governed appearing of intensive variations which a transcendental
authorizes in the world”523 and are akin, in the realm of politics, to the passing of a law. Such
changes are fully expected to happen, and occur as part of the normal routine. Yet other changes
fall outside the normal routine, and cannot be understood by referencing only the facts, ideas,
and beings that are already recognized. These extraordinary changes alter the normal routine.
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Depending on how drastic the alterations are, they can be called facts, weak singularities, or
events (with facts having the smallest impact and events the greatest). Events have an enormous
impact because they “make exist within [the state] the proper inexistent of the object-site”524 by
changing the rules governing what appears as a being. The Paris Commune of 1871 was an
event because it made the French government recognize the working class as a significant group.
Previously unrecognized by the state, the working class (as organized through the Commune’s
Central Committee) became a massive political force capable of transforming the Parisian
political landscape. For all intents and purposes, the episode of the Paris Commune made this
formerly inexistent group exist.525 From the perspective of the state, events provide a glimpse of
what Badiou calls the void. When an event occurs we see how our worldview is inadequate for
the task of capturing being, as something presents itself which cannot be explained. As Bosteels
puts it, “the inexistent serves as an index of the strict contingency of everything that appears,”526
meaning that our seeing into the void logically demonstrates the contingency of all that appears
to us. New explanations must be developed to give the inexplicable phenomenon a place.
Because explanations circumscribe multiplicity to create a coherent narrative, and thus all
explanations contain a similar ‘remainder,’ there is no complete explanation to be sought.
Reactions to seeing the void differ: some follow the event to its conclusion, some reject it, and
others deny its existence.527 Yet no matter the choice one takes, society is left to wrestle with the
“phantom of inconsistency”528 the event reveals for a long time to come.
Kuhn’s notions of “normal science” and “paradigm shift” closely resemble Badiou’s
differentiation between “modifications” and “events”. Kuhn describes normal science (what I
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would term the state) as a set of models that provide the foundation for a scientific tradition, like
Newtonian dynamics or wave optics.529 When a paradigm shift occurs new models are
substituted for old ones and a new state is revealed. Kuhn emphasizes that paradigm shifts do
more than just rename objects, as new beings are revealed that were previously unseeable.
Speaking of astronomy, Kuhn writes “Can it conceivably be an accident, for example, that
Western astronomers first saw change in the previously immutable heavens during the half
century after Copernicus' new paradigm was first proposed? The Chinese, whose cosmological
beliefs did not preclude celestial change, had recorded the appearance of many new stars in the
heavens at a much earlier date.”530 Kuhn’s focus in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions on
how paradigms allow one to see new things is supplemented in his later work by a study of how
linguistic change occurs. According to Paul Hoyningen-Huene, “In the first case, it is perception
that grounds the connection with the world; to encounter the world is to see it…In the second
case, by contrast, the connection with the world is a product of language; to encounter the world
is to capture it linguistically.”531 Kuhn and Badiou emphasize that we should not think about
rule changes and paradigm shifts as simply psychological operations, as they have an effect on
perception, experience, and being as well. They are more than conceptual heuristics, as they
affect any and all engagements we have with what is outside us. Badiou and Kuhn differ on
several points. Unlike Badiou, Kuhn believes a well-defined material realm exists outside
paradigms532, though he implies that the nature of that material world is impossible to get at.533
Outside rules, Badiou is only willing to posit “multiples of multiples.”534 Additionally, Kuhn
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does not distinguish degrees of change as Badiou does. There are no equivalents in Kuhn to
Badiou’s notions of “fact” and “weak singularity,” though inasmuch as they all affect the
foundations of a normal situation, it is likely Kuhn would categorize them as paradigm shifts of a
different quality.
The inconsistencies of being that for Badiou give way to change are described by Kuhn
as anomalies which “[violate] the paradigm-induced expectations.”535 Kuhn’s anomalies reveal
the limits of a theoretical model just as Badiou’s events expose the threshold of knowledge. The
primary difference is that Badiou’s events are instantaneous and lack ontological standing, while
Kuhn’s anomalies are “extended episodes” that appear as “novelties of fact” which can be
reproduced and examined.536 In Logic of Worlds Badiou says the event is that which “makes
what did not exist in a world appear within it”537 and later on, when describing the event of the
French Revolution, says “the unknowns of the Central Committee, politically inexistent in the
world of the eve of the insurrection, exist absolutely on the very day of their appearance.”538 For
Badiou, events are instantaneous, even though our wrestling with them and their implications
may take a long time. No such distinction is present in Kuhn. Yet for both the abnormality
disappears upon its incorporation into a new theoretical model. Neither Kuhn nor Badiou
believe that one model will account for everything, and they consider it important to continue to
develop new models to account for any inconsistencies the old revealed. For Kuhn, people react
to anomalies by forming different schools of thought that inform different research programs.539
The research program that takes hold is the one which incorporates the anomalies most
effectively. And while Badiou identifies three types of reactions to the event, Kuhn (perhaps
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because he refers to the field of science rather than politics or history) claims that all reactions
attempt to incorporate the event in some form. This state of confusion, trial, and error is
excellently translated into the field of politics by Deleuze and Guattari, who in A Thousand
Plateaus describe how groups within states often have “fringes or minorities” which produce a
furor against the state’s sovereignty and lead to an epoch of revolution. As they say, “there are
always periods when the state as organism has problems with its collective bodies, when these
bodies, claiming certain privileges, are forced in spite of themselves to open onto something that
exceeds them, a short revolutionary instant, an experimental surge.”540 The revolution is
“confused” and causes the state to analyze the surge and shift itself to reinscribe its order back
over the revolution.541 Yet just as Badiou and Kuhn emphasize the productivity of events, so do
Deleuze and Guattari conclude that revolutions are not defined simply by hostility to the state’s
authority, saying “[revolutions] can make war only on the condition that they simultaneously
create something else.”542
The transformative understanding of change detailed by evental thought is useful for a
study of revolution because it shows how change can be triggered without referring to doctrines.
It inscribes radical change into the structure of the state, but resists attempts to plan out that
change in advance. Change will happen when there is a need for something new, and such needs
are indispensible. The confusion, debate, and uncertainty that surround events are a positive
attribute to be embraced by revolutionaries. It is in the opening this disorder creates that the
building of a new state unshackled by the old is possible.
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Breaking up the state, but holding on to the pieces
Evental thought is a way to think beyond the limits of the present. The seemingly
intractable confines of Being are broken apart so that its infinite possibilities can be approached.
Evental thought has much to offer revolutionaries, for it is able to reveal the limits of any state
without at the same time prescribing a definite form for the state. As understood by evental
thought, revolutions are not stained with meaning, forced to perpetuate a particular state, or made
to advocate for a future society. The radical politics of evental thought advocates freedom and
openness, not just with regard to specific policies but also to what populates the state. Programs,
doctrines, and well-defined goals are excised from revolution as such. The state is not gone, but
while events remain its ability to oppress is always threatened. When interpreted by evental
thought, both Marxism and social contract theory become tools for building the state after an
event rather than descriptions of the only justifiable state. Arendt’s rereading of the legacy of
social contract theory illustrates this, as her claim is that the contract is about coming together to
create a space where politics can occur, and not any particular doctrine or program. Similarly,
Badiou ascribes to communist thought, though he reinterprets the materialist dialectic as a
carrying forth of a truth that can create a new world. Deleuze and Guattari makes a similar point
in What is Philosophy, saying that Marxism is a way of reterritorializing things.543 Though the
danger of turning the non-foundationalist, flexible, and constantly changing ideas of evental
thought into dogma must be guarded against, they are nevertheless valuable tools that allow for
the rethinking of dangerous ideas.
But if events are to be wholly separate from states, evental thought, as it has been
construed so far, is still problematic. Even though evental theorists do not posit rules or ends
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that circumscribe revolution, they still use the state for their descriptions of the forces that
produce events. In order for multiplicity, difference, and openness to theorize revolution’s
ability to transform the state, it is necessary that they each be separate from the state. Yet as part
of the state, evental theorists can only encounter and describe those ideas inasmuch as those
ideas are also a part of the state. Because there is no possibility of thinking beyond the state, or
of perceiving the world in a manner unaffected by the state, it must be the case that these forces
and operations can be perceived within the confines of the state. The answer that evental theory
provides for how it can view what is beyond the state from the state is that the operations it
describes are held within the interstices of states. They are not present as things, but as relations
or as processes which states must follow in order for our experience of states to be consistent.
Yet these operations that construct states and hold them together are not just found behind states,
they are found behind revolution too. Revolutions are produced through the same operations,
processes, and forces that produce the state. This creates a dilemma for evental theory, for its
theories are only tenable if the operations, processes, and forces are perceivable from within the
state, yet revolutions are not free as long as revolutions are conceived of as their product. Thus,
despite their best efforts to escape the state, evental thought ultimately reproduces the equivalent
of proto-states. A proto-state is a formal, transcendental architecture responsible for forming
beings, subjects, and all other appearances found within the state. It consists of consistent forces
or process that condition both the state and revolution. These proto-states are less determinate
than the states of social contract theory and Marxism, but nevertheless bind revolution to an
abstract order.
Because the projects of Badiou, Kuhn, Foucault, Arendt, Deleuze, and Derrida are so
varied, engaging their projects will be an effective means of illustrating the different possible
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manifestations of a proto-state. By examining how their proto-states still control revolution we
will see what still needs to be done for revolution to escape the state. As I will show, evental
thought determines the process of revolution by promoting proto-states that create change in a
specific way. A longer argument is forthcoming in the next chapter, but for the moment let’s
consider how change is conditioned within the work of Badiou and Foucault. First, Badiou’s
theory of revolution relies heavily on the declaration. As Badiou says, “By the declaration of the
belonging of the event to the situation it bars the void’s interruption. But this is only in order to
force the situation itself to confess its own void, and to thereby let forth, from inconsistent being
and the interrupted count, the incandescent non-being of an existence.”544 Badiou’s revolutions
must be attached to a truth procedure, for there is no radical change unless a new set is declared
and the truth of that set propagated.545 But is it not possible for there to be revolutionary change
that goes unrecognized in language or thought, or for such change to occur in the relationships
between extant beings rather than through the creation of a new set? The American and French
Revolutions have had unexpected effects on society throughout history up to and including
today, even though by Badiou’s logic the multiples they constitute were declared long ago.
Politicians, military leaders, and social movements have been inspired by them in ways those
involved with the revolutions never imagined, and the messages inherited from the revolutions
have been revised numerous times. Badiou’s reliance on the logic of multiplicities, and in
particular on the fact that transcendental rules determine which multiplicities are recognized as
ones546, sets up a state that determines how events occur.
Foucault’s notions of power and discourse return a substantially different concept of
events. Unlike Badiou’s truth-procedures, Foucauldian power and discourse are located within
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the social realm.547 Creating an event is not about the reworking of a set’s logic but rather the
organizing of points of resistance in order to deploy new power relations throughout society.
The rule of immanence that Foucault follows in his study of events means that contestation and
strategy are irreducible parts of power, and that as a result power can be both seen and
manipulated. As Foucault writes, “Rather than analyzing power from the point of view of its
internal rationality, [my project] consists of analyzing power relations through the antagonism of
strategies.”548 Events for Foucault involve radical reversals in power dynamics, the production
of new behaviors, and the reworking of old habits to make them more amenable. They are like
“games” that involve a “complicated interplay” between power and freedom.549 Yet Foucault’s
attempt to see the system of differences at the heart of power relations550 means that it is difficult
for him to appreciate revolutionary militancy. There may be a shared vision of a future to come
that inspires a revolution, as Foucault believed was present during the Iranian revolution551, but
danger of misusing power means that such a vision cannot be safely codified. Any program or
strategy needs to be subjected to critique, and so Foucault’s ideal revolutionaries are those who
experiment instead of rigidly following a program. Foucault points to the dichotomy between
the creative, intrepid revolutionary life and the militant programs of revolutionary parties in his
lecture series The Courage of Truth, saying that it would be interesting to study “how the idea of
a cynicism of the revolutionary life as scandal of an unacceptable truth clashed with the
definition of a conformity of existence as the condition of militantism in the so-called
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revolutionary parties.”552 As these examples show, the proto-states of evental theorists
determine the state and how revolution should function in relation to it. Movement is
subordinated to the proto-state’s prescription of how it occurs.
A state of any kind acts to restrict change, and is as a result hostile to revolution. A
revolutionary state is a contradiction in terms, for all states project a stagnancy before them that
oppresses. A theory of revolution that escapes the state will need to find a way outside this
dilemma. Perhaps an answer will be forthcoming if we begin by inverting the strategy that has
been used so far. Political philosophy—including evental thought—explains the state by
referring to its parts or the processes that compose it. This is what it means to search for
foundations. But what if by delving deeper and deeper into the molecular constitution of the
state we are prevented from finding the answers we need? What if, instead of explaining the
state by referencing its parts, we begin with the notion that the parts must be explained by
reference to the state? This question, and its implications for a theory of revolution, will be
taken up in the next chapter.

552

Foucault, Courage of Truth (Government of the Self and Others II): Lectures at the College de France 19831984, trans. Graham Burchell (Palgrave Macmillon; New York, 2011), 186. In this passage Foucault does not mean
cynicism in the conventional sense of the term, but in relation to the set of philosophers collectively known as the
Cynics.

143

Dynamic Anarchism’s Revolt: Turning the System Against Itself
Liberating revolution in 12 easy steps
It is now time to lay out a new theory of revolution. To make it digestible, I will pose to
this new theory the same four questions that I posed to evental thought in the preceding chapter.
But because this theory must avoid perpetuating any part of the state my claim is that nothing
grounds the possibility of revolution other than the state itself. There are no beings, no pieces,
no processes or forces that, in composing the state, also condition radical change. The
description given to revolution must preserve the three traits, mentioned in chapter one, of
incommensurability, unpredictability, and indiscernability. The state itself leads to radical
change, just as radical change leads to the state. Thus to present my theory I will answer
questions one and three at the same time, then move on to question two and, finally, question
four. As I will show, by conceiving of the state as dynamic and generative it is possible to resist
the pressure to hold a piece of the state apart from change or to theorize a proto-state.
By answering questions one and three together several problems arise which must be
solved. First, a new concept of the state must be found. If even the proto-states of evental theory
are problematic, our new theory must present states as wholly dynamic and changeable, yet also
primary rather than derivative. In short, this theory must be able to explain change by
referencing states themselves rather than their pieces. This bears some similarity to Badiou’s
theory, but is also distinguishable from it on a couple of points. The first is that Badiou
conditions his events upon the “void” (in Being and Event) or a “site” (in Logic of Worlds)
whereby the contingency of a particular world can be made manifest. As I will show, I consider
events to be endemic to the nature of states, or a part of how they function. It is how states
operate as a whole, and not a part of them, that should be studied to see how events appear.
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Second, Badiou’s logic of multiplicity—which extends beyond any particular state or situation—
conditions the fact that there is a void or site, and thus the possibility for the types of events
Badiou describes. By contrast, I do not extend any such logic outside states. The next problem
that needs to be addressed is why evental thought is wrong to assume processes external to states
(i.e. the proto-states referenced in the last chapter). Though such processes condition both the
state and revolution, they are only a serious problem for revolution if they privilege the state by
circumscribing the possibilities for change. A new theory must show why the creation of protostates is unnecessary or dangerous for revolution. Third, this approach requires a new path to
radical change. In order to adhere to the stipulations of problems one and two, we must find a
way to theorize revolutionary change without making its existence conditional. Radical change
cannot simply be the expected product of forces and beings coming together; it must have a
character unique to itself which is not apparent by looking at the state’s composition. As I will
show, the key to solving these problems is to rehabilitate the notion of ‘system.’ By defining
states in relation to systems it is possible to see how states, by themselves, can be wholly
changeable without needing to posit a proto-state. This can work because systems, properly
understood, do not come from a stable ground but are related only to themselves. Because this is
the case any part of them is open to change. A new understanding of system developed along
these lines not only will provide the concept of the state needed, but also the necessary context
for a new theory of revolution.
Before developing a solution to problem one, some time must be spent articulating the
concept of ‘system’. As I use the term, systems are radically interconnected networks composed
of creators of change, objects that are changed, and mechanisms for change in such a way that
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each and every member is composed of and reflected within the others.553 All systems are
dynamic such that all parts are in motion and constantly changing their relationship to, their
effect upon, and their role within the system. As I will show in my elaboration of this definition
and what it entails, unpredictable movement is a necessary and natural part of systems.
This description of system leads to an important question: what holds the pieces of the
system together? This resolves into two questions, which I will answer in turn. First, why is it
incorrect to see the world as composed of atomized, individual beings, or to use a non-system
based ontology? The reason why the idea of systematicity must be brought in is because the
only way of explaining dynamism without it is to resort to a proto-state. The rationale for a
system’s motion—and for the motion of every piece of a system—must be explained, but
without creating a transcendental architecture that generates it. The only answer is to see the
motion as an intrinsic part of the system, and not as the product of eternally present processes.
There must be a system, as without it the goal of liberating revolution is impossible. Second,
what keeps the pieces of the system from going their separate way? While this is a potential
outcome of a revolution, it is true that most systems do not break apart easily. They have a
tendency to stay connected. The reason for this is that the system is responsible for constituting
its parts, just as the parts constitute the system. Connections exist not just between the different
agents and objects of the system, but between these elements and the project of the system at any
particular point in time. Though in the right circumstances a being will leave a system, it is this
relationship that tends to keep the system bound together.
Also integral to this theory is that while every particular system has agents of change,
objects of change, and means of change, none of them necessarily persist. These features can
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always be overthrown. In describing what a system itself is it is impossible to say any more than
that it is interconnected and dynamic. Even to say that systems contain an agents, objects, and
means of change is partly inaccurate, for by treating these elements as separate the indivisibility
of the system is hidden. Though the system is not a simple unity, neither does it easily
differentiate into rigid and atomic parts. Either choice presents the system, or a piece of it, as
firm and unchangeable. Rather, the system is a complex whole of continually differentiating and
merging parts, the movement of which can be helpfully understood through the four elements
above. It is both dynamic (understood as constantly changing in all aspects) and emergent
(understood as the ability to develop novelty as a result of such change). Fred Evans makes a
similar point in reference to society, which he says is a “multivoiced body” that operates as a
“unity composed of difference.”554 The voices of society are always “‘in motion’” and “exist as
responses to one another,” and while it is possible to identify the individual voices, every “voice
is shot through and partially constituted by the other voices of the community.”555 The same
principle Evans points to with regard to societal voices applies to systems, for just as societal
voices are always drawing from and reflecting each other, so too is each part of a system a
reaction to and product of the rest. A system is not a rigid and hegemonic unity, but one
comprised of many ingredients that both constitute and are constituted by change and whose
character and function is not set in advance. As I will show below, it is the radical
interconnectedness and interdependency of these ingredients which allow me to make this claim.
There is both sameness and difference—both unity and plurality—in the system, but what
constitutes each is in flux.
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At this point it is necessary to introduce the concept of elaboration. Elaboration occurs
as a system operates, for as the various parts interact they develop and grow in complexity. A
nascent political state inevitably encounters problems and challenges that require new solutions,
and which lead it to create new laws, organizations, or structures. The United States’
Constitution only alludes to the President’s ability to appoint a Cabinet, and the first time one
was formed there were only four positions (Secretary of State, War, Treasure, and Attorney
General). As the government developed the Cabinet grew in complexity to the point where it
now has fifteen positions (and another twenty Cabinet positions have been proposed to address
lacuna in federal government oversight). These new positions do not contradict, oppose, or
otherwise immediately undermine the political organization of the United States; rather, they are
conceived of as helping to grow and preserve the country’s ability to meet its constitutional
requirements. As a system operates, it naturally develops layers of complexity.
Before going further, let us compare the way systems have traditionally been discussed
with the concept of system I am developing. Though the diversity of philosophical systems
makes generalizations difficult, it is possible to find ways in which great systems thinkers of the
past have impeded or formalized the dynamism of systems. Kant, for instance, describes how
external input is ordered through time, space, and the categories of pure reason. Because these
categories are conceived to be unchangeable, there is no possibility of his system developing.
Hegel, according to one reading of his system, formalizes the manner in which knowledge can be
reached. When he says “knowledge is only actual, and can only be expounded, as Science or as
system”556 one interpretation of this claim is that he believes a systematic examination of
knowledge predicts the dialectical movement of “externalizing…the Notion”557 and subsequently
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reincorporating the externalized concepts into a “[philosophically] comprehended
organization.”558 Because Hegel knows the rules of the dialectic, he can foresee the trajectory of
knowledge—not just in the sense of reaching its telos in absolute knowing, but in the sense of
predicting its constant externalizing motion. Reflecting on this project, or on systems thinking in
general, some have said that it reduces becoming to a mere formula. Michel Foucault describes
his project as trying to flee Hegel559, and criticizes the dialectic for guaranteeing that difference
will always be recaptured.560 In broader terms, Nietzsche criticizes systematicity as such as
showing “a lack of integrity.”561 Even those who reject this, arguing that Hegel is much less
deterministic than such a reading would imply562, maintain that change, movement, and truth
always come from a conflict of opposites563—claiming in essence that dynamism is produced in
a necessary way even if becoming itself cannot be reduced to a formulaic piece of knowledge.
Though past systems thinkers have a restrictive understanding of systems, anti-systems
thinkers do not escape systems thinking. Many contemporary philosophers identify systems with
form, order, and the normal way of doing things. Systems must be fought to get change. Instead
of capturing the definitive nature of the state, systems take what is irreducible to thought and turn
it into something determinate. In portraying certain elements as stable, and all change as the
result of fixed causes, systems miss how nonidentity, dialectical sublation, and difference
undermine all determinations. Adorno writes that “The pedantries of all systems, down to the
architectonic complexities…are the marks of an a priori inescapable failure,” concluding that the

558

Ibid., 493.
Foucault “The Discourse on Language” in Archaeology of Knowledge and Discourse on Language, trans. AM
Sheridan Smith (Pantheon Books; New York, 1972), 235.
560
Foucault, “Theatricum Philosophicum,” in Aesthetics, Method, Epistemology: The Essential Works of Michel
Foucault, ed. James Faubion (The New Press; New York, 1998), 358.
561
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman(Cambridge University Press; Cambridge,
2005) 159.
562
Zizek, Less Than Nothing, (Verso; London, 2012), 195, 199.
563
Ibid., 201.
559

149

necessary outgrowths of all systems reveal “the untruth, the mania, of the systems
themselves.”564 Similarly, Foucault asserts that systems of knowledge have led to enslavement
and domination565, while Derrida claims that the goal of his project is “to seek new concepts and
models, an economy escaping this system of metaphysical oppositions.”566 Anti-system
philosophers claim all systems are incapable of doing what they set out to do. Yet we should
question whether these thinkers really escape systems. The tools they develop to disrupt systems
(such as the nonconceptual, power/resistance dynamics, and the idea that meaning is always “tocome”) only function because the tools have a presence within, or are a part of, the systems they
are disrupting. Without this being the case it would be impossible for these tools to undermine
any system. These tools are not beyond systems per se, but rather are presented as parts or
attributes of all systems that previously went unseen. More importantly, these tools cause
change—by subverting and creating new identity—in a specific way. In Foucault’s philosophy,
for instance, power is always immanent but “[masks] a substantial part of itself,”567 creating
change through the tactical utilization of relationships for the purpose of instituting a new regime
of order. The tools described by anti-systems thinkers operate as part of a determinate system
that may be unfamiliar within the history of philosophy, but it is still a system. And as a system,
every element of it is interconnected and interdependent. Changing one thing in the system can
create a ripple effect that changes other pieces of it as well. If these tools are part of the system,
they are just as subject to being changed by an alteration in the system as any subject or object
within it. The tools of anti-systems thinkers cannot affect things within the system while
remaining apart from the movement of the system. Anti-system thinkers may undermine rigid
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and determinate systems of earlier philosophers, but in doing so they create systems of their own.
To an extent anti-systems thinkers admit this, as Foucault describes power as being able to
change in how it functions, while Deleuze presents his ontology differently within different
fields. Thus the tools of anti-systems thinkers are not monolithic. For now, my point is just to
show how systems are still vital elements of anti-system thinkers’ philosophies, and that the
working of systems affects their tools even as the tools change systems.
This concludes my account of what constitutes a system. It is now time to consider what
constitutes a state. Though as I will show a state is composed of all the elements of dynamic
systems, it needs to be distinguished from dynamic systems as such. This difference is necessary
because dynamic systems can be radically altered without disappearing or collapsing. Yet if this
same condition is applied to the state, then we must incongruously conclude that no state can
ever cease to exist. At some point, the definitions of dynamic system and state need to diverge.
The primary difference between a system and a state comes from the fact that a state is
characterized by an archetype. This archetype includes ideas about how things work, the nature
of the environment, and what is to come in the future. It is both a representation of and a
prescription for the order politics takes within a dynamic system. So unlike a dynamic system, a
state consists only of those movements (especially those of elaboration) which develop, enhance,
perpetuate, or preserve its archetype. In other words, a state is a dynamic system inasmuch as it
consists of all the same elements as one, and inasmuch as it grows in complexity like one, yet
anytime the system moves in a way that undermines the states’ archetype, that movement cannot
properly be included within the constitution of the state. In short, a state is the archetypal
movements, beings, and interactions of a dynamic system.
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There are two reasons why this definition of state differs from other theories. The first
has to do with the placement of the archetype, which does not precede or determine the state.
Archetypes emerge from dynamic systems as they settle into a sustainable routine. Yet they are
not only representational, as once they emerge they can play an agential role in preserving the
state. They become the measure against which actions are judged, or institutions are formed, and
they prohibit those things which do not meet their guidelines (just as how in Hobbes’ theory it is
inappropriate to question the unitary authority of the sovereign).568 Thus unlike the states of
social contract theory, for which the order of states is determined in advance, the states of
Dynamic Anarchism have no predetermined archetype. Nevertheless every archetype is still able
to play a role in disciplining the system to act in a particular way, and in resisting radical change.
The second reason the state of Dynamic Anarchism is different is because it is not static. While
it does follow a certain order, the movements that form and the complexity of that order is
always evolving. The particular processes that form the order at one point may be swapped out
for others later on without any discernible change in the archetype itself, assuming the product of
each set of processes is the same. This means that Dynamic Anarchism would reject the Marxist
claim that economic relationships always determine the form the state takes. It also entails the
rejection of the Marxist base-superstructure theory, for the order of the state is not inherently
hierarchical, nor does the archetype define a separate realm from the processes and movements
of the state (as the base and superstructure do in Marxist theory). States are mobile, and as such
cannot be modeled simply as a ‘universal’ or ‘one’. 569 Any account of them must be able to
illustrate both what is allowed to change and what is required to stay the same. As long as states
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contribute to the perpetuation of a certain political arrangement, there is no necessary way or
domain through which they form that order.
This new model of the state contradicts Badiou’s and Žižek’s ideas of universality and
one-ness. Because the state is an adaptable system all notions of stability and normativity come
from within a system, not from without. Deleuze makes this point by saying “Representation is a
transcendental illusion”570 and that to liberate difference we must no longer subordinate it to the
identity of the concept and the thinking subject, to the similar within perception, to the negative,
and to the analogy of judgment.571 It is for this reason that the notions of universality proposed
by thinkers like Žižek and Badiou are problematic, for when they oppose unity, or ‘the one’, to
the radical openness of the ‘real’ or ‘multiples of multiples’ they assume a universal that is
uniform and hegemonic, and whose notions of stability and normativity are transcendental
conditions that come from beyond the universal itself. Badiou makes this point in discussing the
need for a metastructure that structures all ones, saying “In order for the void to be prohibited
from presentation, it is necessary that structure be structured, that the ‘there is Oneness’ be valid
for the count-as-one.”572 The state, for Badiou, regardless of its historico-social situation, is
always involved in the operation of guaranteeing “that there is Oneness…among the set of its
subsets.”573 And Žižek claims that signifiers devoid of content still can have an effect as empty
signifiers.574 In other words, what constitutes the state is for them nonadaptive and formulaic.
While it is true that a signifier or a form can remain without any content, I believe Žižek and
Badiou miss the fact that signifiers and forms cannot remain without a context that allows them
to operate as such. Signifiers do not exist independently but they depend upon a context that
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imbues them with the power to signify. Peter Hallward traces this deficiency in Badiou to his
reliance on set theory, saying “Set theory obliges us to think that ‘there are only multiplicities,
nothing else…’ Not only is relation thus conceived as little more than a variation on the
elementary relation of order (greater-than or lesser-than), there is no clear sense that it can
qualify, shape, or otherwise affect the objects related.”575 What needs to be opposed to radical
change is not something simply uniform and hegemonic in its emptiness, but something that is
plural and variable at the same time that it is consistent.
The real need for a theory of revolution—one that escapes the notion of state entirely—is
not just to question the determinacy of appearances and beings in the state, but to question
determinacy itself. It is not enough to displace order from the things in the state to the processes
that compose them; it must instead be shown that determinacy itself is not determinate. Systems,
and all the pieces found within them, must be seen as evolving, emergent, and capable of
developing novelty without reference to a proto-state. Building off of the idea of MerleauPonty’s hyperdialectic, we need to find a way to understand systems that is not simplistic and
reductive, and which does not prescribe a form for systems but allows for their change and
creativity. This openness to change must include the forces, operations, and processes that
produce the state as well as the things within it. We need, in a word, hyper-systematicity.

How to trust the system as a revolutionary
At this point we have begun to answer the first problem that arises from combining
questions one and three together: a state is a dynamic system characterized by an archetype. We
have covered what it means to be a system and an archetype, but we still need an account of
dynamism, both what it is and how it works. From this account we will be able to see how this
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new understanding of the state makes proto-states irrelevant and puts us on the path to a new
account of radical change (the second and third problems identified above).
An explanation of the dynamism of states begins with the means of change recognized by
the state. As has already been mentioned, states encourage some types of change and disallow
others. The conventional perspective is that participating in encouraged forms of change
perpetuates the state while a massive violation of the state’s laws brings forth revolution.576
Many poststructuralists disagree, saying action maintains the state’s hegemonic system by
reinforcing the particular schema underlying that state, and that truly radical change requires
advocating for an indeterminate ideal or political will.577 Properly speaking, though, none of
these name revolution but only the direction in which one moves in relation to the state. And no
matter how hard one tries, moving in any of these directions is not guaranteed to bring about
revolution. If revolution is to be truly unpredictable it cannot be the likely result of taking any
particular relationship to the state. I say this not to disparage the important work that activists do
in holding the state to account for its crimes, but to point out that advocating against the state is
not a recipe for revolution any more than advocating for the state assures its preservation. Large
movements for radical social change have failed to motivate revolution, while strong rulers have
been unable to prevent dramatic shifts in the state. Even advocating for a state “to come” can
continue ad infinitum without any revolutionary effect. The state, qua system, does not function
in a predictive and restrictive manner. Claiming a particular relationship to the state will result
in revolution ignores the ability of systems to transform, and, by doing so, to yield results that are
unexpected by examining the system’s components. Revolution can result no matter what
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direction people take with regard to the state, as what defines revolution is its ability in the right
context to create a catalytic change throughout the system that fundamentally rewrites the state’s
archetype.
The existence of radical change means we must supplement our account of systems to say
that in addition to the changes the state recognizes there are also changes that are
incommensurable, unpredictable, and indeterminate from the state’s perspective. These latter
changes are catalytic in nature and have the ability to revolutionize the state, but—and this is
vital—they result from nothing other than the state itself. To explain why this is, let us return to
the composition of the state itself as a dynamic mixture of agents, objects, and means for change
all held together through an archetype. Because we are beginning with the state itself and not
with the pieces it resolves into (i.e. a proto-state), there is a fundamental interconnectivity that
defines the state. Disparate pieces do not come together to form states; rather the state is
constantly dividing, allocating, merging, and transforming itself such that any time a separate
piece is identifiable it is shot through and wholly dependent upon everything else in the state.
Each piece of the state is so interwoven with the others that a small modification can catalyze a
massive effect. The introduction of something new, or the ongoing recurrence of phenomena
past what an environment can sustain, can create a sea change in how the system as a whole
works. There are numerous illustrations of each type of change. In regards to the former, one
example is the radical shift in city planning, culture, and lifestyle that occurred as a result of the
introduction of the automobile, not to mention its impact on the environment, economics, and
international relations.578 In regards to the latter, the climate change crisis is an excellent
example of how recurrence of phenomena can change a system. The environment is built to
absorb carbon dioxide, but not at the level it is being released currently. Unless this stops,
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scientists predict a worldwide transformation of the climate that will exceed anything humans
have ever experienced.579 Being able to predict phenomena does not mean one is able to predict
all their effects. The thoroughly interconnected nature of a system means that everything in the
system acts both according to its own plan and in response to others’ actions. The most elaborate
schematics of systems cannot predict how these actions and reactions will affect the long term
functioning of systems. The behavior of a system in motion is not reducible to the behavior its
outline predicts.
One example will illustrate how this works. Marx’s system projects a communist society
will result from the ongoing dialectical relationship between material forms and human society.
To reach this conclusion Marx relies on analyses of wealth creation, social order, and human
need. His predictions thus rest on the assumption that politics, society, and the economy will
progress logically based on rules discernible from his situation. Yet on numerous occasions
small events have led to massive and illogical changes Marx’s system was unprepared for. In the
latter half of the twentieth century Marx’s acolytes had to rework Marxist thought to explain the
splintering of the international workers party that occurred as a result of developments in world
affairs. The Marxist Nicos Poulantzas describes this as one of the two major “crises” of
Marxism in the latter half of the twentieth century, saying that because of it “we came to the
realization, among others, that we do not have an adequate Marxist explanation, based on serious
theory and scientific evidence, for the situation which prevails in the countries of 'actually
existing socialism.'”580 Terry Eagleton claims that “it is no longer easy to say what counts as
being a Marxist” given how many of the doctrines central tenets have been discounted.581 Other
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Marxists have questioned whether the analyses Marx gives in Capital still hold today given how
much media, technology, and science have affected the world’s development.582 In both of these
cases, the developments did not violate any rules of Marx’s system (that is, the ongoing presence
of world affairs and the development of new technologies was something Marx expected and
allowed for), but still led to changes that required a substantial reworking of the Marxist system.
Additionally, consider the effect the introduction of Marx’s system has had on the
predictions Marx makes. Russians and Cubans attempted to create the conditions Marx says are
necessary for revolt, while capitalists engaged in massive programs to seek out and punish any
attempts at organizing workers. The former can be seen in Lenin’s programmatic adherence to
the idea of the vanguard party583 and Castro’s show trials584, both of which were identified with
the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. The latter is demonstrated by the fact that capitalists have
funneled millions of dollars into third world militias and political movements to undermine
Marxism.585 In both cases people are responding not just to the natural conditions and historical
developments Marx describes, but to his predictions as well. Since in all his writings Marx never
theorizes the effect his thought will have on the population, it is a fair assumption that he felt it
would have no appreciable effect and that economic forces would dominate history’s
movements. Though it is impossible to judge how different the last century would be without
Marxist thought, can it really be said—given how much foreign, domestic, and economic policy
was decided based on fear of or fidelity to Marxist doctrines—that it had no appreciable effect on
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history? Economist John K. Galbraith argues for its profound impact, saying “If we agree that
the Bible is a work of collective authorship, only Mohammed rivals Marx in the number of
professed and devoted followers recruited by a single author. And the competition is not really
very close. The followers of Marx far outnumber the sons of the Prophet.”586 This is not to say
that Marx’s system is worthless, incapable of making salient points about philosophy,
economics, or history, but that it is significant that the Marxist system has had to be reworked
many times in response to radical and unexpected changes catalyzed by entirely predictable
alterations that were not external to Marxist thought. No matter how well designed systems are,
when new phenomena are introduced, or when the system can no longer sustain certain ideas and
behaviors, then the very assumptions on which the systems are based have the potential to
change dramatically. The radical interconnectedness of systems means that they are volatile and
de-centered even when they do not appear to be, and thus radical change is always possible in
ways the system cannot predict.
The dynamism I describe here needs to be related back to the ongoing discussion within
systems theory about open versus closed systems, for it may seem like I am claiming a system is
either closed or dynamic, when what I am actually claiming is that all systems—whether closed
or open—are dynamic. To start, let us define open systems as those “characterized by outputs
that respond to inputs but where the outputs are isolated from and have no influence on the
inputs,” and closed systems as those characterized by a “loop structure that brings results from
past action of the system back to control future action.”587 Open systems are those which receive
inputs from outside the system, and closed systems are those which receive their own outputs as
inputs (it is possible for a system to be mixed, and receive inputs both from beyond itself and
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from itself). In both closed and open systems, as they were classically conceived, the inputs go
through the same set of steps, or the same processes, as all previous inputs. While over time the
output can yield drastically different results, the steps or processes that inputs undergo never
change. What Dynamic Anarchism claims is that this classical conception of systems is
inaccurate, and that all systems are actually dynamic such that the processes that define them are
subject to fundamental change as well. Although it seems that some systems are determinate
rather than dynamic, this is a function of the fact that some systems are not very complex or
interconnected. Such simple systems generally operate formulaically, though over a long enough
period of time they express dynamic attributes. Complex and highly interconnected systems are
better examples of the issues under discussion here. Whether closed or open, it is not unusual
when a system is highly complex, or if it is given enough time, for the processes defining it to
shift, to reverse themselves, or, in rare occasions, to dissolve themselves entirely.
In making this claim, I am drawing from recent discoveries within complex systems
biology that have demonstrated that it is possible for wholly determinate systems to yield
phenomena that are fundamentally new within the context of the system. John Holland writes of
such complex systems that “The interactions between the parts are nonlinear, so that the overall
behavior cannot be obtained by summing the behaviors of the isolated components…In this
sense, more comes out than was put in.”588 The difference between rigid systems and the
transformative systems Holland describes has to do with whether the order governing systems is
formulated from beyond the systems themselves, or whether the order is part of the system.
When the order comes from without it is impossible to change, yet when the order is generated
by the system itself it can be completely rewritten. Although each individual system follows
rules, when the right context comes along every one of those rules can be overthrown.
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Nothing—no beings, rules, forces, or guidelines—defines systems as such except the fact that
they are dynamic. This approach reveals how even the most determinate system will over time
produce diversity and generate new structures, operations, and functions. Scott Page writes that
if one begins with systems that are composed of “diverse, interdependent, networked entities”589
capable of change then one sees that complexity and a rich array of new phenomena can emerge
even from a relatively minimal number of parts. Page concludes that “fundamental diversity is
not required for complexity. Emergent diversity is.”590 Importantly, because these systems are
dynamic rather than static they react not just to the rules governing them but to their products,
the behaviors of the subjects and objects composing them, and the network of forces that allow
them to function. Determinate systems thus often yield unpredictable effects because of what
scientists have termed the “multiplier effect” and the “recycling effect,” whereby small
accretions or deficits can over time accumulate to the point where they invalidate a theretofore
intrinsic part of the system. Holland writes that the multiplier effect “jeopardizes long-range
trends based on simple trends”591 and says that the “overall effect [of the recycling effect] on a
network with many cycles can be striking.”592 Though these claims are made with reference to
biology, studies have shown that these principles hold true for all complex systems593.
Phenomena such as emergence, unpredictability, and dynamism are the result of complex
interdependent networks, so this description is just as easily applicable to the field of politics as
it is to biology.
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The notion of complex and dynamic systems brings us to the crux of where my concept
of state diverges from evental thought. What systems thinking does which makes it
advantageous to evental thought is situate change in a fundamental and irreducible position. In
order to demonstrate what I mean by this, it is necessary to review how change is positioned
within evental thought. Ignoring for the moment the differences between evental projects, every
evental thinker situates change as the expected product of the operation of regularly occurring
processes. The same is true of revolutionary change. Foucault writes “…it is doubtless the
strategic codification of…points of resistance that makes a revolution possible”594 while Badiou
claims that it is only through an “interpretive intervention” that an event like the French
Revolution can be “presented in a situation.”595 While on the one hand making revolution
conditional on these processes violates the principles, mentioned in chapter one, that revolution
be unpredictable and incommensurable, the larger issue is that the nature of change is
circumscribed. Foucault, for instance, locates the domain of power wholly within the social
(saying “[power] is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular
society”596), thus privileging social apparatuses like institutions, micro-practices, and discourse
as the primary vehicles through which change occurs. Foucault is right that power is the
function of relations; that it is polyvalent, de-centered, mobile, and transitory; and that there is
always an ongoing play between power and resistance.597 But he limits the place from which
revolution can occur while binding it wholly to the proper functioning of power. In his theory,
revolution must come from the social realm, and not from anywhere else. Thus revolution is
confined by the limits power has by virtue of locating it within the social realm. While
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resistance is always incapable of undoing how power functions, Foucault gives no indication that
it can affect where power functions. To be more specific, particular characteristics of a type of
power (i.e. the words, gestures, and institutions that it operates through) can change. However,
power always functions as a characteristic of the social realm, and as such is bound by the limits
of that realm. Though Foucault has a very expansive notion of the social, the effects that nondiscursive and non-social beings have on our politics or social order often goes un-theorized by
Foucault. Similarly, Badiou restricts revolutions in terms of how they operate. He insists that
events are instantaneous, as they are either included within the situation or they are not, and so
there are no gradations or middle ground.598 Badiou’s events must begin from a vanguard which
has declared a new set, and it is by winning over converts that the world becomes organized
through this set’s rules.599 The processual, gradual, and relational character of revolutions is a
secondary attribute of revolutions. Revolutions are principally defined by instantaneity and
fidelity. Badiou is right that revolutions are irreducible to states, but he is wrong to make
revolutions conditional on the act of declaration, as though the unique character of the state a
revolution responds to plays no significant role in how that revolution appears.
Dynamic Anarchism, by contrast, does not build radical change into the system as the
expected result of the proper functioning of determinate processes. Radical change is an
irreducible and foundational feature of systems, just as systems are an irreducible and
foundational feature of radical change. Inasmuch as states are systems characterized by an
archetype, they are fully capable of yielding radical change that undermines the order their
archetype prescribes. Revolutions occur when entirely expected and predictable changes in a
system cause, by virtue of the complexity and interconnectivity of systems, unexpected and
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unpredictable changes that fundamentally alter how a system operates. Nothing operating
behind revolution causes it; rather, revolutions are coincident with and as fundamental as the
state. To return to my point about determinacy, the problem with evental thought is that it
deconstructs the determinacy of objects, identities, and other beings by maintaining the
determinacy of signifiers, gestures, words, and power. These tools used by evental thought have
a coherent field in which they operate or a formal structure that defines how they work. But
indeterminacy loses its significance if it depends upon determinate tools; rather it must have a
basis of its own. A liberated theory of revolution must find a way to describe radical change, not
as the product of various forces and operations, but as something synchronous with and yet
irreducible to the state (inasmuch as it undermines the state’s archetype).
This last point requires elaboration, for the theory of Dynamic Anarchism insists upon a
new basis for understanding radical change. The fact that evental theorists elaborate processes
that lead to radical change means that they see such change as the product of specific types of
interactions and not as a condition of systematicity. The idea that revolutions are performed by
acting in a certain way means that within these theories revolution is always generated by the
same mechanism. That mechanism may manifest itself differently in different revolutions, but
its basic character remains. Dynamic Anarchism proposes a different concept of radical change,
positioning it not as the result of any mechanism, but of the nature of systems. It is part of the
character of systems, given their complexity and interconnectivity, to at times yield radical
change. Radical change is thus incapable of being described as a product, for the very condition
in which things exist is what accounts for it, not any specific process. This is why even the nonmechanistic understanding of Hegelianism is unsatisfactory, for it still presents radical change as
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something produced through interaction. Radical change can best be described as a system’s
irreducible tendency to escape its own being.
This means that all states are idiographic, and that there is no nomological basis for
understanding each and every state. Revolutions, and the states that precede and follow them,
can yield novelty because there are no rules that constrain how that novelty is produced or the
form the state can take. Yet this does not mean that different states are so singular that there are
no places where they overlap or display similar attributes. It is not the case that everything about
the state changes in each revolution. Thus while on an absolute basis there are no similarities
between states, from within the perspective of a state it is possible to conceive of laws that apply
to more than one’s own state, and to develop a nomological basis for discussing the state. And
while this basis may hold through several states, ultimately the fact that each state emerges from
a dynamic system means that no individual basis can become the ground for all states.
Now that a more complete analysis of systems and states has been given, I can return to
the question of contingency raised in the last chapter, and in particular what states and the things
within states are contingent upon. Things in the state are contingent upon the rest of the
system—in particular the relations and movements that comprise and maintain it. The state itself
is contingent upon the continuous reproduction of it by the system. And because the way in
which systems are interconnected and dynamic is so open to change both states and the things
within them are also open to significant change.
We now have a complete solution to the first problem identified above. The solutions to
problems two and three (why proto-states are irrelevant and the path to a new account of radical
change, respectively) are contained germinally in this account, yet before concluding this
section, and my answers to questions one and three, I will explain these solutions more
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explicitly. Let’s begin with problem two. As I mentioned in my first critique of evental thought,
proto-states act as a transcendental architecture within states. They do not determine what
specific beings appear in the state any more than the gothic style of a cathedral determines which
biblical scenes will appear on the walls. However, proto-states provide a space for and a form by
which beings and meanings appear. The reason this is now unnecessary is because, by viewing
states as dynamic and complex systems, we avoid the need to posit transcendental processes that
act within yet exist separately from the state. As long as the system is not seen as coming from a
stable ground, but is related only to itself, then any part of it is open to change. And as long as
we remember that parts of states are interdependent and that states themselves are dynamic, then
that change does not need to be produced externally but is an intrinsic characteristic of a state’s
existence. There is no longer any necessity to use proto-states to explain events, as states can
now do that. When we properly conceptualize states as systems, then we can see that what
motivates radical change is not a transcendental process like Deleuze’s deterritorialization or a
perpetual condition like Arendt’s notion of human plurality. That which is wholly immanent, as
long as it stays in motion, can produce radical change. As Holland writes, “perpetual novelty is
still typical”600 even in systems that are fully comprehended.
The label of transcendental, as I use it with regard to evental theorists, needs a little more
explanation. While deterritorialization, power-resistance, human plurality, and other such
processes are transhistorical, they do not exist apart from the state, and to that extent are not
transcendent. What I claim is transcendental about these processes is the fact that they operate
within a determinate domain and/or function in a formulaic manner. For example, in Deleuze
deterritorialization comes from the interaction between the plane or consistency and plane of
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organization. What will find articulation (i.e. haecceities and modes of individuation601 in the
plane of consistency) in an event, and how it will be articulated (through content and expression)
are predetermined and beyond change. Though on the whole a defining feature of Deleuze’s
project is openness to change, I believe Deleuze keeps certain traits about the world stable and
predetermines how change will enter the state (i.e. from the outside, through a “flash” or
“upsurge”602). Revolution seems to be separated from other changes by degree and by where it
comes from, but not by the kind of change that is invoked. Similar considerations limit the
processes of other evental thinkers (such as Foucault’s placing of power in the social realm and
Badiou’s use of a formulaic means of change, discussed earlier). The systems of evental thinkers
are transcendental in the same way Kant’s categories are transcendent. Kant’s categories cannot
exist apart from the subject, but nevertheless limit what a person can know (while at the same
time conditioning and grounding knowledge in an important way). Similarly, evental thinkers’
systems, even as they ground radical change in a significant way, still end up placing boundaries
around it.
One might say, in response to my account, that I am rejecting determinacy in states by
giving a determinate account of states myself. What this objection misses is that the
characteristics I give to states are only those necessary to preserve their movement and
dynamism—in short, their indeterminacy and openness to change—while at the same time
maintaining their existence. It is necessary to maintain that individual states preclude some
changes while encouraging others (i.e. each individual state has an archetype), as without that the
concept of “state” is lost. To cut up states any further leaves one with nothing but isolated and
disparate parts incapable of interacting. One ends up with nothingness, as even the principle of
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motion does not arise until one has a system. Yet it is also necessary to maintain that states are
diverse, transformative, and radically interconnected, as without these characteristics states
become static and unchangeable. Only by viewing states in this manner can their diversity,
dynamism, indeterminacy, and plurality be preserved without arresting their movement in
advance.
The final problem to be solved, before moving on to question two, is the new path to
radical change. One conventional theory says that it involves seeking out an eccentric point
within the old state that, by referring to an unconditioned outside realm, can be used to build a
new state. By appealing to the indeterminacy and multiplicity of this outside, or rather to the
necessity of its existence but unknowable nature, one can always reach beyond the immediate
world. It is ostensibly in these dark spaces that radical change waits. The problem is that,
without the transcendental architecture of the proto-state, we lack an easy route to this outside.
Indeed, as I will show, the idea of an outside is called into question. To get radical change
without appealing to a proto-state we must instead study the changes of the state. The new path
to radical change starts by studying how the changes that occur in the state relate themselves to
the state, and how they can produce a radical change that is not limited by a particular domain or
necessary form. Because these questions cannot be answered without first giving an account of
the event, I will return to them at the end of answering question two.

How to escape the state without leaving it
The answer to question two, just like that to questions one and three, can be split into
several problems. First, we need to understand how events come about. If we reject the idea that
revolutions can be explained by referencing the proto-state, we must either find another way of

168

contextualizing revolution or resign ourselves to being perpetually incapable of capturing their
nature. Second, we need to understand what effect revolution has upon the state. Though I have
been saying that it is a radically transformative power, a more explicit description should be
found. Finally, we need to give a clear definition of revolution, one that not only escapes the
problems of earlier definitions but which can be made useful for the practical purpose of
revolution. If I am right that solving these problems requires looking to the motions and changes
of the state, then it must be shown why there is a problem with seeking an outside. As an
analysis of this issue will solve the first problem of this question, I will begin there.
The question of the outside has often haunted philosophy. Our inability to explain all we
have evidence for, combined with the significant developments, shifts, and transformations
observed in history, has led many philosophers to posit a fecund realm beyond human experience
as the source of all these changes. Two oft-used models for this outside are the Kantian
noumenal realm and the negative moment of the Hegelian dialectic. In the former, our
experience and knowledge point to a realm where things exist in a manner that is incapable of
being understood by humans. In the latter, our ability to describe something necessitates that
something else remains to be described. Speaking schematically, the difference lies in whether
the outside is underneath appearances or beyond them. In both cases the outside is the place
where what exists resides in its most basic form. We do not encounter it directly, but its
presence conditions all knowledge and experience. Evental thinkers, drawing from both models,
use this concept liberally. Foucault says that knowledge, discourse, and power are dependent
upon an absent being that constitutes their ‘outside’. “Power is everywhere” such that we cannot
escape it.603 Because power and knowledge are inextricably intertwined and, together, ‘invest’
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things with meaning (e.g. they invest the human body with a political significance604), we are
forever incapable of knowing anything about what exists outside our knowledge and social
situation. Yet, as he says in “The Thought of the Outside”, the very capability of knowing and
saying anything point outside themselves to “a thought that, in relation to the interiority of our
philosophical reflection and the positivity of our knowledge, constitutes what in a phrase we
might call ‘the thought of the outside’.605 Similarly, Deleuze posits the plane of consistency606;
Badiou has the realm of pure multiplicity607; Kuhn claims there is a world beyond what our
paradigm allows us to see608; and Arendt says we cannot encounter the world unmediated by the
plurality of humans (the “basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to man”609).
In the philosophies of evental thought, these outside realms are manipulated by a proto-state to
produce what appears. For Foucault power cuts up the outside world in different ways, while in
Deleuze the territorialization of the plane of consistency produces new strata. The outside is not
altered by engaging it, but by pulling it together in different ways it is possible to produce new
beings, ideas, meanings, and signs. There are no limits to how this outside realm can be pulled
together, as for all intents and purposes it is immeasurable and unbounded. This is why Derrida
can speak of meaning as something “to come”610 and Žižek can claim that there are multiple
ways of instantiating the universal notion of a Master-signifier.611
The outside, as it is used by evental philosophy, is instrumental in explaining where
meaning and order originate. Yet, as the outside does not create either on its own, the processes
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constituting the proto-states are integral. Evental theory requires both an outside and a protostate to function. By eschewing the proto-state we run into a serious problem, for we cannot
reach the outside without it. As long as philosophers hold that there is an external realm they
cannot reach, one which is the source of everything they know and experience, it is necessary to
posit processes that can grasp it for us. Yet the result of them positing these transcendental
processes (i.e. proto-states) is that they determine the domain or the form of revolution. Positing
an outside from which our knowledge and experience originate thus compels us to once again
bind revolution to a state (albeit a much different one than before). This can be demonstrated by
looking at how the descriptions evental thinkers give to the outside circumscribe possibilities for
change. Let’s take Badiou’s example of multiplicity. Badiou’s description of the outside as a
realm of pure multiplicity indicate that for him the outside is defined by infinite variety and
number, for one-ness is always a function of the state. This description means that the outside is
permanently characterized by disparity, as it is impossible to have variety and number without
that. As a result, change in Badiou’s system is permanently subordinated to the condition of
disparity. One may object that this does not circumscribe change as it is impossible to have
change without disparity. While this is true, change is just as much defined by what it brings
together as what it divides. For Badiou, whatever is brought together (and declared a “one”) is
always properly multiple, for that is its original state. The work that change does in bringing
things together is necessarily transitory and derivative, while by contrast divisions are eternal.
This theory is valuable in that it preserves the possibility for every “one” to change. But
Badiou’s insistence that disparity remain permanent calls into question his later concern
(discussed in Conditions, The Communist Hypothesis, and elsewhere) with political fidelity, for
by his account there is no connection or common cause I can develop with others that is not
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artificially created, whereas our differences are natural and permanent. Every unity is capable of
breaking apart, but no difference will ever completely disappear (for even if we do not recognize
it, it remains in the outside). Badiou’s philosophy claims change can only create “simulated”
unities while recognizing “real” differences.
In addition to conditioning the manner in which change can occur, and thus attaching
revolution to a state, there is another reason why the concept of the outside fails to create a
liberated revolution. Since the existence of the outside can be recognized, even if not directly
engaged, it is clear that every person in the state has a mediated relationship with it. Within
Foucault’s system, I relate to the outside through my ability to resist the dominant forms of
power in society; as a subject I always have the ability to cut up the world in new ways that
oppose those held by academic, economic, and political institutions. Within Kuhn’s, I can grasp
anomalies by explaining them with a new paradigm which supplants that of ‘normal science.’
The fact that I can engage the outside, even in a mediated way, means that evental thought does
not just posit relationships between the different parts of the state; it posits that each part of the
state has a relationship with the outside as well. This has an important consequence, for it
indicates that the outside is part of the state as well. Or, to be more specific, it means that
evental thinkers—despite their claims otherwise—do not treat the outside as entirely external to
the state, but as another level of the state. As they explain it, the outside is not wholly separate
from the state but rather an unchanging and permanent part of the state—in short, it is like the
permanent figures of the sovereign and history that I critiqued in my respective discussions of
social contract theory and Marxism. To explain this in another way, the fact that a relationship
exists between the beings of the state and the outside means that they comprise a system. And as
a system necessarily presumes the interconnectedness of all the parts such that they are always
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“‘in motion’” and “exist as responses to one another,”612 then the outside and the beings of the
state must be capable of radically affecting and being affected by each other. The outside must
be as open to radical change as every part of the state is. This can also be explained in
Foucauldian language as follows: if we admit that a relationship of any sort exists between the
parts of the state and the outside, then we must also admit that this relationship has both the
attributes of power and resistance. That is, we should be able to resist any determinations given
to the outside or the idea that there are any necessary processes (proto-states) that must be
utilized to reach the outside. Yet if it is open to change in this manner then it is really not an
‘outside’ in any meaningful way—it certainly fails to meet the definition of outside given above.
The only conclusion can be that the ‘outsides’ evental thought conceives of are just other parts of
their states.
There is one final point we must cover before moving one, which is whether or not
anything replaces the ‘outside’ of evental thought. Since we cannot posit anything completely
external to a system in such a way as to make it consistent, rational, or even existent, ‘nothing’
replaces the outside. What is outside a system is completely unknown, and so as far as anyone
can tell there is nothing. This is not just an epistemological nothingness, but an ontological and
metaphysical nothingness as well. Yet no system is completely totalized, and so it is always
possible for ‘something’ to appear in the system from that ‘nothing.’ I call these somethings that
appear nihils, and they represent one of the two ways anomalies can appear in the state and
create a catalytic change. The proper way to understand the appearance of nihils is to think of
them as literally somethings created from nothing, and not as somethings originating from a
extant place we have no access to or awareness of. Not only does the latter create an outside that
is systematic and partially knowable, ultimately tethering it to a state and restricting radical
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change, but it misunderstands the phenomena of nihils by implying that they will be forever
mysterious unless a permanent origin and process for creating them can be found (i.e. an outside
and proto-state). Though nihils originally appear from nothing, their anomalous nature can be
erased by transforming the system to the point where they can be contextualized and explained.
This claim begs the question of whether the necessity of incorporating nihils into the system is a
limiting factor, given the order of the state. This is an important question as it reveals something
about the challenges a revolution comes up against. Because the order of the state is constantly
being produced again and again (rather than the state perpetually being characterized by a
particular order), any part of the state is potentially open to change. As a result the order of the
state isn’t limiting in the sense of circumscribing change or presenting an impenetrable
boundary. However, the order of the state can slow or hold back the speed at which change
occurs, and in this sense can limit change (that is, it can limit the rate of change, not its
possibilities). However, as history has shown, attempts by the state to limit change—because of
their heavy-handedness—can end up accelerating change. One example of a nihil is the 1999
WTO protests in Seattle colloquially dubbed the “Battle in Seattle.” In the lead-up to the protest,
no one in the media, political, or economic circles was aware of the political potency of the antiglobalization movement. And while there was significant organizing done prior to the events, as
well as a call to action that was distributed widely, even the event’s organizers were surprised by
the level of turnout received and the impact they had.613 The events revealed the presence—
previously unknown and outside the political order—of a new political movement with a great
amount of power. Following the events, there was a scramble to understand and situate the anti-
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globalization movement, and to give it an explanation that would reveal its origin, motives, and
goals.
The appearance of nihils often leads to shifts within a system, just like how in Kuhn’s
theory anomalies within science can lead to the creation of a new paradigm. Yet it is important
to recognize that what is going on when that happens is not that we are finding their definitive
place, but that we are reproducing them in way that aligns them with the system. This is similar
in nature to the creative attributes of power that Foucault discusses, whereby a delinquent can be
created where before there were only criminal acts.614 The individual character of each nihil that
arises from nothingness can, by altering the web of relationships, agents, objects and forces
constructing every system, be given a place within the system. Giving it this place entails
providing it with an identity, a metaphysics, an ontology, even perhaps a political or ethical
status. And as the alteration of a system yields other changes down the line as different parts of
the system adjust themselves to accommodate for the changes already made, we can see how it is
possible for a nihil to produce a catalytic change. It should be noted that the introduction of a
nihil is not guaranteed to bring about catalytic change; rather that is only one of its possible
outcomes. At other times a system can accommodate a nihil without radically transforming
itself. The determining factor is the nature of the system the nihil is introduced to, for depending
on the reactions of the agents, objects, and relations found there a revolution may or may not
occur.
The other way in which catalytic change can be started is from inside the state. Though
we do not know whether anything surrounds the state, we do know that the state is dynamic.
Revolution can come from the motion of the state, though this motion is of necessity not
transcendentally grounded in an outside but is immanent to the state. Small and incremental
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changes can, in the right context, create massive shifts that substantially change the state. This
type of phenomena I call an emergent property. It occurs when, over time, unexpected outcomes
result from fully determinate and understood states. To explain emergent properties—and by
doing so complete the solution to the first problem of this question—let us observe how systems
operate when we work with the assumption that every part of them responds to every other part.
First, we see that the movement of states constantly affects how they operate, and so the state is
continually open to the possibility of change. When subjects and objects interact they produce
outcomes the state responds to. Sometimes these outcomes correspond to predictions about the
state, but other times they deviate from them. These deviations are anomalous, but as they result
from fully comprehended systems they are emergent properties rather than nihils. Only those
properties which deviate from expected outcomes count as emergent phenomena, and they
should be understood as qualitatively different from outcomes which are predictable. Shifts
constantly occur in the state in response to these emergent properties. Some emergent properties
produce small shifts (e.g. the presence of protesters leads states to add more police to the streets),
but others cause massive disruptions (e.g. the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi led to the
Arab Spring). When an emergent property results in the latter, there can be profound
consequences for the state. Catalytic change results when, as a result of an emergent property,
the state is mobilized against itself. This is why the image of the strong, aggressive
revolutionary is not always accurate; sometimes militancy requires withdrawing oneself from the
action and letting the state fight itself.
My claim is that a revolution begins in the dysfunction of a state, when the
interconnected pieces cease to function as usual. Such dysfunction can result from the catalytic
change created by either type of anomaly. It is important to keep in mind here the distinction I
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made back in chapter one about the 2 aspects of revolution (anomaly and catalytic change), for
by simply saying that catalytic change produces a revolution my argument sounds circular. To
reiterate, anomalousness is how revolution appears inasmuch as it is unattached to the state, and
captures its qualities of exemption from the status quo and deviation from the normal order.
Catalytic change is how it appears from within the state, and captures the fact that revolution is a
change that changes the changes within the world. Nihils and emergent properties are the two
types of phenomena a system can encounter which can set a revolution in motion. That is, in
appearing they initiate the catalytic change and anomaly of revolution. Nihils and emergent
properties are distinguished from the two aspects of revolution because, while their appearance
may be unexpected, they do not necessarily lead to revolution. It is possible for nihils and
emergent properties to end up intensifying the order of the state rather than undermining it.
The appearance of circularity within my argument only emerges if we ignore what the
state is and attempt to trace revolution back to a source within the state that conditioned it, rather
than look to the context of radical change. Another way to explain this is as follows: what
conditions revolutions is not any figure, being, or force. What conditions them is not even
systems qua networks of agents, objects, and rules. What conditions them is systems inasmuch
as they are dynamic. What we are seeing with revolution is a type of movement that occurs in
dynamic and complex systems which is not reducible to the makeup of the system. Dynamic and
complex systems, by their very nature, include movements that are anomalous and which
instigate catalytic change. The problem with saying catalytic change is produced by catalytic
change is that it misses the larger context, which is that complex and dynamic systems contain
catalytic change as an integral part of themselves. Catalytic change is not an accidental product
of complex and dynamic systems, self-produced, nor the predictable result of any part of a
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system. Catalytic change is an intrinsic and irreducible part of systems. It is the context of
systematicity that keeps the argument for catalytic change from being circular.
Returning to the origin of revolution, the loss of usual function it brings about will not of
necessity be the direct result of a deliberate act of resistance. While some revolutions do begin
with an organized group coming together to resist, others begin through the overreach of the state
or because of incidental factors. No one type of movement can be identified as the definitive
cause of revolution, as any movement, given the right context, has the ability to throw a complex
and interconnected system into chaos. But a revolution is more than the production of chaos, for
as long as the archetype grounding a particular state remains then the most that has occurred is
civil disorder. Just creating more dissidents, or switching sovereigns without changing the
government, is not revolutionary; the ground of the system needs to be rewritten. What brings a
revolution about, contrary to the Marxist tradition that looks for an accumulation of
contradictions, is an increase in unexpected movements. When these movements become
arranged in such a way that they catalyze a massive shift (the right way being unique for each
particular state), they undermine the state’s archetype. This seems to raise the question of
whether movements or contradictions come first. It is not necessarily wrong to see movement as
a product of contradictions, but doing so does require us to think through the lens of a state. By
focusing on movements we ensure that we keep revolution liberated. After all, there are other
models for movement that do not see it as the result of contradiction, and in each of these models
movement plays a determinate role given to it by objects and how they interact. The aim of this
project necessitates that revolution be approached from movement first.
China’s revolution illustrates this. Throughout the early 1940’s the communist ideology
spread throughout villages as a result of a push by the communists to build their base in local
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communities (helped by the factionalism that dominated pre-World War II China). In the late
1940’s fighting broke out between the Communists and Nationalists, resulting in a civil war.
The Nationalists were slowly undermined—in part because of their repressive policies, rampant
famine, and excessive inflation—leading to a communist victory.615 Put in other terms, as the
communist deviation spread it undermined the traditional Chinese state until the rules governing
the old system failed. This in itself was not transformative. The revolution truly took place
when new rules were written, such as those governing how individuals are to be distributed.
Whereas before 1949 people were distributed according to their faction and family, Mao’s
communist government introduced agrarian communes as a way of reorganizing society into
collectives.616 Similar changes were made in governance, economics, and culture. The
undermining of the old state’s rules created the possibility of producing fundamentally new rules,
and thus of completing the revolution. Although the Communist movement collapsed shortly
thereafter, this does not negate the fact that a revolution occurred. The collapse happened
because the Communist state was not a sustainable system.
Emergent properties do not result from going outside the state, but from the state’s
motion producing something new and unexpected. And when that new and unexpected property
leads to the collapse of the old archetype and the rise of a new, one has a revolution.
Alternatively, nihils do not come from an outside which we can say exists and about which we
know only basic facts. They appear from nowhere, and as the system attempts to make them
consistent radical change can arise. In response to the possible objection that I am treating
nothingness like an outside, I argue that by not providing it with any positive content I avoid
doing so. Nothingness does not condition or share any traits with the state, and so while we can
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speculate about what might be there, the fact that these concerns are purely speculative indicates
that it is not an outside in a metaphysical or ontological sense.
I want to avoid aligning this position with vitalism. Revolution does not create without
constraint and is not detached from the state. The two are intimately connected, as it is the
state’s motion and interconnectedness which bring revolution into being. Fred Evans defends
Deleuze and Guattari from charges of vitalism by saying “desire does not exist in abstraction
from assemblages; it is thus ‘tied’ to reterritorialization and, hence, not vitalistic in the pejorative
sense of a force that creates without constraint.”617 Similarly, revolution is a destabilizing
motion that results from the movement and interaction of the pieces of the state. Deleuze and
Guattari differ from me because they root the composition of desire within a proto-state and
external ‘plane of consistency’, while I root the composition of revolution in the movement and
interconnectedness of the system. Their notion of desire is formed molecularly (with reference
to what composes the state), whereas my notion of revolution is formed laterally (with reference
to the other pieces within the state).
With these dual concept of emergence and nihils we can see how it is the state, and in
particular the inherent changes it possesses as a dynamic and complex system, which ultimately
contextualize revolution. This answers the first problem of question two. The last two problems
require an account of how novelty functions once it appears. This is the problem I will take up in
the last section of the chapter.

Whence comes the new?
To begin an account of how an event creates change, let’s examine the situation that
follows the collapse of the state. Lacking a unified system that is well recognized and accepted,
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agents begin searching for a new order to replace it. The previously cohesive system breaks into
many conflicting voices. Some attempt to quell any lingering unrest, and others plea for
everyone come together as a community. Voices of continued militancy call for the criminals of
the past to be judged, while remnants of the old regime try to limit any change. To make certain
that the ideas they fought for stick, revolutionaries need to continue their work through writing,
protest, and organizing. The political arena tends to be fecund after a revolution, with many new
political parties forming, ideas being generated, and lifestyles attempted. Despite the creativity
and openness to change that exists during this time, it is wrong to say that there is no order
structuring how politics functions. As I indicated above, orders are a necessary part of systems,
and so while a political arena is more open and fluid during the time following a revolution there
are still rules grounding it at any particular time. Yet these rules, unlike those within an
established state, are provisional rather than definitive. They are in part comprised by interim
rulers, such as the national and state authorities established by the Patriots during and
immediately after the American Revolution, or the Supreme Council of the Armed forces
established by the Egyptian military following the events of 2011. Beyond the rulers, there are
political forces being established throughout the population (such as the Jacobins and Girondists
after the French Revolution). In some cases these other forces are not explicitly political entities
but nevertheless play an important political role. Many have noted the importance Islam played
in the Iranian Revolution, while race was similarly an important factor in the revolution that
overthrew the apartheid regime in South Africa. The point is that the state following a revolution
does not lack an archetype, but that the archetype it has is much more malleable. Because of
this, everything within the state goes through a transition period whereby all of its parts—from
one’s identity to their relationships and status in society—are open to change. The entirety of
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what constitutes the state goes through this process. This is the case because what held things
relatively constant—the recognition and enforcement of a common archetype between all—is in
the process of being reestablished. In short, during the period of transition following a
revolution, there is just as much movement between rules as there is movement within rules.
The essential question is what reestablishes a more permanent archetype after a
revolution. What slows the catalytic change of revolution to the point where the provisional
orders established during the transition period are replaced by established orders of relatively
stable states? While states can break apart because of revolutions, and the transitional period
following a revolution can be excessively long, it is generally true that revolutions end in the
creation of a new order. Revolutions are useful tools for creating much needed radical change,
but they are poor at securing a newly obtained order from being harmed. With notable
exceptions, agents, forces, and objects within a system lean towards the establishment of a new
state if for no other purpose than their own protection and longevity. Systems thus exhibit a
tendency towards creating a relatively stable and harmonious equilibrium following a massive
shift (though, it must be noted, an inherent feature of this equilibrium is that it is always open to
radical change). This equilibrium is not teleological in the sense of being the only or the primary
goal towards which the system—or the different beings in the system—aim, but because
peoples’ desire for change is often accompanied by a pursuit for ways to preserve that change
when it arrives, it is often the result. The catalytic change of revolutions is often brought to a
halt by the very people and the very forces that brought it about. This is what was meant earlier
when I said that revolution leads to the state just as the state leads to revolution. Only in this
way will the goals of a revolution be preserved for a substantial length of time.
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This provides us with the solution to the second problem of question two: novelty is
followed by a period of provisional orders until the system itself reaches another point of
equilibrium. If revolutionaries want to reach their goals, ensuring that this equilibrium is to their
liking is as vital a task as instigating the revolution in the first place. The creation of lasting
change requires that the equilibrium reached is not equivalent to the one preceding the
revolution. This also enables us to solve problem three and provide a new definition of
revolution that escapes the problems of others. In light of everything so far, I define revolution
as “an unpredictable disruption of a state (understood as a complex, dynamic system) which
instigates a catalytic change throughout capable of changing anything within and that, of
necessity, rewrites the archetype of the state.”
We have now reached the fourth and final question: what is the relationship of revolution
to the state? Because revolution does not come from outside the state and is not assembled upon
permanent foundations, the answer must be that each revolution builds a unique relationship to
the state. As I mentioned earlier, another way of putting this is the state-revolution relationship
is idiographic (that is, related to or descriptive of single and unique facts and processes) and not
rule-based. This seems to be a necessary outcome of saying revolutions are incommensurable,
unpredictable, indiscernible, and expressions of radical change, as any formality given them
would take away from these characteristics. Several people have noted that idiographic studies
are valuable for providing explanatory knowledge and discovering independent variables, even if
they do not have the same predictive power of nomological generated knowledge.618 It is also
important to note that idiographic explanations provide understandings of phenomena by
investigating them in their uniqueness, and so are not just the handmaidens to nomological
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knowledge. There is no one form that revolution has, for destabilization can occur in many
ways. History displays great variety in the strategies, weapons, ideas, technologies, and
programs revolutions have used to achieve their goals. For example, radicals have described
their relationship to the state in many ways. Some say their movement will raze the entire state
to the ground, some see themselves operating on the state as a surgeon operates on malignant
growth, and some see their actions as the fulfillment of a promise the state made. The tactics
used in revolutions are similarly variable. They range from spectacular shows of nonviolent
resistance to hidden guerilla warfare. The specific path of each individual revolution is tailored
to the precise nature of that state. No domain names the area within the state to which revolution
applies, and no one model captures every relationship between revolution and the state. For
those who emphasize the importance of revolutionary fidelity this discovery should bring pause,
for it indicates that there is always an element of presumption that accompanies any
revolutionary act (namely, that the alternative system they are proposing will be sustainable and
consistent). Because this is impossible to know in advance, revolutionaries must be critical and
thoughtful with regard to their propositions. An unthinking and dogmatic revolutionary can be
as dangerous in the long term as an unthinking and dogmatic statist.
Revolutions can be described after they happen (though only from the perspective of the
state, not absolutely), and the strategies that worked in one place might have currency in another,
but no form holds forever. Understood through this lens, the evental theories of Kuhn, Badiou,
Foucault, and others are best thought of as strategies which help undermine states. They recast
the state in a new light and produce projects that undermine the state’s institutions of repression,
but they cannot perpetually model how things work. This point is in part meant as a critique of
Badiou’s truth-procedures, which do a lot of work in justifying how the tactic of militancy can be
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used to undermine the state. Inasmuch as revolutions often require a great deal of trust, faith,
and organizing capacity among revolutionaries, Badiou’s idea is an important conceptual tool.
But the thing which Badiou claims is external to the state and which justifies his theory, the
generic procedures that summon the void into being, are not external to the state but merely
another level of the state (they are part of Badiou’s proto-state). For this reason a transformation
of the state has the potential to change the nature and effectiveness of Badiou’s truth-procedure
model. When a state changes the theories of evental theorists may not serve the same function.
The pieces of the state that evental theorists posit should be seen as devices for the purpose of
undermining the state rather than as ontological facts.
Some of the ways the state-revolution relationship has been modeled will be studied in
Chapter 5, where I will discuss the practical value of Dynamic Anarchism by comparing it to
several revolutionary movements. For now, it is enough to close question four, and this chapter,
with the assertion that, by making the state wholly changeable and liberating revolution from it,
we also ensure that the two have no definitive relationship. This being the case, it is important
for revolutionaries to stay vigilant so as to prevent the state they are opposing from reasserting
itself unexpectedly. It may be necessary for them to change their tactics in order to preserve
their goals. Revolutionaries must think through the lens of dynamic systems so that they can see
the ripple effects their own and other people’s actions have, and respond in the most effective
way. Militancy must be combined with an openness to change to achieve the best results.
Perhaps by thinking about revolution in these terms, revolutionaries will be more cautious about
holding too firmly to any particular ground, and less susceptible to repeating the state they just
left behind.
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Changing the World, No Matter the Cost: The Practice of Revolution
The Wisdom of Revolt
Common sense says nothing is more foolhardy than becoming a revolutionary. It is
illegal, immoral, dangerous, and pointless. Moreover, it disrespects society, for why wouldn’t
someone who cares about its betterment not submit their suggestions for approval? What
arrogance that unelected militants claim to know how to best organize others’ lives. Every
revolutionary, including those now internationally praised as freedom fighters, faces such
accusations. The criteria separating a hero from a war criminal is not as stark as is pretended.
States prosecute the same actions that created them, claiming that laudable actions can be
distinguished from criminal by the campaign they support. But the liberated revolution does not
accept the state’s judgment regarding which causes are legitimate. No dictates determine its
method, and no formulas can say when it is lawful to rebel. In exchange for its inability to
provide a detailed revolutionary program the liberated revolution is capable of imagining many
possibilities, though in order for this theory to be preferable to those built on a state we must
solve two problems. First, how do we make Dynamic Anarchism useful for revolutionaries?
Despite its intellectual value it is functionally useless outside the academy unless it can aid
activists. Second, is it possible for Dynamic Anarchism to ward off dangerous revolutions? If
Dynamic Anarchism cannot circumnavigate bloody revolutions that produce more disastrous
states than the ones overthrown, it may be preferable—even if inauthentic—to stick with a
theory of revolution tethered to a state. The purpose of this chapter is to answer these questions
by showing that Dynamic Anarchism is not just a curiosity for the intellectual archive, but a
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powerful weapon for the disenfranchised. Opposing the conventional wisdom, I intend to show
that becoming revolutionary is one of the most meaningful actions a person can take.
My previous investigations of revolution focused on what a revolution is and its
relationship to the state. But for people ‘on the ground’ the biggest question is not “what is
revolution?” but “what should we do?” Now that we have an ontology of revolution, it will be
instructive to see what it has to say about strategies and tactics, both in the sense of developing
practical heuristics for activists and in the sense of engaging the corpus of what has already been
said. For that reason, the final inquiry this project will take up is the question of how one should
strategize for revolution. Which approaches are the most effective, and what signs indicate
success? To the extent that this constitutes a separate field of study, I call it revolutionary
pragmatics to indicate that it is focused on the practical side of revolution. As a way of drawing
out the implications of Dynamic Anarchism for the practice of revolution, I will contrast it with
three distinct schools of thought within revolutionary pragmatics: the manner of attack used in
the American and French revolutions, guerrilla warfare, and American black radicalism. For
each school of thought, I will cover some of its principal tactics, the different ways these tactics
have been interpreted, and the contexts in which they have been applied. The term “strategy”
will be used to indicate the larger plan or method being used to achieve the goal of revolution,
and the term “tactic” will be used to indicate the specific practices or exercises employed by the
strategy. With respect to the American and French Revolutions, I will discuss the
revolutionaries’ usage of declarations, pamphlets, battlefields, and courtrooms. Next I will
analyze guerrilla warfare’s emphasis on community support, isolated groups, spectacular
displays, constant yet low-intensity engagement with the enemy, and propaganda. Finally, I will
go into the different ways black radicals have advocated for the organizing of the black
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population, the strategic (as opposed to wholesale) undermining of the system, and the practice
of autobiography. Following my discussion of each school’s tactics I will look at each school
from the vantage of Dynamic Anarchism, pointing out lessons that can be drawn from each
school and discussing any critiques that Dynamic Anarchism would make. The purpose of this is
to develop a flexible yet useful approach to the issue of transforming states which can serve
revolutionaries in a variety of contexts. My claim is that the fomenting of revolution requires a
comprehensive and integrated approach to systems focused on pushing them to their limits, while
the building of a new state requires thinking creatively about one’s end goals while being
mindful of how to intervene most effectively.

Declaring Freedom: Pamphlets, Armies, and the Uprooting of Monarchical Power
As two of the first well-documented revolutions of the modern era, the American and
French Revolutions represent two initial attempts to create radical change. The idea of
overthrowing a monarch and establishing a new state being relatively new, the question of how
be successful was both profound and difficult to answer. Revolutionaries did not simply make
use of the gun or guillotine, but developed semiotic, rhetorical, and judicial weapons as well.
The French and American revolutions illustrate a number of important points about what it takes
to carry out a successful revolution, not the least of which is how to catalyze radical change.
Nevertheless, as I will show, the revolutionaries used their tactics programmatically and without
a complete awareness of the potential of systems to transform.
Because this chapter is about tactics and strategies, the question of purpose is not intrinsic
to its point. Still, it is useful to spend a moment on the grievances which sparked the American
and French Revolutions since they influenced the tactics used. Both American and French
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revolutionaries held that the sovereign violated the social contract by infringing on the natural
liberties of citizens. They argued that the application of monarchical power was arbitrary,
damaged the common good, and did not allow input from the people. In particular, Americans
claimed that King George III “deprived [them]…of the benefits of trial by jury”, “dissolved
representative houses repeatedly”, “obstructed the administration of justice, by refusing his
assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers,” and instituted taxes that the colonists had no
say in.619 The French, in their Cahiers of 1789, called for freedom of the press, a uniform
application of taxes that did not exempt anyone, and regular meetings of the Estates General to
discuss important issues relating to the welfare of the nation.620 Early on there was a demand for
the abolition of feudalism, including the elimination of public titles and local differences in the
law, so that everyone would appear equal under the law.621 Revolutionaries wanted everyone
who was counted as a subject by the law to have a say in the constitution and maintenance of the
sovereign power.
Though popular images connected with both revolutions depict people rioting in streets
and fighting in fields, each revolution began long before any shots were fired. Revolutionary
fervor was first rallied through the dissemination of pamphlets outlining positions contra the
monarch. Pamphlets spread the message of revolution by uniting people in disparate areas under
a common ideology. The most well-known pamphlet from the American Revolution, Tom
Paine’s Common Sense, has been lauded as “the most incendiary and popular pamphlet of the
entire revolutionary era,”622 though it was supplemented by many others, including James Otis'
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Rights of the British Colonies and Stephen Johnson's Some Important Observations. These
pamphlets all make similar claims about concepts like liberty and rights, but their significance
comes from their being widely distributed and written with that fact in mind. They are not
dispassionate academic exercises but rabble-rousing treatises. They contain rhetorical flourishes
highlighting the populace’s grievances and passages meant to kindle peoples’ desire for revolt.
Paine says that “the sun never shined on a cause of greater worth”623 than the American
Revolution, while James Otis inveighs that “if a man is not his own assessor” then “his liberty is
gone or lays entirely at the mercy of others.”624 The French Revolution’s pamphlets also
transmitted revolutionary ideas throughout the country using rhetoric and persuasion. While
some pamphlets, like the Cahiers de Doléances, did not call for revolution, they did help form
the revolutionary agenda people organized around. Others, like Sieyes’ What is the Third Estate,
became the rallying cry for the revolution. The wide dissemination of pamphlets was key to
their success, as it enabled the ideology of revolution to permeate society. It was just as
important that the pamphlets’ ideas be available everywhere as it was that they have a
convincing message, as it gave the impression that the desire for revolution was not just the
agitation of a few insurgents, but reflected the broad feeling of a majority of the population.
Paine’s pamphlet, which had an initial printing of 1,000 copies, eventually sold about 150,000
copies625 throughout the colonies and later on made it to Europe and Latin America. Even for
those who couldn’t read the text, the ideas contained in it were passed along verbally.626 This is
important because it shows that the ideas of Common Sense were by themselves not what made

623

Tom Paine, Common Sense, http://www.bartleby.com/133/3.html
James Otis “The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved” in David Burg, The American Revolution
(Facts on File: New York, 2007), 44.
625
Eric Foner; Tom Paine and Revolutionary America [New York; Oxford University Press, 1976], 79.
626
Alfred Aldridge, Man of Reason: The Life of Thomas Paine [London; The Cresset Press, 1959], 43..
624

190

the pamphlet important, as to some degree those ideas were already present in the colonies.627 It
was the way the pamphlet was able to spread. Similarly, many of the Cahiers in France were
published in order to lend influence and credence to the demands they contained.628 Through
their rhetoric and their pervasiveness, these pamphlets persuaded people to renegotiate their
relationship to the monarch, moving the populace in a more revolutionary direction.
Pamphlets from this time made great use of the declaration, which as a tactic is a
powerful way of moving the state towards revolt. Both the American and French revolutionaries
are known for candidly stating what powers the king possesses and which belong to the people,
such as in the “Declaration of Independence” and the “Declaration of the Rights of Man”. By
doing this revolutionary groups claim the right to represent the people, whom they say deserve a
voice in policy discussions regarding taxation and the use of public resources. For instance, the
National Assembly in France first ran afoul of King Louis XVI by issuing statements that
abrogated to themselves duties traditionally handled by the monarch.629 Louis allowed some but
refused others, leading to a confrontation between the National Assembly and the monarchy.
Similarly, the American Revolution was encouraged by pamphlets published in response to laws
like the Stamp Act, Sugar Act, and Currency Act (which demanded that colonists pay for the
protection of the colonies with extra taxes). Objections made by colonial politicians were
circulated in pamphlets demanding the King respect the rights of the colonists. The “Declaration
of Rights and Grievances,” published by the First Congress of the American Colonies in 1765,
opposed the actions of the crown with a formal declaration that for all Englishmen, “no taxes
should be imposed on them, but with their own consent, given personally, or by their
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representatives”630 and that every man has the right to choose who represents them. Claims
about what rights and responsibilities men possess are not argued for in these documents; rather,
they act as the premises that ground conclusions about the actions or policies the populace
should support (such as revolution or constitutional monarchy). The declaration, then, is not
meant to convince people of the nature of man—it provides an alternative foundation for the
state. Whereas the monarch claims that all agency within the state comes from her or him, the
declaration provides a semiotic assault on this idea by claiming that agency derives from human
nature. The declaration was a form of illocutionary attack preceding the physical violence that
followed.
Both the American and French revolutions reached points where semantics and public
posturing were not sufficient to express all the built up animus. Fury over the powers claimed by
the sovereign or the liberties the masses exercised led to violent confrontations. Due to the
centralization of power in France and the decentralization of it in the colonies, many of the
physical conflicts of the American Revolution took place on battlefields and near remote
garrisons while those of the French Revolution took place in city streets and royalist buildings
(like the Bastille). In addition, the American Revolution was not as concerned with class
divisions as the French. But both the monarch and loyalist forces fought against revolutionary
groups, and the weapons included guns, cannons, rocks, and swords (though the French
Revolution, unlike the American, did not have a maritime theatre). Revolutionaries did not hide
their allegiance but publically identified the side they were on.631 The targets were sites from
where the monarch’s authority was exercised, as the goal was to inhibit the other side’s capacity
for action. Only when this was accomplished would it be possible for a new government to
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form. It is clear that causing carnage was not a major tactic of revolutionaries, as when someone
was killed it was because they had become symbols of monarchical power. King Louis XVI and
Marie Antoinette did not die because of who they were, or because slaughter itself held any
intrinsic benefit, but because of the position they occupied. They were living embodiments of
monarchical power, and for this reason needed to be overthrown. As Robespierre wrote, the riot
that deposed the king “was the entire people [exercising] its rights” as “friends of liberty,”632 for
the ideals of liberty and republicanism cannot coexist with that of royalty.633 This idea of going
after sites from where monarchical power is exercised is also why in both revolutions there were
campaigns aimed at removing from power loyalists and those who sympathized with the
monarch. In the American Revolution, loyalists were removed from places of power634 and in
some cases had their property confiscated.635 And during the revolution, when loyalists formed
militias that fought alongside the British, they were isolated from the social life of the colonies.
Members of the French Revolution, once they had control of the state, used the courtroom as a
device to excise loyalist elements from the population, sending approximately 2,600 people to
jail or the guillotine during the Reign of Terror.636 Though in many cases those who were
ostracized or executed were not guilty of any crime, the claim was that sites from which
monarchical power could reassert itself needed to be removed from society.
The tactics of the American and French revolutions illustrate several important points
about conducting a successful revolution. As I mentioned in the last chapter, the point of a
revolution is to use the movements of the state to create a massive change that calls into question
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the state’s archetype. Instead of referring to the outside of the state, you refer to the inherent
instability of it, or its constant evolution and transformation. What the American and French
revolutions did that was so effective was to build fields capable of changing the processes that
produce the state. By fields I am referring to zones where new, disruptive operations can be
performed. I use the term fields rather than “spaces” to indicate that these fields are always
characterized by a process, operation, or idea and not just empty voids. They are fields because
there is a locus that orients them which, if it countervails the state, can be revolutionary. Fields
are not separate from the state, but they do represent a different level or separate segment of the
state (though as all fields are contingent, they are not permanently separate). In these segments,
movements that have traditionally reproduced the system are altered in such a way as to create
the potential for a catalytic change. Fields take the processes of the state that authorize change
and reinvent them. Doing so causes small shifts within the system that can build on each other,
hopefully leading to a large enough movement that the archetype of the state becomes
unsustainable. Put in colloquial terms, revolutionaries need to construct a space within the state
where they can begin to conduct revolutionary actions. This is what Tom Paine, Sieyes, and
other pamphleteers were doing by writing and distributing their work. They were altering
networks and pathways within the state to make them more amenable to the idea of revolution,
turning public places into radical spaces and certain ideas into forms of dissent. The spreading
of the pamphlets led to the formation of new relationships, many discussions about revolution,
and the modification of how the idea of revolution was viewed by colonists or the French people.
At no point did they leave the state, but they did use its interconnectedness and systematicity to
change how it functioned. The first step in many revolutions is the creation of these fields
(which need not be physical—they can be ideological, emotional, or virtual as well), and the way
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to do it is by finding a way to use the avenues already provided by the state to build dissent into
the operation of the state.
The next aspect of revolutions that the American and French revolutions illuminate is the
importance of using the state to create a point of disruption. While predicting the point of
disruption is near impossible given all the factors that go into the state and the difficulty of
modeling how they all interact, revolutionaries should push forth in trying to manufacture one.
The point of disruption is the place and time where the changes that go into constructing a state
are reversed, and become undermining instead. Given the diversity of revolutions, the point of
disruption is not always a brief moment in time or a small physical location, as sometimes
revolutions take place gradually over a long period of time and across great distances. The best
way to produce this point is to create crises that put the state in conflict with itself. Since there is
no way to think or act from beyond the state, the uprooting of the state must come from within.
In both the American and French revolutions the justifiability of self-determination was put into
conflict with the needs of the monarch. Prior to the revolutions, it was not that selfdetermination did not exist, but that it wasn’t enshrined in the state’s foundations. Both the
British and French monarchs allowed their subjects a significant degree of autonomy; the only
caveat was that the sovereign could, if they chose, intervene in a subject’s life. While at times
Kings George and Louis XVI made arbitrary and authoritarian decisions, for the most part the
colonists and French people controlled their lives and business. The liberties that were being
fought for in the revolutions were in many cases already respected in practice and were not of
great concern to the King. The reason for the revolution was not to gain self-determination, but
to inscribe it into the archetype of the state. Agitating for this goal led George and Louis XVI to
expend greater amounts of energy to preserve their rule. The moment of crisis was brought
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about by practices furnished by the state which forced the state to work harder for its goals until,
between the agitation of the rebels and the overreach by the sovereign, the state as it was
constituted became unsustainable.
The problem with both the American and French revolutions has to do with the
programmatic way in which they pursued their ends. Though the revolutions made important
strides forward in considering how to constitute the sovereign in a more natural and fluid way,
they clung to practices taken from the state in conducting their revolution. Although it is
impossible to avoid taking practices from the state, there is a danger when you arrange your
revolution around those practices, rather than pushing them to their limits, that the possibilities of
your revolution will be inhibited. The revolutionaries did not see courtrooms, declarations,
centrally organized armies, and their other tactics as contingently useful for undermining the
state, but as the proper program for conducting a revolution. Their revolutions were hamstrung
by the fact that they conceived of certain forms (such as the sovereign, the law, and the public
good) as being at the heart of proper governance. When their revolutions reached a place where
new foundations could be produced, they ended up repeating a number of the authoritarian
structures and elitisms that should have been undermined (the US continued slavery despite its
hypocrisy, recognized by numerous people at the time, when contrasted with the statement “all
men are created equal”). Their adherence to a programmatic revolution also meant that the
system they returned re-calcified the networks and processes within the state. Revolutionaries on
both sides of the Atlantic, because of the way they approached their revolutions, were incapable
of seeing the importance of a transformative, evolvable, and sustainable system, meaning that the
same hostility to change that the revolutionaries criticized George and Louis XVI for would be
present within their own systems as well. French and American history bear witness to this fact,
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as the French government has changed its constitution five times, while the Americans have been
amending theirs for centuries. And in many cases, when such changes are proposed, they are
strongly opposed by entrenched elites and representatives of the sovereign power. A successful
revolution must avoid dogmatism yet stay militant to achieve its goal.

Invisible Fighters and the Spectacle of Violence
The flexible strategy of guerrilla warfare stands in stark contrast to the programmatic
revolutions in America and France. Guerrillas must be decentralized and mobile while still
obeying a formal hierarchy. Rather than approach revolution with an idea of how it should
occur, the texts of guerrilla warfare say resistance must be adaptable to particular conditions.
Che Guevara’s initial definition of the strategy in the treatise Guerrilla Warfare emphasizes that
this manner of fighting has “diverse characteristics” and “different facets”. While admitting that
there are rules to which guerrilla warfare is beholden, Guevara emphasizes that “geographical
and social conditions in each country determine the mode and particular forms that guerrilla
warfare will take.”637 Revolutions that use guerrilla warfare are historically anticolonial
struggles, and take place in countries that have been exploited to such an extent that the
population is incapable of mustering an army that is in any way equivalent to the state’s. While
to some extent all revolutions are asymmetric (as no revolutionaries start out with all the
privileges of the state), guerrilla warfare is used primarily when the inequality is so large that it
cannot be adjusted for within the bounds of conventional warfare. Still, it is wrong to think of
guerrilla revolutionaries as resourceless underdogs who win solely by grit, courage, and luck.
Guerrilla revolutionaries cultivate other resources, and their tactics ultimately derive not from
their lack of resources, but from the presence of unconventional resources. Guerrillas wage a
637
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war of attrition, fighting slowly but continuously until the state can no longer hold the ground it
once relied on. They insist that both flexibility and a vigorous militancy is required for success.
Yet it is worth questioning whether their militancy is misplaced, and if their behavior at times
harms the people they are trying to protect.
One of the resources that guerrillas have which makes them a potent force is the support
of the local community. Because they don’t wear identifying marks and operate at unusual
hours, successful guerrillas are able to blend in with the population, and as long as the population
believes in the guerrillas’ cause they will supply the guerrillas with food, shelter, cover,
weapons, and more. Nelson Mandela writes that the support of the community was vital for the
work of the African National Congress (ANC)638 and that, as a fugitive, he worked primarily in
the night and slept in other peoples’ flats.639 Several times he escaped capture solely because a
black policeman sympathetic with the cause of independence refused to bring him in. Mandela
concludes “Black policemen have often been severely criticized during the struggle, but many
have played covert roles that have been extremely valuable.”640 The state is aware of this
resource, though from its perspective guerrillas are making deceitful and disingenuous appeals to
the population. Major John Pustay of the United States Air Force says that guerrillas are able to
harness nationalism, promote reform, organize the discontented by using “character
assassination,” “psychological warfare,” the “covert sponsoring of parties in opposition,” and the
enlistment of “government officials to serve secretly the revolutionary movement.”641
Accordingly, one of the ways the state can respond is to resettle the population to areas
uninhabited by guerrillas, thus “denying [the guerrillas] important sources of logistics and
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intelligence support.”642 An excellent example of this is the USA’s Phoenix program instituted
in South Vietnam between 1965 and 1972. Carried out by the CIA with the support of South
Vietnam, the program aimed to destroy the political infrastructure of the Viet Cong through the
“neutralization” of as many suspected Viet Cong as possible. Neutralization consisted of
capture, interrogation, resettlement, and, in some cases, torture and killing. Though it is
unknown how many Viet Cong were neutralized through Phoenix, estimates vary from 25,000 to
80,000 individuals.643 This technique was also used in China in the 1930s and in the Philippines
in the 1950s. David Petraeus recommends that the population of the colonizing country be
mobilized early to support the army’s mission abroad, thus forestalling any significant anti-war
protests.644 In the theatre of guerrilla warfare, local communities are the first site of struggle.
Because of this community support guerrillas are able to use another one of their primary
tactics: decentralized, disparate groups. When guerrillas can rely on the locals they do not need
to worry as much about setting up defenses, developing supply lines, and protecting captured
land. They can live hidden, their location protected, until it is time to strike. After the strike,
they can just as easily disappear into the social milieu. Mao Zedong says a guerrilla force will
fail “if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their
sympathy, co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained,”645 while Carlos Marighella claims a
guerrilla “must know how to live among the people, and he must be careful not to appear strange
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and different.”646 Because the forces guerrillas have traditionally fought are more privileged,
making direct and open confrontation futile (i.e. the state’s control is so complete that it is
impossible to rally any sort of collective resistance), the best approach is to organize groups so
that they can carry out their work without having to consult a centralized planner for every
action. Though the general goals of the resistance are known by all, groups are given
independence within the borders of their area as to how to achieve those goals, and information
about specific tactics and how to carry them out is shared. Hoang Van Thai’s manual for
Vietnamese guerrillas claims that once peasants are recruited to the cause, they should not join
an army but “stick to the people and to their locality, forming the core of the guerrilla forces in
the villages.”647 The goal is not to destroy the enemy quickly and thoroughly, but to “exhaust
him on a large scale” by striving to “annihilate enemy forces in small operations.” This goal will
only be achieved through “initiative of action,” “flexibility,” “secrecy,” and “surprise.”648
Though this flexibility allows “the guerrilla fighter [to invent] his own tactics at every minute of
the fight,”649 the decentralization of guerrilla bands does not imply a lack of order. Guerrilla
bands have strong hierarchies650, but the commands issued from the top are open enough to allow
for innovation by the fighters.
Even though guerrillas prize obscurity for most of their actions, the public audience is an
important part of their overall strategy. Guerrilla bands need anonymity so they can organize
and move effectively, but because their purpose is fundamentally political they must at times
attract attention with spectacles. This is important for countering the ubiquity of the state, which
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through its various functionaries and institutions can give the impression that its power is
absolute. One of guerrilla warfare’s goals is to interrupt the solidity of the state with highly
visible displays of violence, and to show the people and enemy soldiers that the state is not
impervious to harm. These can involve sabotage, destruction of property, executions, even
terrorism. Guerrilla fighters justify violence by saying that it is a reasonable response to the
violence committed by the state. Yet they caution against its misuse, for attacking the wrong
targets and endangering innocent lives jeopardizes the good will of the communities they rely on.
Mandela narrates how the state’s “ruthlessness and lawlessness” led him to advocate violence,
concluding “for me, nonviolence was not a moral principle but a strategy; there is no moral
goodness in using an ineffective weapon.”651 But upon the organization of a militant wing of the
ANC (the “Spear of the Nation”), it was decided that sabotage (of power plants, telephone lines,
and transportation links) should be the principle tactic and loss of life should be strictly
avoided.652 Che Guevara claims that sabotage targets should be chosen for how effectively they
paralyze society. For him, it is pointless to attack a soft-drink company because “a certain
number of workers are put out of a job but nothing is done to modify the rhythm of industrial
life,” yet it’s perfectly justified to attack a power plant because, though workers will be
displaced, it leads to “the paralysis of the life of the region.”653 Guevara goes further than
Mandela, claiming that loss of life is acceptable if “it is used to put to death some noted leader of
the oppressing forces well known for his cruelty, his efficiency in repression, or other quality
that makes his elimination useful.”654 While sabotage and executions are valuable for guerrilla
warfare inasmuch as they destroy the enemy’s capacities, they also instill fear in the elites being
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targeted655, and for this reason are not just military acts but messages to the population at
large.656 This game of ‘message sending’ is a hallmark of guerrilla warfare, for, as noted above,
the population is an important point of struggle. However, the message being sent is not always
positive. Intimidation is a much larger weapon in guerrilla warfare than it ever was in the
conventional revolutions of the US and France, and not just for the guerrillas. Pustay’s
counterinsurgency manual recommends the state “mete out stringent but legally appropriate
punishment to villagers found to be harboring insurgents or supplying them with food or other
contraband,”657 while guerrillas—through military operations and psychological warfare—
should be made to believe they face “inevitable defeat” and “that unless they surrender nothing
awaits them but death.”658 This is why, in so many of the US’s military interventions during the
latter half of the twentieth century, a key tactical component has been to coerce the population
with “displays of American military power”659 that demonstrate the US’s willingness to use force
to defend their interests. As Petraeus documents, this tactic was used in Korea in 1976660,
Lebanon and Grenada in 1983661, and Nicaragua in 1986.662
The highly visible, punctuated violence of sabotage and terrorism must be contrasted
with the other form of attack guerrilla’s employ: the constant engagement with the state’s forces.
In addition to causing massive public displays of violence, guerrillas regularly attack enemy
forces with guns to create a constant yet restrained stream of violence. The point of such

655

Ibid., 118.
Carlos Marighella, “From the ‘minimanual’” in The Guerrilla Reader (Temple University Press; Philadelphia,
1977), 227 and Alberto Bayo, “One Hundred Fifty Questions to a Guerrilla” in Strategy for Conquest, , 354-5.
657
Pustay, Counterinsurgency warfare, 97.
658
Ibid., 105.
659
Petraeus, American Military, 191.
660
Ibid., 157.
661
Ibid.191, and 199.
662
Ibid., 220.
656

202

exercises is not just to wear away at enemy forces, but to destroy morale.663 Guerrillas “shoot
and scoot,” attacking the enemy by surprise at potentially any moment of the day, inflicting
maximal casualties, then fleeing before the enemy can mount an effective defense. Mao writes,
The movements of guerrilla troops must be secret and of supernatural rapidity; the enemy
must be taken unaware, and the action entered speedily. There can be no procrastination
in the execution of the plan; no assumption of a negative or passive defense; no great
dispersion of forces in many local engagements. The basic method is the attack in a
violent and deceptive form.664
Because guerrillas spend so much time running away, it is important for them to know the
territory they are fighting in and to be able to move quickly over a variety of different terrains.665
Fighters have to be innovative, accommodating, and capable of living for extensive periods of
time with the bare necessities. Many guerrilla manuals emphasize the importance of being able
to ‘live the militant life’; that is, being completely sure of the justness of your cause, willing to
commit your body and soul to it, and prepared to sacrifice yourself for it. It may be necessary
for you to give up your life to ensure that a bombing goes off as planned, or to slow the advance
of the enemy so that the rest of the guerrillas get away, and guerrilla manuals emphasize that
such fidelity is one way guerrillas can make up for the disadvantages they have compared to their
enemy666. This sense of commitment, and of aligning your life with a higher purpose, is a
resource that—like the support of the locals—can even out the disparity between the state and
guerrillas. Like with the previous techniques, the state has recognized this resource and
developed countermeasures to it. They recommend using small scale operations instead of large
scale ones, and training troops to be adaptive and semi-autonomous.667 However, because the
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state’s army rarely consists of ‘people taking a principled stance’ but rather paid functionaries,
they do not have an easy equivalent to the militant life.
Though all the actions of guerrillas carry messages for the enemy and the people, many
of the tracts written about how to conduct guerrilla warfare emphasize the importance of setting
up a propaganda industry. It is important that the message of the war—why it is occurring, what
the guerrillas are doing to support it, and the benefits that already liberated areas have reaped—
reach the population. In addition, the creation and dissemination of propaganda gives those
lacking the constitution to fight yet sympathetic with the cause something to do.668 Guerrillas are
encouraged to use printing presses, radio towers, and even television stations to get their message
out. The chief goal of propaganda is to convince the indifferent and confused of the virtue of the
guerrilla’s cause by raising awareness of the state’s oppression. Guevara writes that
“[Propaganda] ought to create a consciousness of the great national problems, besides offering
sections of more lively interest for the reader.”669 Guerrillas reject intentional dishonesty, but
they do emphasize that the primary purpose of the news released by the propaganda machine is
to promote the guerrilla’s cause. The news gathering operation is to be controlled by the
guerrilla band itself, without any firewall separating those involved with news gathering from
those involved with advocacy.670 And propagandists are encouraged to only report those facts
which are sure to secure support for the cause or which are “directly related to the struggle for
liberation.”671 The implicit assumption is that propaganda must act as a countermeasure against
the biased media of the state, which produces lies and distortions about the guerrilla band and
their purpose (Pustay advocates the state create a “psychological-action program” for population
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control, though he says it should be focused on “description of government achievements and
future plans in socio-political reform and economic development”672). By making propaganda
an integral part of their cause, the guerrillas are able to tie the dissemination of information into
their militant lifestyles. Even those not actively involved in conflict can turn their everyday
actions into weapons.
Just like the American and French revolutions, successful revolutions conduced via
guerrilla warfare are able to create fields for dissident action and bring events to a point of
disruption. But whereas the American and French revolutions were aimed at an immanent
monarch (inasmuch as the revolutionaries identified with the same culture as the sovereign),
guerrilla revolutions have been aimed either at an occupying foreign power or an oppressive
government supported by one. Because of such differences guerrilla revolutions exemplify
another important aspect of revolutionary praxis: the radical. A radical is an aberrant product of
the state which acts as an agent in the production of disruptive effects. While not necessarily
physical people (radicals can be ideas, groups, forces, etc), radicals always come out of a system
that is becoming destabilized. This separates them from nihils and emergent properties (the two
forms of anomaly referred to in chapter 4). Whereas anomalies like nihils and emergent
properties can initiate the destabilization of a system, radicals are a product of such
destabilizations which contribute—through aberrant behaviors—to the overthrow of the state.
Radicals come from the catalytic change initiated by anomalies. States that are more dependent
upon violence and oppressive practices (perhaps as a response to an anomalous uprising) are
more likely to create radicals which, unless they are effectively removed from society
(imprisoned, executed, or otherwise effectively eliminated), will act counter to the state’s
interests. As products of the state, radicals are determined according to the projects of the state.
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What they are, and how they operate, is wholly a result of the state’s output. Yet their output—
that is, what they reflect back to the state, or how they take up and manipulate parts of the
state—is antithetical to the reproduction of the state. This can be seen in the propaganda
guerrillas advocate, which re-narrates events and facts to support revolution, and in their tactic of
sabotage, which appropriates the state’s transportation and energy infrastructure (among other
things) and returns it as unusable. We can also see how the state’s ideas become radical in
Mao’s treatment of the yin-yang and Mandela’s deployment of the idea of democracy. In both
cases, the ideas were originally used by the state as a way of ensuring its perpetuation, as the
Kuomintang employed the yin-yang to encourage nationalist pride in China’s Confucian
tradition and South African elites utilized democracy to promote working within the legal system
for political change. Yet Mao used the notion of yin and yang, and in particular its dialectical
movement, to illustrate the importance of continual reform and revolution673, while at his 1959
trial Mandela suggested that civil disobedience could be used in the name of achieving
democracy.674 The militant life described by guerrillas should be read as their attempt to build
radicality into their movement. By encouraging this lifestyle they can prevent radical behavior
and thought from being stamped out or incorporated back into the processes that form the state.
The attempt by guerrillas to turn radicality into a movement brings up another aspect of
revolution, which are the ordering and disordering effects that are present in every state. These
effects are the products of the movement of the state, and in particular the interactions of the
agents, objects, and processes found at any particular moment. Ordering effects are those which
go towards the promotion of the state, while disordering effects are those which go towards its
dissolution. Guerrilla manuals are full of ideas for how to create disordering effects, the most
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important of which I have discussed above. Unlike the American and French revolutionaries,
who adopted their revolutionary program wholesale from the state, guerrillas are encouraged to
think creatively about how to disrupt the state and to be, in essence, bricoleurs of revolution.
They are to use whatever means available, be it hillsides, nighttime, or abandoned weaponry, to
push for the state’s overthrow. They must be careful of the propensity for disordering effects to
become an ordering effects (and vice versa), for any action can have either effect given the right
context. Sabotage can end up promoting the state if it inconveniences too many people, while
terrorism can repel sympathizers if it targets innocents in large numbers. Because every ordering
and disordering effect is immanent to the state, the role they play is dependent upon the broader
context of the state and its movements. Revolutionaries must be canny about deploying them
even as they are militant in trying to bring the state to a moment of crisis.
It is this danger of hyper-militancy that has made guerrilla warfare risky, and at times
harmful to the cause of revolution. Because it is conducted so much from the shadows, its
methods are rarely subject to scrutiny. For instance, guerrilla groups in Laos who opposed the
Communist forces of Southeast Asia trafficked in heroin, relying upon material support from the
CIA.675 Evidence of this, as well as numerous other crimes carried out by US supported
militants, was hidden from the US Congress and the American people for years through
manipulation of the news media.676 And while revolutions never receive legitimacy or public
approval prior to their existence (except, perhaps, in spirit), revolutionaries occasionally apply
the exceptionality of their revolution to all their actions and, ultimately, to the government set up
afterwards. Rather than making the principles of their revolution the foundation of the next state,
these revolutionaries make themselves the foundation, becoming akin to a Hobbesian sovereign.
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In short, guerrilla warfare has a tendency to form a dogmatic or permanent vanguard. Such
vanguards fail to take into account the interconnectedness and the movements of the system as a
whole, focusing instead on their own band while protecting themselves with the claim that
anything done in the name of the revolution is justified. Highly undemocratic and brutal policies
are enacted by this self-appointed vanguard of the revolution, which often undermine the very
principles of the revolution. Following his victory, Fidel Castro tasked Committees for the
Defense of the Revolution with monitoring the population and reporting any signs of dissent,
among other things. These committees have been responsible for numerous violations of human
rights during their existence.677 Similarly, Mao’s Cultural Revolution lead to the persecution of
many dissidents and ethnic minorities in the name of preserving the legacy of the revolution. 678
Though such historical events are clearly not the result of one isolated factor, they could not have
occurred without those in power claiming to be guarding the revolution and justifying their
authoritarianism as an extension of the revolution’s legacy. Such practices are a misuse of
guerrilla warfare’s tactics of invisibility and violence, which, while perhaps justified as a way of
disordering the state and creating a point of disruption, cannot be justified as means of
governance. Instead of being programmatic about its tactics (as the revolutionaries of the French
and American revolutions were), guerrilla warfare is programmatic about how to be militant. It
enshrines one specific approach towards the state as the paragon of revolution, and justifies its
hold on power by claiming this approach is a necessary precondition to rule. Militancy for
guerrilla warfare means being fixed, unchanging. It is not for them an evolving and fluid affair.
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Guerrilla warriors who establish a vanguard in the state following their revolution end up
conducting guerrilla warfare on their own population.

Solidarity, Autobiography, and the Protracted Revolution
The third and final school of thought I will discuss is American black radicalism, which
is itself composed of several different approaches. Like the approaches I have already discussed,
Black radicalism has dealt with questions of dogmatic programs for revolution and the
appropriate type of militancy to use. It has debated the efficacy of integration vs. separation,
violence vs. nonviolence, and socialism vs. fundamentalism. What makes this debate important
is that it strategizes how to achieve revolution against socio-cultural forces instead of particular
governments. One reason there are so many different approaches advocated by black radicals is
because their task is not as straightforward as toppling the elites running a particular political
infrastructure and founding a new infrastructure afterwards. Because the problem stems from
ingrained ideologies, dogmatic practices, and enormous yet sluggish institutions, it is not
immediately clear which weapons to use and at whom to train them. Many of those standing in
the way of progress are nevertheless people of good intent, while many of those you would hope
to mobilize have been taught to see themselves as deserving of their subjugation. What makes
black radicalism fall within the scope of this investigation, despite the fact that its primary goal is
not the complete overthrow of a government, is that it calls for both the radical restructuring of
the social and ideological order and for that change to be reflected in politics itself. Though
there are strains of black thought that prescribe reform rather than revolution, I am focusing on
those strains that insist that a massive change in the social order is needed. The shift demanded
by black radicals within these latter strains is as substantial as that demanded by other schools of
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revolutionary thought. So whereas other revolutionaries demand egalitarian policies, black
radicals demand that egalitarian policies already in place be applied universally regardless of
race. And while other revolutionaries target political or economic elites, black radicals target
social or cultural elites and the racist forces that produce them. Because of this difference, the
approach black radicals take is more malleable and adaptable than the tactics of the American
and French Revolutions were and the tactics of guerrilla warfare are. This is necessarily the case
because the forces they are fighting, which have real and brutal consequences, are more
intangible, pervasive, and de-centered than are the enemies of those who have used these other
strategies. Even though black radicalism is faced with this difficulty, several tactics are
universally promoted throughout the corpus of black radical literature. I will go over each one
individually, describing both the conventional features and goals of each tactic as well as their
different interpretations. As I will show, black radicalism is significant because its singular
obstacle has led it to develop unique ways of attacking the state.
Among the most pervasive tactics advocated by black radicals is that of solidarity.
Though what that solidarity should consist of, and how it is to be brought about, is disputable,
there is universal agreement that it is a precondition for black liberation. Blacks must
communicate with each other and organize themselves into groups capable of responding
effectively to threats. Such solidarity is more intimate than being added to an email listserve or
joining the Rotary, as members of black radical groups often protect each other and encourage
the development of personal connections within the black community, in some circumstances
going so far as to operate with the same close-knit practices found in a military unit. At the end
of his life Malcolm X emphasized the danger of factionalism, saying of black groups that
“instead of them having any degree of coordination toward a common objective, usually they are
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divided and spend a lot of time either being suspicious of each other,”679 and highlighting the
importance of blacks recognizing “their humanity,…their own worth, and…their heritage.”680
The Black Panthers, in order to advance their agenda of—among other things—full education,
security, and human rights for all blacks, organized themselves into the “Black Liberation
Army,” complete with military titles, a weapons program, and mandatory education classes on
first aid, politics, and revolutionary ideology.681 The main point of contention when it comes to
the question of solidarity refers to who to organize, as certain strands of black radical thought
criticize the forming of alliances with whites or focusing on certain segments of the black
population. In general, black thinkers fall into four camps: those who advocate a qualified unity
with whites, those who focus on organizing blacks within the US, those who encourage unity
among all blacks worldwide, and those who call for a flexible approach to coalition building.
The reasons for these differences come from the possibilities and dangers that black radical
thinkers see coming from the inclusion or exclusion of certain groups in the fight against racism.
Those who argue for a qualified support with whites argue that the best results will come
when blacks and whites communicate with each other about the goals of society and take
responsibility for enfranchising blacks. They do not want to reduce the difference between
whites and blacks to nothing, but argue that independence requires whites and blacks to make
common cause with each other. Booker T. Washington says as much in discussing how blacks
can begin to show signs of civilization, saying “From every standpoint of interest it is the duty of
the Negro himself, and the duty of the Southern white man as well as the white man in the North,
to see that the Negro be helped forward as fast as possible towards the possession of these
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evidences of civilization.”682 The early W.E.B Du Bois began his political program with the
belief that whites were simply ignorant of their actions, and that by educating them it would be
possible to get their support for policies improving the condition of blacks. Against the naiveté
of whites Du Bois advocated “Truth: carefully gathered scientific proof that neither color nor
race determined the limits of a man’s capacity or desert,”683 at which point it would be possible
for both races to begin to address the problems afflicting blacks together. The call for racial
harmony is criticized by black radicals of the other camps, who insist that nothing will be given
blacks without a movement compelling whites to change, for it is not simply ignorance but
prejudice, avarice, and privilege that entrench racial disparity. Frederick Douglass is well known
for advocating such a struggle, saying “Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did
and it never will.”684 Those who focus on the mobilization of blacks within the US believe that
by militantly resisting the pressure to conform to white standards of behavior, blacks can
overcome these other forces. Whites can be involved, but they cannot subordinate the interests
of blacks to their own. While not opposed to working with those outside the US, those following
this school of thought believe doing so is not as important as is organizing blacks directly
affected by the ills of this country. The founding documents of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC) have as their first aim the achievement of “full citizenship rights,
equality, and the integration of the Negro in all aspects of American life,” and advocate focusing
on organizing blacks in the south.685 The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC),
though it identifies with “the African struggle as a concern for all mankind”, only organized
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students on campuses in the South and asked President Eisenhower to “lend the prestige of his
office to the solution of the racial problem in this country.”686 The implicit claim of this tactic is
that it is simpler and more effective to control a local or nationally focused group than an
international group. This is one reason why numerous individuals and organizations became
upset when Martin Luther King Jr. began to speak out about the Vietnam War, as they felt that
King, by engaging the problems of Southeast Asia, had diminished his utility to his cause.687
Opposing this argument is the claim that uniting blacks around the world actually
increases one’s strength. Pan-Africanists like the later W.E.B. Du Bois, Back-to-Africa
advocates like Marcus Garvey, and Black Power activists like the Black Panthers all call for the
creation of an international body that can promote the interests of blacks. Garvey’s Universal
Negro Improvement Association “seeks to emancipate the Negro everywhere [as well as] a free
and redeemed Africa,”688 giving blacks safety and teaching them self-reliance.689 Similarly,
Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, in Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in
America, identify their movement with the building of a worldwide anti-colonial force690, and
Fanon advocates for the unification of all colonized people to route colonial forces.691 Given the
significant numbers of blacks throughout the world, a unified struggle of all peoples of African
descent is said to be more effective than fighting colonialism and racism independently in every
country in which it exists. In addition, results will come quicker as more pressure can be brought
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to bear with greater expediency.692 Yet some claim even this tactic is limiting and dangerous.
As any coalition excludes some and includes others, we must be careful about how we define our
community. An overly rigid concept of blackness—even one which includes blacks
worldwide—can entrench a certain concept of blackness while subordinating other concerns
(such as gender and class discrimination) to this one conception. Without including a critique of
black identity within the coalition building that one does, one risks perpetuating dangerous
systems of power and alienating potential allies. For this reason, several contemporary black
radicals emphasize an variable and plural approach to solidarity. Angela Davis says “it is
important to recognize the various forms of agency with which identities can be and are
constructed, in order not to get stuck in them,” concluding that “ideological affinity is not
essential to coalition work” and that it is more important to work on issues and raise questions
than focus on achieving purity within one’s coalition.693 Manning Marable agrees, emphasizing
that community itself is a site of struggle and that only through building partnerships across
identities can we reach our goals.694 This final approach concludes that the importance of
solidarity comes more from the practice of it than who one unifies with. Because racism can
change form, black radicals must vary their partners in order to respond to the new challenges it
poses.
Another prominent tactic utilized by black radicals is planning a nuanced approach to the
system of racist oppression. Lacking an obvious physical target and faced with a racism that
pervades institutions, practices, and thoughts, black radicals expend great effort considering how
to create a militant and effective resistance. What weak points within the system can be
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manipulated to cause a massive disruption? How can one avoid harming people of good faith
who nevertheless act as stewards of the system? The three approaches generally prescribed by
black radicals include directly engaging the system, building a separate system outside the
current one, and using a mix of the first two (an inside-outside approach). The first approach,
used by Washington, Du Bois, and the Civil Rights movement, can mean working within the
avenues for change given by the state or it can mean applying force directly to the state. The
former was one of Washington’s chief tactics, and he was relentless in pushing for change using
legal means. “If the law is disregarded when a Negro is concerned, it will soon be disregarded
when a white man is concerned” he says, “and, besides, the rule of the mob destroys the friendly
relations which should exist between the races…”695 In addition to founding the Tuskegee
Institute and encouraging black entrepreneurship, he also pressured Presidents Roosevelt and
Taft to pass laws correcting unequal treatment of blacks.696 Washington condemned all
violations of the law, advocating that whites and blacks be tried and punished equally.697 It is
this last point that later black radicals advocating direct engagement with the system questioned.
According to them, it is unjust to follow an unjust law, and if courts and politicians are unwilling
to address the injustice then citizens have an obligation to disobey so as to bring attention to it.
Much of this resistance was framed around the philosophy of nonviolence, especially in the
period directly after World War II. Sit-ins compelled the desegregation of lunch counters,
freedom rides drew attention to discrimination by bus lines, and freedom schools taught blacks
skills neglected by the underfunded and racist educational system. For Bayard Rustin,
nonviolence was vital as it was both “consistent with the ends [blacks] desire” and a “practical
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necessity”698 given the forces arrayed against them. There is a trade-off inasmuch as
nonviolence seems to take longer and open oneself to serious harm, but as Howard Zinn writes in
his account of SNCC, “…to seek justice at any cost may result in bloodshed so great that its evil
overshadows everything else and splatters the goal beyond all recognition. The problem is to
weigh carefully the alternatives, so as to achieve the maximum of social progress with a
minimum of pain.”699 While some black radicals endorse violence in self-defense700, only rarely
has it been advocated as a tactic with which to attack the system. Nat Turner’s 1831 rebellion is
a notable exception to this, as is Jesse McDade’s defense of the ethics of revolution. As McDade
says, “…if one moves against oppression he moves against other men. This is one of the
antinomies of action, namely, that one cannot act for man without acting against men.”701
Though she admits that it is preferable to avoid loss of life702, and that one’s means must be
considered carefully703, violence and revolution are preferable to letting an unjust system
stand.704 The inviolable necessity of freedom, and the importance of having a system that
recognizes it, justifies using violence in more than just self-defense.
For most of the twentieth century the primary alternative to direct engagement was the
withdrawal approach, whereby blacks disengage entirely from the state and create their own.
The principal line of argument in support of this is that blacks will never be able to achieve selfdetermination and freedom in a system constructed and run by whites. The oppressor never
698
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willingly frees the oppressed, though at times the former may throw scraps towards the latter to
assuage the ire. According to those advocating withdrawal, scraps is all working within the
system gets you. True freedom will remain elusive until blacks take responsibility for their own
security, their own community, and their own liberation. Only once that is achieved should
blacks engage whites, at which point both sides can engage the other as equals. Marcus Garvey
was one of the first to advocate this approach with his plan of getting all black Americans to
return to Africa. From there, blacks can create a system they control, and are not dependent
upon the good will of white elites.
Negroes, get busy building a nation of your own, for neither Europe nor America will
tolerate us as competitors in another half century. Let’s get busy now, and…fight for
those ideals that are possible—not to ever see a black President, Cabinet Officer, or
Mayor in the country or state where the white man forms the majority population, but of
ourselves to build up Africa, where our race will have the opportunity to rise to the
highest positions in society, industry, and government.705
Garvey, like others who hold this position, believes in the purity of the black race, prescribing
tactics based on how that purity can be preserved.706 What changes about the approach is where
and how separation should occur, for after Garvey the idea of migrating to Africa is emphasized
less. More suggest that the separation should occur through the creation of a black nation within
the US nation. As a minister of the Nation of Islam Malcolm X advocated for a black homeland
to be set aside within the US707 while the Black Panthers called for a de-centralized collection of
sovereign black communities and organizations spread throughout society.708 Even whites with
good intentions would be barred from participation, as their presence alone could perpetuate
white supremacy. Only through ‘doing it on their own’ would blacks achieve “full participation
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in the decision-making processes affecting the lives of black people” and “recognition of the
virtues in themselves as black people.”709 The full empowerment of blacks requires the least
amount of conditioning by whites as possible.
The mixed inside-outside approach sees flaws in both approaches. It recognizes that
spending all of one’s time engaging the system leaves one hamstrung by the system, with only
gradual reforms ever resulting from one’s actions. Similarly, leaving the system makes one
powerless and impotent. The greatest amount of change results from a combination of both
approaches. Marable eloquently describes this approach, saying
We must build a powerful, multiracial coalition of labor, women, and other potential
allies inside the progressive party-in-the-party. Yet we cannot transform the system by
working on the inside alone. Outside challenges must raise the issues of racism, sexism,
poverty, and powerlessness and must occur simultaneously with electoral work—teachins, demonstrations, neighborhood organizing, civil disobedience, and every form of
nonelectoral protest.710
Holding too firmly to one tactic or the other, one risks losing the momentum that makes a
movement successful. In addition, being too firmly inside or outside allows one’s enemies to coopt one’s progress or render one mute within political discourse. The inside-outside approach is
more nuanced and accommodating, allowing one to react to new developments and modify one’s
tactics as needed. It allows for the recognition of new forms of racism, the partnering with other
groups with similar causes, and the critique of dangerous forces within one’s revolutionary
movement. People advocating the inside-outside approach have been more amenable to
partnering with the labor movement and communist groups, and have also made important
feminist critiques of black liberation movements. And they can respond more quickly and
immediately to new forms of racism, such as how prisons are being used as a way of
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disenfranchising blacks. It is towards this accommodating approach that Malcolm X was
moving towards the end of his life, as he found that his philosophy of Black Nationalism was
“alienating people who were true revolutionaries dedicated to overturning the system of
exploitation,”711 saying that “I for one will join in with anyone, I don’t care what color you are,
as long as you want to change the miserable condition that exists on this earth.”712 Reflecting on
the legacy of Malcolm, Angela Davis writes that the slogan ‘By Any Means Necessary’ needn’t
just mean the tactics used to change the system, but also “the means necessary to rethink and
reshape the contours of our political activism.”713 An inside-outside approach that lacks a
dogmatic method and centralized base of operations (either within the system or without) has the
ability to adjust to the system without losing its ability to meaningfully affect the system.
The final tactic I will discuss with regard to black radicalism is autobiography. The
telling of personal stories illustrative of the problems of racism conveys the harm of racism and
its many intricacies far more powerfully than a purely abstract account would. By narrating their
individual experiences of being excluded, degraded, objectified, or worse, black radicals are able
to make the often unseen practices of racism tangible. Whites, often inoculated from
encountering their own racism, are compelled to reexamine their own behavior, while blacks, by
sharing such experiences, see the systemic qualities of racism. In effect, autobiography becomes
a tactic of resistance by making racism real while building relationships of responsibility and
solidarity which can be used to combat it. One of the most well known examples of
autobiography by a black radical, The Autobiography of Malcolm X, began because, as Alex
Haley recounts, Malcolm thought it would be a good way of “[helping] people to appreciate
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better how Mr. Muhammad [the leader of the Nation of Islam] salvages people”714 While
Malcolm may have primarily been interested in the effect the text would have on blacks, it is
evident that its account of personal metamorphosis and steadfast commitment to revolutionary
action has had a profound effect on whites as well.715 Not only did it provide an inspiring
example of an important figure, but it fleshed out the gaps in the public perception of Malcolm
received from politicians and journalists. It gave Malcolm a chance to communicate more
directly with his audience, in essence recapturing for himself a measure of agency lost when his
voice was interpreted by the white state. This recapturing of agency, and reframing of
commonly held ‘truths’, is something George Yancy speaks about in his discussion of Frederick
Douglass’s autobiography, saying “through the process of narrating his ex-istence, Douglass
challenged the racist assumption that Black people have no perspective on the world…[and] he
defied and challenged the caricatured myths and normativity of whiteness.”716 The presence of
the black voice, and the importance of its story, comes across in a more clear and compelling
manner when recited through autobiography. It comes as no surprise that so many black radicals
have used this strategy717, for it rehabilitates a power racism has long denied them: the ability to
decide who they are.
The question of who and how to organize resistance to racism demonstrates another vital
aspect of revolutionary praxis—the importance of building dynamic and reactive networks. By
this I mean something similar to what black radicals refer to when discussing coalitions and
community: an arrangement of relationships capable of responding quickly to incidents. All the
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pieces of such revolutionary networks already exist in the state; the task of revolutionaries is
create an awareness of the network among its parts. This act slightly alters the role the
individual agents, and the network as a whole, play in the state, giving it a more revolutionary
purpose. The network can be cemented by building new relationships between the parts while
reinforcing those that already exist. The production of these fluid, militant, and—most
important—conscious networks creates new agents within the state capable of more efficiently
pushing a state to a moment of disruption. Revolutions stand or fail by how quickly allies can be
mobilized and how firm the relationships within the network are. Networks that can react
quickly to actions by the state (for example, the worldwide support Angela Davis received
during her imprisonment and trial) or reproduce disruptive forms of behavior throughout the
state (such as how civil disobedience spread all over the South during the civil rights era) are
more effective at achieving their goals and more resilient to attack. The networks that black
radicals tried to form were a way of resisting the state’s method of cutting up and isolating
people to prevent effective opposition. Building connections across age groups, geographic
locations, and even color lines provides more resources to draw upon in times of social upheaval
and a greater degree of agency in producing a situation amenable to revolution. The question is
how to frame your network so that it is flexible and resilient without being so lax that it cannot
pull together when needed. The Organization of Afro-American Unity was so disorganized that,
without the charismatic personality of Malcolm X to hold it together, it collapsed718, while, as
Manning Marable points out, Marxists have never been able to build a strong coalition with
people of color because of their authoritarian structure.719 Every network must have a
compelling center that keeps people organized and mobilized, but that center cannot be too
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rigid—or the network too inflexible—without becoming elitist and alienating allies. The most
effective network is one which is itself centered around an ideal or a goal, but in which no part of
the network is itself the center. The network must be allowed to evolve, while the center itself
must be reexamined and critiqued periodically to ensure that it is still represents the goal people
are interested in pursuing. No network should see itself as permanently necessary, as there may
come a time when circumstances and the good of the cause require a network to disband. This
means of organizing revolutionary movements works well because it takes advantage of the
inherent dynamism and complexity of systems. Rather than trying to create another static and
determinate system to replace the current one, this method of organizing draws from one of the
benefits revolutionaries always have on their side—that every system is by its nature dynamic.
By using adaptive and reactive networks revolutionaries can maintain their presence even as the
state changes in response to them, updating their allies and practices as needed to confront new
challenges. Only in this way will a revolutionary network be both dynamic yet durable.
The final point I want to bring up with regard to black radicalism is their approach to
changing the state. Whereas the other strategies for revolution I’ve discussed attack the state to
achieve victory, black radicalism is more interested in short-circuiting it. Though black radicals
often frame what they are doing as attacking the system720, very rarely do they advocate the
formation of an army whose purpose is to attack white armies, depose white politicians, and
seize control of the capital. The purpose of the tactics used by Washington, Du Bois, Garvey,
SNCC, the Black Panthers, and others was to rewire parts of the state so that its normal circuitry
became a problem. White society has long relied on blacks—for labor, for consumption of their
products, for entertainment, and a variety of other purposes. In addition, white identity as
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dominant depends upon black acceptance of their role as subservient. Instead of full scale revolt,
black radicals attempt to undermine this system by blocking or altering the function of the forces
pushing blacks to play these roles. Booker T Washington worked for the education of blacks so
they would not reestablish old black stereotypes with their behavior and action. Blacks in the
Civil Rights movement purposefully avoided ‘black spaces’ and ‘black behaviors,’ resisting
constant attempts by police to send them back. The Black Panthers informed and armed
themselves so that they could ‘monitor the monitors’ and care for their community. White
society’s need for blacks was put in direct confrontation with their racist antipathy. As I
discussed above, the question of the most effective way to short circuit the state (from inside,
outside, or both) is an important one, as it raises the issue of what is the most effective way to
undermine the state’s foundations. Yet as a strategy, short-circuiting is significantly different
from guerrilla warfare and the American and French revolutions. It attempts to map out the state
in advance, and tailors its tactics in response to specific circumstances. Because it is not as
concerned with demolishing the state, but with creating a movement that will radically transform
it, it is better prepared to respond to the destruction of the old state with ideas about constructing
a new one. As a result, it is able to resist some of the bloody epilogues that have followed other
revolutions.
Though at times black radicalism has employed overly programmatic tactics and been
guilty of hyper-militancy, it has also developed solutions to those problems. The emphasis on
community by so many black groups prevents too much reliance on one doctrine, instead
operating with a more flexible, grassroots approach. Similarly, the focus on an inside-outside
approach prevents excessive militancy. In fact, because black radicalism has been quite
meticulous about critiquing itself, and because it represents a variety of viewpoints, there are
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very few critiques to be made. Nevertheless, there are two criticisms that, while they have to
some degree been picked up by black radicals already, bear repeating through the lens of
dynamic anarchism. The first has to do with how black radicals position themselves in
relationship to the state. As I have already shown, one strand of thought (which began in
germinal form with Booker T Washington, then continued through Garvey, early Malcolm X, the
Nation of Islam, and the Black Panthers) advocates the tactic of separation from the state.
Underlying this tactic is the claim that blacks represent an absolute Other, or a voice wholly
precluded from the white world. Fanon illustrates this when he says “between the white man and
me the connection was irrevocably one of transcendence.”721 As I showed in the last chapter, if
blacks were truly Other—that is, exiled to the outside—they would be completely invisible, to
the point where they could have no interaction with the white world and the white world could
have no interaction with them. Without diminishing the extent of anti-black discrimination and
the suffering it has caused, it is inaccurate to portray blacks as separated from the state. Blacks
have a presence within the state, though it is thoroughly unequal to whites and has a long history
of oppression. It is more accurate to say that blacks and whites occupy different layers within
the state, and that instead of excluding blacks from the world whites have attempted to control
and speak for blacks. This is an important distinction because when blackness is portrayed as a
voice from outside the world it effectively insulates itself from all critique and interconnection
with other parts of the state. As the outside blackness is noumenal, and is able to critique the
state without opening itself to criticism. Some race activists reject any criticism coming from
whites (or any race other than theirs) as being irrelevant to their experience and thus capable of
being disregarded. Many excellent race activists do not do this, but it is a tendency that needs to
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be avoided, especially as it tries to turn that race into a foundation of another state, in essence
treating whiteness as whiteness has treated them. The interconnectivity of the world means that
to critique the world is to open oneself to change too, for the system of white supremacy cannot
be torn down without blackness being affected too. This does not mean that the tactics
recommended by individuals and groups holding this perspective are wrong, but that how they
work and what their goal is must be reframed.
Finally, Dynamic Anarchism suggests that black radicals must shift their perception of
their enemy. As I have shown, the history of black radical thought is filled with reassessments of
previous strategies and prescriptions for what to do in the future. In many of these
reassessments, the reason why someone or something is considered to have failed is because
‘they didn’t understand the problem fully.’ W.E.B. Du Bois doesn’t get the importance of
empowering blacks economically and politically, says Garvey.722 The black middle class doesn’t
grasp the necessity of fighting against the system, says Le Roi James.723 Black women have a
unique perspective on black liberation that must be considered, says Angela Davis.724 Implied
by many of these reassessments is that while racism does at times change how it manifests itself,
it has a central core that defines it. Black radicals just need to find the right formula of resistance
and it can be put to an end. It is more likely, given the behavior of systems, that racism is highly
mobile, fluid, and resilient. Because it has no central core but only a variety of manifestations,
there is no best strategy for solving it, nor does the fact that one strategy failed mean it was
wrong. Racism evolves in response to resistance to it, and the best approach to combat it is to be
open to the development of new tactics and unfazed when they fail. Nonviolence was not
necessarily a misstep, as some say, but that does not mean it will be permanently effective.
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Similarly, the militancy of the Black Power movement may have achieved important results in
the 1970s, but this does not make its dissolution a disappointment. The perception of whiteness
and racism must be de-centered—not because it doesn’t have definable characteristics at certain
points in time, but because those effects stem from a dispersed and interconnected system
capable of significant transformations that perpetuate anti-black oppression in many ways.
Echoing Marable’s claim that community must be a site of struggle, I believe resistance itself is
also such a site.

Revolutionary Cascades
A way of summarizing all that has been said here is that Dynamic Anarchism provides a
method for transforming moving systems without regarding those systems as permanently
centered or ordered. Systems are in a state of flux and lack any definitive order; thus the project
of resisting them cannot forever utilize the same strategy. To demonstrate this we can once
again turn to Badiou, who claims that militancy “permanently affirms the existence of that which
has no name”725 and that the goal of radical politics is “to find another disposition between
masses, classes, parties; another composition of the political field…”726 If we apply this logic to
the question of resistance, then we see how tactics of resistance must be constantly reassessed
and developed anew. We may not be able to avoid drawing them from the state, but we can push
them to their limits, combine them with others, deploy them in new contexts, or reverse their
manner of application, among many other options. The best way to get to a point of disruption,
to produce radicals, to utilize active and reactive networks, and to employ all the features of
revolution discussed in this chapter will change depending upon the particularities of the state

725
726

Badiou, Philosophy for Militants, trans, Bruno Bosteels (Verso; Brooklyn, 2012), 76.
Ibid., 78.

226

being opposed. Protests that work well in one context will fail in another, while nonviolence will
be unable to accomplish the same goal everywhere it is used.
Dynamic Anarchism diverges from Badiou on the question of militancy when it comes to
encouraging fidelity. For Badiou militancy is as simple as rigorously affirming the “fictions” (or
truth-procedures) that bring about the politics you desire. The problem with politics, as Badiou
sees it, “is the lack of a great fiction as support for a great belief. Thus, the final belief in generic
truths, the final possibility of opposing the generic will to normal desires, this type of possibility
and the belief in this sort of possibility, in generic truths, has to be our new fiction.”727 The
danger of doing that in a moving, interconnected system, however, is that you cannot be sure,
when the new fiction is introduced into the present state, that it will bring about the state you
want. Unseen contingencies could subvert one’s momentum, taking one’s “fiction” down a
different path than the one expected. Marxist doctrines have been used in a whole host of ways
that Marx himself would have found objectionable. And in the early 1960s, Malcolm X’s ideas
aimed at empowering African Americans were picked up and supported by the Ku Klux Klan.
Alternatively, it is always unclear, prior to the institution of the new state, that it will function as
intended. As Foucault writes, new configurations of power-knowledge emerge from
“substitutions, displacements, disguised conquests, and systematic reversals.”728 Similarly, in
dynamic systems such events happen over and over as their different pieces interact, making the
process of transforming a state much more unpredictable than Badiou’s form of militancy would
suggest. The fidelity Badiou advocates towards fictions is dangerous for the way in which those
fictions can yield vastly different results depending on how the system they are interacting with
moves. In contrast to Badiou, Dynamic Anarchism claims that what is needed is not new fictions
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but new arrangements of subjects, objects, and forces. The formulaic and generic truths
advocated by Badiou must be replaced with actual moving networks. The descriptions of how
these systems work must not precede the systems (as Badiou’s fictions precede the state they
instantiate) but develop alongside them. These arrangements can, and should, be altered when
and if a reversal occurs that jeopardizes the revolution’s goals. There is still room for militancy
inasmuch as these arrangements will ultimately be aimed at achieving ends desired by
revolutionaries. But whereas Badiou’s concept of fidelity fixes on an abstraction, Dynamic
Anarchism fixes on how best to create a productive relationship between ends desired and the
arrangements necessary to achieve them.
If there is something radical about the strategy I have outlined which separates it from
others, it is that I hope to have put to rest the claim that revolution must proceed from outside the
state. This trope—repeated endlessly throughout revolutionary literature—has led
revolutionaries on an incessant journey to try to discover what is beyond the state and firmly
plant themselves there. This is why it is common for revolutionaries to castigate other, disliked
advocates for change for being “puppets” of the elites, lacking authentic radical credentials
because they are too wedded to the dominant power structure. Real revolutionaries, they claim,
fight power from the outside, not depending upon the state but only on others who act from the
same place. One of the fundamental claims of Dynamic Anarchism is that this ‘journey’ is a
fool’s errand, as it is impossible to exist without some connection to the state. Radicals can
attack the state from a vast number of places within the state, but not from the outside. Rather,
as the “inside-outside” debate within black radicalism demonstrates, it is more productive for
revolutionaries to hit the state from a variety of locations, using a mixture of tactics. It is harder
for the state to isolate and marginalize a revolutionary movement that is embedded throughout
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itself than it is a centrally located band of rebels. This is easily demonstrated by looking at
revolutionary history, for even when small bands did much of the work of revolution, their
success was dependent upon the support of the population. It is important that revolutionaries
cease the futile endeavor to find the outside of the state and the oft divisive discourse about how
those who remain within are “lackeys” or “pawns.” This does not mean revolutionaries should
cease critique about the ways in which state power is being repeated through their actions, or
how new strategies may be able to overcome previous impediments. What I am opposing is the
manner of discourse which treats being ensconced within the state as a pejorative. A diversified,
collaborative, yet militant approach, both with regard to where one acts from and the tactics one
uses, has a greater chance of success. This does not mean that it will never be necessary to use
small, well-armed groups to carry out objectives that are kept secret from the rest of the
revolutionaries spread throughout the population. It does necessitate that the overall strategy of
revolution should not be based primarily upon the actions of such groups to the exclusion of
others.
There is much more to be said about the praxis of revolution than can be said here.
Conducting a revolution is never a staid affair. It requires great insight, observation, and
perseverance. Militancy must be combined with flexibility to prevent the state from assimilating
a revolution’s movement into the forces that perpetuate it. This requires a firm grasp of the
state’s system—including the agents and movements that compose it—as well as the acumen to
apply pressure in just the right way. The weak points of each state will differ, but the features of
revolution I have pointed to in this chapter should help make them visible. By seeking out fields
and radicals and cultivating their destabilizing effects one begins using the processes of the state
to undermine the state’s foundations, as the state must begin to transform itself to handle these
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new and unexpected elements. As the state tries to reground itself, revolutionaries can use the
dynamic and reactive networks to broadcast their cause while manipulating the ordering and
disordering effects to push the state further and further from its old ground. Eventually, the old
foundations will become untenable, and the state will reach a point of disruption where the forces
within it no longer go towards its formation but its dissolution. As important as getting to this
point is for revolution, it is vital that revolutionaries keep abreast of the rapid changes that are
occurring and respond to them to prevent a catastrophic outcome. This does not mean
dominating the system and forcing it to comply with your will, but harmonizing with it and
mediating it, keeping in mind the dual poles of militancy and flexibility. Build a sustainable,
resilient state grounded in the foundations that will best allow society to flourish. This demands
openness to change and movement, for rigid states easily crumble, but also respect for
interdependency and the harms that a state which is too ungrounded can have. As Arendt says,
the state must provide a “space where freedom can occur”729 There is much left to be
determined by each revolutionary within their own context, but this framework provides a
starting point. It will not repeat the old state because, unlike other theories of revolution, the
features of revolution designated in this chapter name movements which contribute to the
dissolution of states. The only ontological commitment made is to the irreducibility of radical
change present within all states. And the only program advocated is the exploitation of said
movements for the purpose of creating revolution.
At the height of a revolution there comes an imperceptible point which carries the old
state away as it passes. The system that was now isn’t, and its former pieces topple from their
position of authority like a cascading falls. Possibilities burst forth for consideration, though
feelings of jubilation are inevitably accompanied by uncertainty about the future. Everyone must
729
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soon set about the work of statecraft, but for evermore they can reflect upon that moment of
creation. The moment won’t prevent the state from faltering in a multitude of ways as it changes
and grows, but if the revolution has been successful it will have carved the proper foundations
into the heart of the state. And as people look back, they can remember that moment proudly as
the moment the impossible was achieved.
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